




























ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Tilburg, 
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof.dr. F.A. van der Duyn Schouten, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college 
voor promoties aangewezen commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op 









PROMOTOR:   Prof. Dr. Luc Renneboog 














This thesis is the outcome of my doctoral research carried out at CentER, Tilburg 
University over the period 2002-2006. I would like to express my gratitude to those who have 
contributed to the thesis.  
First of all, my special words of appreciation go to my supervisors, Luc Renneboog and 
Jenke ter Horst. I am sincerely grateful to both Luc and Jenke for their support and effort spent 
on my research during the past four years. I benefited enormously from their invaluable 
expertise, insightful comments, and excellent supervision. Their advice and support have been 
very important for my professional development, in terms of both research and teaching. It has 
been very pleasant and productive to work with Luc and Jenke, and I hope that we will continue 
research cooperation in the future. 
I would like to express my gratitude to other members of my dissertation committee: Stijn 
Claessens (World Bank), Piet Duffhues, Marc Goergen (University of Sheffield), Kees Koedijk 
(RSM Erasmus University), Massimo Massa (INSEAD), and Bas Werker. I highly appreciate 
their effort spent on assessing the thesis. Their suggestions are invaluable and helped me a lot to 
improve the thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank my coauthors of some of the essays 
included in the thesis, Frederic Palomino, Charles Bellemare, Michaela Krause, and Sabine 
Kröger, for their contribution and research cooperation.  
I am grateful to my colleagues at the Department of Finance, and the Department of 
Economics (where I spent the first year of my PhD). In particular, I would like to thank Lieven 
Baele, Fabio Braggion, Joachim Inkmann, Bertrand Melenberg, Steven Ongena, Jan Potters, and 
Arthur van Soest for their help and support. I have enjoyed a lot sharing the office with Emilia, 
Greg, Cal and Eduard, at different stages of the study. I would also like to thank my fellow 
finance students, Norbert, Marina, and Marta, with whom we shared the unforgotten PhD 
experience from the beginning to the end.  
Many thanks go to my PhD friends in Tilburg (Yuan, Qin Tu, Youwei, Yue, Zhen, Jiajia, 
Attila, Amar, and many others) and in other universities (Yu, Tao, and Rong) for the colorful 
times we spent together. I would also like to thank my flat-mates from Prof. Verbenelaan 90 where I lived during 2000-2004: Mark, Raoul, Wilco, Andreas, Arnaud, and others, with whom 
we shared many happy moments. They contributed to the core of my Dutch experience.  
Last but not least, I would like to say thank you very much to my wife Hui Jiang. This 
thesis is devoted to her.  
                                      
Chendi Zhang 
 
August 2006, Tilburg  
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
1.  Introduction                                       1 
 
I   Ethical Investments                           
 
2.  Socially Responsible Investments: Methodology, Risk Exposure and Performance  5 
2.1  Introduction                           5 
2.2  Institutional background of SRI                     6 
2.2.1  History of SRI                        6 
2.2.2  The market of SRI                       8 
2.2.3  Regulatory background                    10 
2.2.4  Investment screens                     12 
2.3  Firm-level analysis on SRI                     15 
2.3.1  Theoretical background                   15 
2.3.2  Empirical evidence                     18 
2.4  Performance evaluation of mutual funds                 22 
2.4.1  Mean-variance analysis                                                                             23 
2.4.2  Performance evaluation methodologies               26 
2.4.3  Related performance measures                 31 
2.5  Portfolio-level analysis on SRI                   34 
2.5.1  Research hypotheses and methodologies               34 
2.5.2  Performance of SRI funds in the US                 36 
2.5.3  Performance of SRI funds in the UK                42 
2.5.4  Performance of international SRI funds                43 
2.5.5  Money-flows of international SRI funds               46 
2.6  Conclusion                        48 
 
3.  Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?                    49  
3.1  Introduction                        49 
3.2  Institutional background                      52 
3.3  Data and methodology                     54 
3.3.1  Sample selection                     54 
3.3.2  Summary statistics                     60 3.4  The determinants of money-flows                   65 
3.4.1  Flows and past performance                   65 
3.4.2  Flows and past relative performance                 72 
3.4.3  Flows and persistence in past performance               75 
3.5  Money-flow volatility                      78 
3.6  Money-flows and future performance                 80 
3.6.1  Money-flows and future returns                 81 
3.6.2  Money-flows and persistence in future performance                                83 
3.7  Conclusion                        86 
3.A  Summary of economic effects                   88 
 
4.  The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds               91 
4.1  Introduction                        91 
4.2  Data                           94 
4.2.1  Ethical and conventional mutual funds               94 
4.2.2  Social and ethical objectives                   97 
4.2.3  Benchmarks                       99 
4.3  Returns  and  risk                     100 
4.3.1  Doing well by doing good?                 100 
4.3.2  Does ethical risk matter?                 106 
4.3.3  How do returns and risk evolve over time?             108 
4.3.4  Time-varying risk loadings and market timing           110 
4.3.5  Is there a cost of inadequate diversification of risk?           113 
4.4  Is there a ‘smart money’ effect?                 115 
4.5  Determinants of returns and risk                 118 
4.5.1  Determinants of returns                 118 
4.5.2  Determinants of risk                   121 
4.6  Conclusion                    124 
 
II   Investor Behavior 
 
5.  Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market: the Peculiar Case 
of Betting Markets                              129 
5.1  Introduction                    129 
5.2  The fixed-odds betting system                  133 
5.3  Data  description                     134 
5.4  Methodology                    136 
5.4.1  From betting odds to expectations about game outcomes         136 
5.4.2  Abnormal return computation                138 
5.5  Results                     139 5.5.1  Stock price and trading volume reactions to game results         139 
5.5.2  Can betting odds predict game results?             145  
5.5.3  Stock price and trading volume reactions to the release of betting odds148 
5.6  Robustness of the findings                   153 
5.6.1  Construction of the prediction variables from betting odds         153 
5.6.2  Team  media  coverage                  154 
5.6.3  Econometric  issues                    154 
5.7  Conclusion                    155 
 
6.  Myopic Loss Aversion: Information Feedback vs. Investment Flexibility       157  
6.1  Introduction                    157 
6.2  Test design and procedure                   158 
6.2.1  Treatment  H                   159 
6.2.2  Treatment  L                   159 
6.2.3  Treatment  M                   159 
6.3  Results                     160 
6.4  Conclusion                    161 
6.A  Instructions of the experiment                162 
 
Samenvatting (Dutch Summary)                    165 
 
Bibliography                     167 
 







This thesis consists of two parts. The first part, titled Ethical Investments, investigates the 
money-flows and risk-return characteristics of ethical mutual funds around the world. The 
second part, titled Investor Behavior, examines the impact of the salience of information and the 
frequency of information feedback on investors’ reactions to news and attitudes towards risk. 
This introductory chapter describes the research questions and main findings of each of the 
chapters. 
Part I of the thesis analyzes socially responsible investments (SRI), which are often also 
called ethical investments or sustainable investments. Over the past decade, socially responsible 
investments have experienced an explosive growth around the world. Particular to the SRI funds 
is that both financial goals and social objectives are pursued. Chapter 2, titled Socially 
Responsible Investments: Methodology, Risk Exposure and Performance, gives an extensive 
review of the literature on SRI. The chapter starts with the historical roots, the market 
development and regulatory background of SRI, followed by a discussion of the theories on 
shareholder- versus stakeholder-value orientations of companies. We describe the empirical 
evidence on the relation between firm value and corporate social responsibility (CSR), defined 
as good corporate governance, sound environmental standards, and care of stakeholder relations. 
After reviewing the methodologies used to evaluate mutual fund performance, we present the 
empirical findings on the performance and money-flows of SRI mutual funds. 
In spite of the fact that SRI has become a multi-trillion dollar market, little is known about 
how investors select funds with explicit non-financial attributes. Investors in SRI funds may care 
more about social or ethical issues in their investment decisions than about fund performance. 
Chapter 3, titled Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?, studies the money-flows into and out of 
the SRI funds around the world. We find that ethical money chases past returns. In contrast to 
conventional funds’ investors, SRI investors care less about the funds’ fees. Funds characterized 
by shareholder activism and by in-house SRI research attract more stable investors. Chapter 1  2
Furthermore, membership of a large SRI fund family creates higher flow volatility due to the 
lower fees to reallocate money within the fund family. SRI funds receiving most of the money-
inflows perform worse in the future, which is consistent with theories of decreasing returns to 
scale in the mutual fund industry. Moreover, funds employing a higher number of SRI screens to 
model their investment universe receive larger money-inflows and perform better in the future 
than funds with few screens. 
Chapter 4, titled The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds, studies the economic 
effects of ethics by focusing on socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. Consistent with 
investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in many European and Asia-Pacific countries 
strongly underperform domestic benchmark portfolios by about 5% per annum. SRI investors 
are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the future, whereas they show some fund-
selection ability in identifying ethical funds that will perform poorly. Finally, the screening 
activities of SRI funds have a significant impact on funds’ risk-adjusted returns and loadings on 
risk factors. 
Part II of the thesis analyzes the impact of information on investor behavior using two 
experiments. Chapter 5, titled Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market: 
the Peculiar Case of Betting Markets, investigates the impact of the salience of information on 
investors’ reactions to news by exploiting a natural experimental setting. Soccer clubs listed on 
the London Stock Exchange provide a unique way of testing stock price reactions to different 
types of news. For each firm, two pieces of information are released on a weekly basis: experts’ 
expectations about game outcomes through the betting odds, and the game outcomes 
themselves. Stock markets react strongly to news about game results, generating significant 
abnormal returns and trading volumes. Due to the absence of a market reaction to betting odds 
and the fact that these odds are excellent predictors of game outcomes, these odds contain 
unpriced information and can be used to predict short-run stock returns. A naive trading rule 
based on the probability to win yields abnormal returns of more than 245 basis points over a 
three-month period. The findings reinforce theories suggesting that under-reaction to news is 
due to investors’ limited processing ability which generates limited attention. In particular, some 
non-salient public information is totally ignored by investors. 
In Chapter 6, titled Myopic Loss Aversion: Information Feedback vs. Investment 
Flexibility, we conduct a laboratory experiment to disentangle the effect of information feedback 
from the effect of investment flexibility on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse 
investor. Our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce 
behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of Myopic Loss Aversion. 
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A last note is that parts of this study are based on other publications and were written in 
cooperation with others: Chapter 2 is largely based on Zhang (2005), Chapter 3 derives from 
Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2005), Chapter 4 originates from Zhang (2006), Chapter 5 is 
a revised version of Palomino, Renneboog and Zhang (2005), and a shorter version of Chapter 6 
has been published as Bellemare, Krause, Kröger and Zhang (2005). 
 








Socially Responsible Investments:  




Over the past decade, socially responsible investments (SRI), often also called ethical 
investments or sustainable investments, have grown rapidly around the world and become a 
multi-trillion dollar market. SRI can be defined broadly as “an investment process that considers 
the social and environmental consequences of investments, both positive and negative, within 
the context of rigorous financial analysis” (Social Investment Forum (SIF), 2001:4). Unlike 
conventional types of investments, SRI funds apply a set of investment screens to select stocks 
from an investment universe based on social, environmental or ethical (SEE) criteria. 
This chapter surveys the literature on socially responsible investments. In the first part of 
the paper, we review the institutional background of ethical investing. In particular, we study the 
historical roots, the market development, the regulatory background, and the investment screens 
employed in SRI. While ethical investing has ancient origins and is rooted in religious traditions, 
modern SRI is based on growing social awareness. Issues like environment protection, human 
rights and corporate governance have become common in the investment screens used by SRI. 
Currently, socially screened assets represent about 10% of the total assets under management in 
the US. Furthermore, in recent years, governments in western countries have taken many 
regulatory initiatives regarding SRI. For instance, the UK was the first country that regulated the 
disclosure of social, environmental or ethical investment policies by pension funds and charities.  
Second, we introduce the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR). At the heart 
of SRI is a fundamental question: is a firm’s aim to maximize shareholder value or stakeholder 
value? While in competitive and complete markets there is no conflict between these two 
objectives, in practice the maximization of shareholder value often conflicts with the stakeholder 
value criterion due to the existence of economic externalities. In the paper, we define corporate 
social responsibility as a combination of good corporate governance, sound environmental 
standards, and care of stakeholder relations. We will present the empirical findings on the impact Chapter 2  6
of each of these three components on shareholder value. In general, the literature shows that 
CSR enhances shareholder value. 
Third, we review the literature on performance evaluation of mutual funds. We evaluate 
mutual fund performance from the perspective of a mean-variance investor, and discuss the 
performance evaluation techniques based on the CAPM and multifactor models (e.g. Carhart 
(1997)). We also discuss methodologies using conditional strategies (e.g. Ferson and Schadt 
(1996)) and seemingly unrelated assets (e.g. Pastor and Stambaugh (2002)) to evaluate fund 
performance. Furthermore, tests of market-timing ability and return-based style analysis are 
discussed. 
Fourth, we present the empirical findings on the performance and money-flows of socially 
responsible mutual funds around the world. For SRI funds in the US and UK, there is little 
evidence that the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds are different from those of conventional 
funds (see, e.g., Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005)). However, SRI funds in Continental Europe 
and Asia-Pacific show strong underperformance relative to benchmark portfolios. Furthermore, 
while SRI investors chase past performance, their decision to invest in an SRI fund is less 
affected by management fees and funds’ risk than the decision of conventional fund investors 
(Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2005)). Also, the volatility of money-flows is lower in SRI 
funds than in conventional funds (Bollen (2006)). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the institutional 
background of SRI.  Section 2.3 reviews the theoretical literature on and the empirical firm-level 
analyses of corporate social responsibility. Section 2.4 reviews the econometric techniques 
employed in portfolio performance evaluation, and Section 2.5 introduces the empirical findings 
of the literature on the performance and money-flows of SRI mutual funds. Section 2.6 
concludes.  
 
2.2.  Institutional Background of SRI 
2.2.1  History of SRI 
Ethical investing has ancient origins and is rooted in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic 
traditions. Judaism has a wealth of teachings on how to use money ethically
1, and in medieval 
Christian times, there were ethical restrictions on loans and investments which were based on 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Laws of Gifts to the Poor 10:7: "There are eight degrees of tzedakah 
(righteous giving), one above the other. The highest degree is to strengthen the hand of a poor person by making a 
gift or a loan, or entering into a partnership, or finding work for him/her, so that they become self-sufficient". In 
Torah, Leviticus 19:9-10 "When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap all the way to the edges of the 
field, or gather the gleanings of your harvest…You shall leave them for the poor and the stranger." and 
Deuteronomy 15:7-8 "If there be among you a needy person…you shall not shut your hand from him/her; but you 
shall surely open your hand and shall surely lend sufficient for his/her need, as to that which is lacking". 
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the Old Testament
2. The Catholic Church imposed a universal prohibition on usury in 1139, 
which had not been relaxed until the 19
th century. In England, a law called The Act Against 
Usury which prohibited excessive interests on loans was in effect from 1571 to 1624 (Glaeser 
and Scheinkman (1998), and Lewison (1999))
3.  
In the 17
th century, the Quakers (‘Society of Friends’) refused to profit from the weapons 
and slaves trade when they settled in North America. The founder of Methodism, John Wesley 
(1703-1791), stated in his sermon ‘The Use of Money’ that people should not engage in sinful 
trade or profit from exploiting others. The Methodist Church in the UK avoided investing in 
‘sinful’ companies, such as companies involved in alcohol, tobacco, weapons and gambling, 
when they began investing in the stock market in 1920s. Based on the teachings of the Koran 
and its interpretations, Islamic investors avoid investing in companies involved in pork 
production, pornography, gambling, and in interest-based financial institutions.  
Modern SRI is based on growing social awareness of investors. Since the 1960s, a series of 
social campaigns, e.g. the anti-war and the anti-racist movements, have made investors 
concerned about the social consequences of their investments. The first modern SRI mutual 
fund
4, the Pax World Fund, was founded in 1971 in the US. Created for investors opposed to the 
Vietnam War (and militarism in general), the fund avoided investments in weapons contractors. 
In the 1980s, the racist system of the apartheid in South Africa became a focal point of protests 
by social investors. SRI investors in the US pressurized companies doing business in South 
Africa to divert those operations to other countries, and urged mutual funds not to include 
South-African nor western firms with South-African subsidiaries into their portfolios. These 
campaigns were relatively successful, for instance, the state legislature of California passed a 
law amendment in 1986 requiring the state’s pension funds to divest over $6 billion from 
companies with activities in South Africa (Sparkes, 2002: 54).  
On April 25
th, 1986 the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the former Soviet Union (now 
Ukraine) exploded during a test, spreading radioactive material across Europe and increasing the 
number of cancer deaths by over 2500. On March 23
th, 1989 the worst environmental disaster in 
the US occurred when the oil supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground near Alaska and spilled 11 
million gallons of crude oil. The above and other environmental disasters in the late 1980s made 
investors aware of the negative environmental consequences of industrial development.  
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Exodus 22:25 “If you lend money to my people, to the poor among you, you are not to act as a creditor 
to him; you shall not charge him interest” and Deuteronomy 23:19 "You shall not charge interest to your 
countrymen: interest on money, food, or anything that may be loaned at interest; but you may charge interest from 
loans to foreigners". 
3 During the reign of Henry VIII (1491-1547), usury was defined as a loan with interest rate higher than 10%.   
4 The first socially screened mutual fund, the Pioneer Fund, was founded in 1928. This fund excluded investments 
in the alcohol and tobacco industries. 
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Since the early 1990s, the SRI industry has experienced strong growth in the US, Europe, 
and the rest of the world. An important factor behind this growth was ethical consumerism, 
where consumers pay a premium for products that are consistent with their personal values. 
Issues like environment protection, human rights, and labor relations have become common in 
the SRI investment screens. In recent years, a series of corporate scandals has turned corporate 
governance and responsibility into another focal point of SRI investors. Hence, criteria like 
transparency, governance and sustainability have emerged as essential SRI screens. 
 
2.2.2  The Market of SRI  
Over the past decade, socially responsible investments have experienced a phenomenal 
growth around the world. Table 2.1 presents the total assets under management (AUM) of SRI 
screened portfolios and mutual funds in the US, Europe, Canada and Australia. 
In the US, the professionally managed assets of socially screened portfolios reached $2.3 
trillion in 2003, growing by 1200% from $162 billion in 1995. Currently, SRI assets represent 
about 10% of total assets under management in the US (SIF, 2005). Although the European SRI 
market is still in an early stage of development, it is also growing rapidly. In 2003, the assets of 
SRI screened portfolios in Europe totaled around €230 billion, and they account for about 1% of 
total assets under professional management in Europe. The UK, the Netherlands and Belgium 
are the countries with the highest percentage of socially screened assets in Europe. In Australia, 
SRI assets have surged, rising 100% in a two-year period from 2001 to 2003. In the US, the 
assets under management of SRI funds
5 reached $138 billion in 2003. From 1995 to 2003, the 
number of SRI mutual funds grew from 55 to 178 in the US (SIF, 2003), from 54 to 313 in 
Europe (SiRi, 2003), and from 10 to 63 in Australia (EIA, 2003). 
It is sometimes argued that investors in ethical funds are willing to sacrifice financial 
returns in order to comply to their social or environmental objectives. The fact that SRI investors 
may have a different investment objective function is suggested by the SIF (2001) report. This 
report shows that during the stock market downturn over the first 9 months of 2001, there was 
94% drop in the money inflows into all US mutual funds, whereas the fall in net investments in 
socially screened funds amounted to merely 54%. The SIF (2003, p.8) states “Typically, social 
investors’ assets are “stickier” than those of investors concerned only with financial 
performance. That is, social investors have been less likely to move investments from one fund 
to another and more inclined to stay with funds than conventional investors.”  
                                                 
5 SRI funds or socially responsible investment mutual funds, a subset of socially screened portfolios, refer to the 
mutual funds applying SRI screens in their investment process. 
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 Table 2.1: Asset under management of SRI funds and portfolios 
 
Panel A of this table presents the number (N) of retail SRI mutual funds and their assets under management (AUM, 
in billion US$), and Panel B reports the AUM of SRI screened portfolios (including the SRI assets under 
management by pension funds and insurance companies). In Panel A, the European countries included are: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, 
and the UK, whereas in Panel B due to data availability, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Poland and Sweden 
are not included. Data in this table are collected from the following sources: US: SIF (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 
2003, 2005); Europe: SiRi (2002, 2003, 2005), Eurosif (2003); Canada: SIO (2002, 2004); Australia: EIA (2001, 







 US  Europe  Canada  Australia 
Year  N  AUM ($b)  N  AUM ($b) N  AUM ($b) N  AUM ($b)
Panel A: SRI retail mutual funds 
1984    4      
1989     20       
1994     54       
1995  55  12        
1996         10  0.1 
1997  144  96        
1998          0.2 
1999  168  154  159  11      
2000         27 6.6     
2001  181  136  280  13    46  0.9 
2002         44 6.7     
2003  200  151  313  15    63  1.1 
2004          12.5    
2005  201  179  375  30      
Panel B:  SRI retail and institutional fund portfolios 
1995    639        
1997    1185        
1999    2159        
2000           33    
2001    2323        1.0 
2002           34    
2003    2164    288      1.8 
2004           55    















In the foreseeable future, the growth of SRI assets is expected to continue worldwide. 
Some of the largest pension funds in the world have shown increasing interest in participating in 
SRI. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CALPERS), the largest pension 
fund in the world, actively engages companies to promote socially responsible behavior and was 
one of the leaders of the tobacco divestment of the late 1990s. The Dutch Pension Fund for 
Public Employees (ABP), the largest pension fund in Europe, revised its Code for Prudent 
Investment Policy in 2000, which states that ABP will promote the integration of SEE criteria in 
its investment process. Mr. Jean Frijns, the Chief Investment Officer of ABP Investments, 
regards sustainable investment as “one of the most critical factors driving the future of fiduciary 
investment” (Financial Times, Jan. 26, 2003). In addition, the Dutch pension fund PGGM, 
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which manages about €45 billion assets, applies two negative screens (weapons production and 
human rights violation) to its investment portfolios (Eurosif, 2003).  
 
2.2.3 Regulatory  Background 
The growth of the SRI industry can be partly attributed to the changes in regulation 
regarding the disclosure of social, environmental and ethical (SEE) information by pension 
funds and listed companies. In this section, we review the regulatory initiatives taken by national 
governments regarding SRI and summarize these in Table 2.2. Most of the SRI regulation is 
passed in Europe. 
 
a. UK 
The UK was the first country that regulated the disclosure of SEE investment policies of 
pension funds and charities. This has contributed considerably to the growth of the SRI industry. 
In July 2000, the Amendment to the 1995 Pensions Act was approved, requiring trustees of 
occupational pension funds to disclose in the Statement of Investment Principles “the extent (if 
at all) to which social, environmental and ethical considerations are taken into account in the 
selection, retention and realization of investments”.  
The Trustee Act 2000, which came into effect in February 2001, requires charity trustees 
to ensure that investments are suitable to a charity’s stated aims. According to the Charity 
Commission guidance, charities should include ‘any relevant ethical considerations as to the 
kind of investments that are appropriate for the trust to make’. In 2002, The Cabinet Office in 
the UK published the review of Charity Law in 2002, which proposed that all charities with an 
annual income of over ₤ 1 million report on the extent to which SEE issues are taken into 
account in their investment policies. The Home Office accepted theses recommendations in 
2003. 
In addition, large organizations of institutional investors also have taken SRI initiatives. 
For instance, the Association of British Insurers (ABI), whose members invest in about $1 
trillion assets, published a disclosure guideline in 2001 suggesting that listed companies report 
on material SEE risks relevant to their business activities. 
 
b. Continental Europe 
Over the past decade, some national governments in continental Europe passed a series of 
regulations regarding social and environmental investments and savings. Since 1991, the 
Renewable Energy Act in Germany gives a tax advantage for closed-end funds to invest in wind  
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Table 2.2: SRI regulations 
 
This table summarizes the regulatory initiatives regarding SRI taken by national government in western countries.  
 
Country  SRI related regulations 
Australia   In a 2001 bill it is stated that all investment firms’ product disclosure statements should include a 
description of “the extent to which labor standards or environmental, social or ethical considerations 
are taken into account.” Since 2001, all listed companies on the Australian Stock Exchange are 
required to make an annual social responsibility report. 
Belgium  In 2001, Belgium passed the ‘Vandebroucke’ law, which requires pension funds to report the degree to 
which their investments take into account social, ethical and environmental aspects. 
France  In May 2001, the legislation “New Economic Regulations” came into force requiring listed companies 
to publish social and environmental information in their annual reports.  
Since February 2001 managers of the Employee Savings Plans are required to consider social, 
environmental or ethical considerations when buying and selling shares. 
Germany  Since 1991, the Renewable Energy Act gives a tax advantage to closed-end funds to invest in wind 
energy.  
Since January 2002, certified private pension schemes and occupational pension schemes ‘must 
inform the members in writing, whether and in what form ethical, social, or ecological aspects are 
taken into consideration when investing the paid-in contributions’. 
Italy  Since September 2004 pension funds are required to disclose non-financial factors (including social, 
environmental and ethical factors) influencing their investment decisions.   
Netherlands  In 1995, the Dutch Tax Office introduced a ‘Green Savings and Investment Plan’, which applies a tax 
deduction for green investments, such as wind and solar energy, and organic farming. 
Sweden  Since January 2002, Swedish national pension funds are obliged to incorporate environmental and 
ethical aspects in their investment policies. 
UK  In July 2000, the Amendment to 1995 Pensions Act came into force, requiring trustees of occupational 
pension funds in the UK to disclose in the Statement of Investment Principles “the extent (if at all) to 
which social, environmental and ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, 
retention and realization of investments”.  
The Trustee Act 2000 came into force in February 2001. Charity trustees must ensure that investments 
are suitable to a charity’s stated aims, including applying ethical considerations to investments.  
In 2002, The Cabinet Office in the UK published the Review of Charity Law in 2002, which proposed 
that all charities with an annual income of over ₤ 1 m should report on the extent to which SEE issues 
are taken into account in their investment policy. The Home Office accepted theses recommendations 
in 2003.  
The Association of British Insurers (ABI) published a disclosure guideline in 2001, asking listed 
companies to report on material SEE risks relevant to their business activities. 
US  Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which came into effect in July 2002, requires companies to 
disclose a written code of ethics adopted by their CEO, chief financial officer and chief accountant. 
 
energy (Eurosif, 2003). In 1995, Dutch Tax Office introduces “Green Savings and Investment 
Plan”, which grants a tax deduction to investments in specific ‘green’ projects, such as wind and 
solar energy, and organic farming. 
Following the British Amendment to 1995 Pensions Act of 2000, four countries in 
continental Europe (namely Belgium, Germany, Italy and Sweden) have passed similar 
regulations requiring pension funds to disclose SEE related information. In 2001, Belgium 
passed the ‘Vandebroucke’ law, which requires pension funds to report the degree to which their 
investments take into account social, ethical and environmental aspects. In January 2002, 
Germany adopted a regulation requiring that certified private pension schemes and occupational 
pension schemes “must inform the members in writing, whether and in what form ethical, social, 
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or ecological aspects are taken into consideration when investing the paid-in contributions” 
(Eurosif, 2003). Sweden passed a regulation (effective since January 2002), requiring Swedish 
national pension funds to incorporate environmental and ethical aspects in their investment 
policies. In Italy, a legislation was adopted in September 2004 requiring pension funds to 
disclose the effect of non-financial factors (including social, environmental and ethical factors) 
that influence their investment decisions. All these initiatives have clearly had a positive impact 
on the growth of the SRI fund industry in Europe. 
France is the first and so-far the only country making SEE reporting mandatory for all 
listed companies. In May 2001, the legislation “New Economic Regulations” came into force: 
listed companies are to publish social and environmental information on the companies in their 
annual reports
6. Meanwhile, since February 2001, the managers of Employee Savings Plans are 
required to consider social, environmental or ethical issues when buying and selling shares
7.  
 
c. Outside Europe 
In the US, section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (July 2002), requires companies to 
disclose a written code of ethics signed by their chief executive, chief financial officer and chief 
accountant. 
Australia is the only country outside Europe that has adopted a regulation regarding SRI. 
In 2001, the Australian government passed a bill requiring that all investment firms’ product 
disclosure statements include descriptions of “the extent to which labor standards or 
environmental, social or ethical considerations are taken into account.” Since 2001, all listed 
companies on the Australian Stock Exchange are obliged to make an annual social responsibility 
report. 
 
2.2.4 Investment  Screens 
The investment screens used in SRI have evolved over time. Table 2.3 presents a summary 
of the SRI screens used by ethical funds around the world. Usually, SRI mutual funds apply a 
combination of the social screens. SIF (2003) reports that 64% of all socially screened mutual 
                                                 
6 Law No. 2001-420, Art. 225-102-1: “[The annual report] also contains information, the detail of which is being 
determined by a decree of the Council of State, on how the company takes into account the social and 
environmental consequences of its activities. The present paragraph applies only to ( listed ) companies [...]." 
(www.eurosif.org) 
7 Law No. 2001-152, Art. 214-39: "The [fund's] internal rules specify, if need be, the social, environmental or 
ethical considerations the fund management company must take into account when buying or selling securities, as 
well as when exercising the voting rights attached to the ownership of these securities. The fund's annual report 
reports on how these considerations have been taken into account, in terms defined by the Commission des 
Opérations de Bourse. " 
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funds in the US use more than five screens, while 18% of SRI funds use only one social screen. 
These screens can be broadly classified into two groups: negative screens and positive ones.  
First, the oldest and most basic SRI strategies are based on negative screens. These filters 
refer to the practice that certain stocks or industries are excluded from SRI portfolios based on 
SEE criteria. The funds based on such screens account for $2.0 trillion out of the $2.15 trillion 
SRI assets in the US (SIF, 2003). A typical negative screen can be applied on an initial asset 
pool such as the S&P 500 stocks from which the alcohol, tobacco, gambling and defense 
industries, or companies with poor performance in labor relations and environment protection 
are excluded. After negative SRI screening, the portfolios are created through financial and 
quantitative selection. The most common negative screens exclude tobacco, alcohol, gambling, 
weapons and nuclear power. Other negative screens may include irresponsible foreign 
operations, pornography, abortion, workplace conditions, violation of human rights and animal 
testing. Some SRI funds only exclude companies from the investment universe when their 
revenue derived from ‘a-social or un-ethical’ sectors exceed a specific threshold, while other 
SRI funds apply the negative screens to the company’s branches or suppliers. A small number of 
SRI funds use screens based on traditional ideological of religious convictions: for instance they 
exclude investments in firms producing pork products, in financial institutions paying interest on 
savings, and in insurance companies insuring non-married people.
8  
Second, SRI portfolios are nowadays based on positive screens which in practice boil 
down to select shares that meet superior SEE standards. The most common positive screens 
focus on corporate governance, labor relations, the environment, sustainability of investments, 
and the stimulation of cultural diversity. Positive screens are also frequently used to select 
companies with a good record concerning renewable energy usage or community involvement. 
The use of positive screens is often combined with a ‘best in class’ approach. Firms are ranked 
within each industry or market sector based on SEE criteria. Subsequently, only those firms in 
each industry are selected which pass a minimum threshold.  
Negative and positive screens are often referred to as the first and second generation of 
SRI screens respectively. The third generation of screens refers to an integrated approach of 
selecting companies based on the economic, environmental and social criteria comprised by both 
negative and positive screens. This approach is often called “sustainability” or "triple bottom 
line" (due to its focus on People, Planet and Profit). The fourth generation of ethical funds 
combines the sustainable investing approach (third generation) with shareholder activism and 
commitment. In this case, portfolio managers or the companies specialized in granting ethical  
                                                 
8 These SRI funds are usually small which in total manage less than $100 million of assets in the US. 
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Table 2.3:  SRI screens 
 
Screens Definitions  Type 
Tobacco  Avoid manufacturers of tobacco products  - 
Alcohol  Avoid firms that produce, market, or otherwise promote the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages 
- 
Gambling  Avoid casinos and suppliers of gambling equipment  - 
Defense /Weapons  Avoid firms producing weapons for domestic or foreign militaries, or firearms for 
personal use 
- 
Nuclear Power  Avoid manufacturers of nuclear reactors or related equipment and companies that 





Avoid firms with investments in government-controlled or private firms located in 
oppressive regimes such as Burma or China, or firms which mistreat the indigenous 





Avoid publishers of pornographic magazines; production studios that produce 
offensive video and audio tapes; companies that are major sponsors of graphic sex 




Avoid providers of abortion; manufacturers of abortion drugs and birth control 
products; insurance companies that pay for elective abortions (where not mandated 





Seek firms with strong union relationships, employee empowerment, and/or 
employee profit sharing. 




Environment  Seek firms with proactive involvement in recycling, waste reduction, and 
environmental cleanup  






Seek companies demonstrating "best practices" related to board independence and 
elections, auditor independence, executive compensation, expensing of options, 
voting rights and/or other governance issues.  





Business Practice  Seek companies committed to sustainability through investments in R&D, quality 




Seek firms pursuing an active policy related to the employment of minorities, 
women, gays/lesbians, and/or disabled persons who ought to be represented 
amongst senior management 
+ 
Human Rights  Seek firms promoting human rights standards  
Avoid firms which are complicit in human rights violations 
+ 
- 
Animal Testing  Seek firms promoting the  respectful treatment of animals  
Avoid firms with animal testing and firms producing hunting/trapping equipment or 
using animals in end products 
+ 
- 
Renewable Energy  Seek firms producing power derived form renewable energy sources  + 
Biotechnology  Seek firms that support sustainable agriculture, biodiversity, local farmers, and 
industrial applications of biotechnology. 
Avoid firms involved in the promotion or development of genetic engineering for 






Seek firms with proactive investments in the local community by sponsoring 





The SRI funds that attempt to influence company actions through direct dialogue 
with management and/or voting at Annual General Meetings 
+ 
Non-married  Avoid insurance companies that give coverage to non-married couples  - 
Healthcare/ 
Pharmaceuticals 






Avoid financial institutions that derive a significant portion of their income from 
interest earnings (on loans or fixed income securities). (Used by funds managed 
according to Islamic principles)  
- 
Pork  Producers  Avoid companies that derive a significant portion of their income from the 
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This table summarizes the investment screens used by SRI mutual funds. In the last column, the ‘-‘ refers to a 
negative screen, whereas ‘+’ refers to a positive one. Data are compiled from Social Investment Forum (2003: 42) 
and the Natural Capital Institute (www.responsibleinvesting.org).  
 
labels attempt to influence the company’s actions through direct dialogue with the management 
or by the use of voting rights at Annual General Meetings. SIF (2003) reports that in 2002 
socially responsible investors in the US filed 292 shareholder resolutions on SEE issues. The 
largest number of resolutions is on environmental issues, followed by issues on global labor 
standards and equal employment conditions.  
 
2.3.  Firm-level Analysis on SRI 
In this section we introduce the findings of firm-level studies related to socially 
responsible investments. While Section 2.3.1 surveys the theoretical arguments, Section 2.3.2 
focuses on the empirical evidence. 
 
2.3.1  Theoretical Background: Should Companies Be Socially Responsible? 
Finance textbooks tell us that companies should maximize the value of their shareholders’ 
equity
9. In other words, companies’ only responsibility is a financial one. In recent years, 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a focal point of policy makers (and the 
public), who demand that corporations assume responsibility towards society, the environment, 
or the stakeholders in general. SRI investors thus aim at promoting socially and environmentally 
sound corporate behavior. They avoid companies producing goods that may cause health 
hazards (like tobacco) or exploiting employees both in developed and developing countries 
(negative screening). They select companies with sound social and environmental records and 
with good corporate governance (positive screening). In general, SRI investors expect 
companies to focus on social welfare in addition to value maximization.  
 
a. Shareholder value vs. Stakeholder value 
At the heart of the SRI movement is a fundamental question: is a firm’s aim to maximize 
shareholder value or social value (defined as the sum of the value generated for all 
stakeholders)? Classical economics (e.g. Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ and the social welfare 
theorems) states that there is no conflict between the two goals: in competitive and complete 
                                                 
9 Value is the present value of future profits over the long run, and it is not necessarily the current market value of 
the firm, as markets can be irrational. Jensen (2004) argues that overvalued equity creates additional agency costs, 
which will inevitably lead to the destruction of firm value over the long run. Therefore, managers should regularly 
communicate with capital markets to prevent not only undervaluation but also overvaluation. 
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markets, when all firms maximize their own profits (value), the resource allocation is Pareto-
optimal and the social welfare is maximized.  
However, modern economic theory also tells us that in some circumstances, namely when 
some of the assumptions of the welfare theorems do not hold, profit-maximizing behavior does 
not necessarily imply social-welfare maximizing outcomes. One of such circumstances is the 
existence of externalities, arising when the costs and benefits of an agent’s action are affected by 
the actions of other (external) agents in the economy. Jensen (2001) gives a simple example on 
externalities, where a fishery’s catch is impaired by the pollution of an upstream chemical plant. 
When the chemical plant maximizes its profit by increasing pollution (as the cost of pollution 
are not borne by the chemical plant), the fishery in the downstream suffers from catching less 
fish and the social welfare (in this case equal to the sum of the profits of the two stakeholders) is 
not maximized. Economic solutions to the externality problem include imposing regulations 
(e.g. quotas or taxes on pollution) and creating a market for externalities (e.g. the trading of 
pollution permits). 
In practice, the maximization of shareholder value often conflicts with the social welfare 
criterion represented by the interests of all stakeholders of a firm, including employees, 
customers, local communities, environment and so forth. By maximizing shareholder value, 
firms may not take care of the interests of other stakeholders. In Continental European corporate 
governance regimes, a stakeholder approach is more common than in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries.
10   
 
b. The Problems of the Stakeholder Theory and Implications for SRI 
According to the shareholder value concept, managers are expected to invest until the 
marginal project’s return exceeds the cost of capital. In the stakeholder value story, firm 
managers are asked to balance the interests of all stakeholders to the point that the aggregate 
welfare is maximized. But the stakeholder theory does not define how to aggregate welfare and 
how to make the tradeoff between stakeholders, including investors, employees, local 
communities, and other social and environmental stakeholders. If the social value of firms can 
be maximized, the society will by definition benefit. However, the question is whether or not 
this goal is achievable and how economic efficiency and managerial incentives are affected by 
the maximization of stakeholder value (including social and environmental value). Jensen (2001: 
14) writes, “it is the failure to provide a criterion for making such tradeoffs (among 
                                                 
10 In Germany, for instance, the importance of stakeholders is even legally defined. German law mandates that the 
supervisory board is made up of representatives of the employees and unions, while the other half of the board 
consists of representatives of the major shareholders. 
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stakeholders), or even to acknowledge the need for them, that makes stakeholder theory a 
prescription for destroying firm value and reducing social welfare”. 
  Given that the objective function of a manager is not well defined in stakeholder theory, 
the performance of managers becomes unaccountable. Jensen (2001) argues that the stakeholder 
theory increases the agency costs and weakens the internal control systems of firms, since 
performance measures are only vaguely defined. Similarly, Tirole (2001: 26) writes, “In a 
nutshell, management can almost always rationalize any action by invoking its impact on the 
welfare of some stakeholder. An empire builder can justify a costly acquisition by a claim that 
the purchase will save a couple of jobs in the acquired firm; a manager can choose his brother-
in-law as supplier on the grounds that the latter’s production process is environmentally 
friendly”. In addition, Tirole (2001) shows that the absence of a reliable performance measure 
leads to flat – rather than performance-based - managerial compensation contracts, which further 
weakens managerial incentives. 
Another problem of the stakeholder approach is that in a competitive market, a firm 
lowering its profits in order to pursue social and environmental goals may not survive the 
competition and disciplining actions from the market for corporate control. The reason is that 
another company can acquire this firm and replace the incumbent management with a value-
maximizing one (Tirole (2001: 24)).  
To conclude, in order for corporate social responsibility to become a workable concept, the 
following guidelines of performance yardsticks should be adopted:  
(1)  Corporate performance must be measurable. Lack of precisely formulated 
corporate goals and measures destroy firm value and social welfare in the long run. Firm value 
remains the single most important performance measure for management. 
(2)  Maximizing long-run firm value is in line with maximizing social welfare. Tirole 
(2001) concludes that focusing on shareholder value is a second-best optimum once managerial 
incentive problems like agency costs have been incorporated in a stakeholder framework. 
(3)  Even if one adopts the shareholder value criterion, it is important to consider the 
welfare of all stakeholders (including employees, the community and the environment) as firm 
behavior induces important externalities. Jensen (2001) notes, “we cannot maximize the long-
term market value of an organization if we ignore or mistreat any important constituency 
(stakeholder)”.  
(4)  Economic theory predicts that companies will be more willing to sacrifice profits 
in order to be socially responsible, when their management is entrenched or shielded from anti-
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takeover mechanisms. The reason is that these managers are less likely to be replaced by profit-
maximizing ones. 
 
c. The Impact of SRI on Firm Behavior 
Given that negative screening is the most common practice in SRI (see Section 2.2.4), it is 
interesting to study whether or not this approach achieves the goal of promoting social 
responsibility. In other words, we ask the question whether SRI affects corporate behavior, or 
whether the SRI’s benefit is only a feel-good sentiment created by not being involved in 
unethical corporate behavior. To answer this question, Heinkel, Krause and Zechner (2001) 
developed a theoretical model that captures the effects of negative SRI screening on a polluting 
firm’s economic behavior. The assumptions of this model are: (i) investors are risk averse and 
consist of two types: green investors and neutral investors, and (ii) each firm has one of two 
technologies: a clean technology and a polluting one. The basic question is whether the presence 
of green investors can cause firms to alter their corporate behavior, i.e. to change from using a 
polluting technology to a clean one. The model shows that the question is answered 
affirmatively: if fund managers adopt negative screens, polluting firms are present in fewer 
investment portfolios, which reduces risk-sharing opportunities among investors. Hence, the 
stock price of polluting firms falls, thus raising their cost of capital (expected return). When the 
increased cost of capital exceeds the cost of capital of socially responsible firms (in this case, the 
ones which transferred to a less polluting technology), polluting firms tend to turn more 
environmentally friendly. In a follow-up paper, Barnea, Heinkel and Krause (2005) investigate 
the effects of negative pollution screening on the investment decisions of polluting firms. The 
issue is examined in an equilibrium setting with endogenous investment decisions, i.e. firms are 
allowed to choose the level of investment. The study concludes that negative screening reduces 
the incentives of polluting firms to invest, which lowers the total level of investment in the 
economy. 
 
2.3.2  Empirical Evidence: Which SRI Screens Can Enhance Value? 
Given that economic theory tells us that firms should be “socially responsible” to the 
extent that it helps maximizing firm value, the crucial question is which SRI screens enhance 
firm value and which do not. In other words, we ask the question which investment screens are 
likely to improve SRI fund performance. 
Before reviewing the empirical literature, we define corporate social responsibility as the 
sum of good corporate governance (protecting shareholders’ interests), environmental efficiency 
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(protecting environmental stakeholders’ interest), and good stakeholder relations (protecting the 
interests of other stakeholders, including those of employees and the local community). In this 
subsection, we review the literature on the value-relevance of corporate social responsibility, and 
try to identify which of these three components are likely to be value drivers.  
 
a.  Corporate Governance Screening 
Corporate governance addresses the conflicts of interests between an agent (manager) and 
a principal (investor). This conflict of interest is induced by the separation of ownership and 
control in the modern corporation, and can bring about large agency costs to shareholders. 
Managers may exert insufficient effort in enhancing shareholders’ value (moral hazard), enjoy 
building corporate empires and extract private benefits of control, and entrench themselves by 
anti-takeover provisions like poison pills such that (dispersed) shareholders cannot exercise 
control. These agency costs are at odds with the definition of corporate governance formulated 
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997): corporate governance consists of “the ways in which the 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a fair return on their 
investment.” Tirole (2001) takes a broader view and defines corporate governance as “the design 
of institutions that induce or force management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders.” 
The empirical literature shows that there is a positive relation between corporate 
governance and a firm’s value. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) (hereafter GIM) study the 
relation between a set of 24 corporate-governance (anti-takeover) provisions and a firm’s long-
run performance in 1990s. Since the governance structures of a firm are not exogenous, the 
paper makes no claim about the direction of causality between governance and performance, but 
rather analyzes whether or not corporate governance is associated with firm value. The data on 
corporate governance (anti-takeover provisions) are drawn from publications of the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) supplemented by information about state takeover laws. 
Based on these provisions for 1500 companies, the authors build a governance index to capture 
the relative power of shareholders’ rights. A striking relation between corporate governance and 
stock returns is found: a strategy (i.e. an investment screen) that involves buying firms with the 
strongest shareholder rights and selling firms with the weakest shareholder rights generates a 
yearly abnormal return of 8.5% per year during the 1990s. The return is measured by the four-
factor model proposed by Fama and French (1993) and extended by Carhart (1997) (see Section 
2.4.2). In addition, the governance index is highly correlated with firm value (measured by 
Tobin’s Q). 
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These findings can be interpreted as follows:  (i) the stock market underestimates the 
agency costs induced by the corporate provisions that reduce shareholder rights, (ii) managers 
have private information (not shared with investors) that future firm performance will be poor, 
so they may use corporate provisions to entrench themselves and reduce shareholder rights,  (iii)  
the significant abnormal returns generated by corporate governance screening may be not due to 
market-inefficiency, but rather capture the premium of some risk factors that is missing in the 
current asset pricing models. 
 The GIM’s approach of defining corporate governance as a set of anti-takeover provisions 
has limitations. Cremers and Nair (2005) extend GIM’s work by classifying corporate 
governance mechanisms into external governance (takeover vulnerability) and internal 
governance (the presence of institutional blockholders), and investigate how the interaction of 
these two governance mechanisms is associated with equity returns. In particular, the authors 
use two proxies for internal governance: the percentage of shares owned by institutional 
blockholders, and the percentage of shares owned by public pension funds. The paper finds that 
internal and external governance are complements in relation to stock returns: an investment 
strategy (screen) based on shareholder rights (external governance) generates an annualized 
abnormal return of 10-15% when blockholder ownership is high (internal governance). 
Similarly, an investment strategy based on firm’s internal governance mechanism generates 
annualized abnormal return of 8% when external governance mechanism is strong (i.e. in firms 
with few anti-takeover provisions).       
It is interesting to study if the same pattern appears in other corporate governance regimes, 
such as in European countries. Bauer, Gunster and Otten (2004) apply the GIM methodology to 
European data. Corporate governance data are obtained from the Deminor Corporate 
Governance Ratings, which covers 269 firms included in the FTSE Eurotop 300 for the years of 
2000 and 2001. For the period 1997-2000, the governance ratings are assumed to be constant 
over time. The authors use the overall governance ratings from Deminor, which are the 
aggregates of 300 criteria covering shareholder rights, takeover defense, information disclosure 
and the board structure. The paper shows that good corporate governance leads to higher stock 
returns and higher firm value in Europe. In addition, contrary to the findings of GIM, the paper 
reports a negative relation between corporate governance standards and earnings measures (like 
ROE). 
While the above corporate governance studies focus on well-developed market economies 
such as the US and Europe, Claessens (1997) investigates the relation between corporate 
governance and equity prices in the context of the transition of centrally planned economies to 
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market economies. He reports that the prices of privatization vouchers depend upon ownership 
structures: the more concentrated ownership, the higher the prices. However, when an 
investment bank holds a relatively large share stake (which suggests conflicts of interests), the 
equity (i.e. voucher) prices are relatively low. 
 
b. Environmental Screening 
Although simple economic logic suggests that a stringent environmental standard can 
increase the production costs and thus hurt corporate profitability, a growing body of empirical 
literature reports a positive relation between corporate environmental performance and firm 
value. Researchers use various methods to study the effect of environmental performance on 
value. First, an event study was performed to examine the information content of corporate news 
on environmental issues. For example, Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) find significant positive 
abnormal returns after a firm receives environmental performance awards, and significant 
negative returns after an environmental crisis.  
Second, using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value, researchers investigate if higher 
environmental standards are associated with a higher market value. Dowell, Hart and Yeung 
(2000) find that US-based multinational enterprises adopting a stringent global environmental 
standard have much higher market values than firms with less stringent standards. Their 
environmental data are from the IRRC’s survey of Corporate Environmental Profile. Using a 
larger sample (the S&P 500 firms), Konar and Cohen (2001) decompose Tobin’s Q into tangible 
asset value and intangible asset value. They find that poor environmental performance is 
negatively correlated with the intangible asset value. 
Third, the empirical literature has recently begun to measure the relation between stock 
returns and environmental performance. Derwall, Gunster, Bauer and Koedijk (2005) construct 
equity portfolios based on environmental performance criteria, namely the “eco-efficiency” 
scores from Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, and measure the performance of these portfolios 
by the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (see Section 2.4.2). The paper shows that a portfolio of 
firms with high environmental scores (based on positive screening) outperforms a portfolio of 
firms with low scores by 6% per annum over the period 1997-2003. The authors give two 
potential explanations for their findings: (i) the stock market undervalues the environmental 
information, and (ii) the eco-efficiency premium captures the premium of some missing risk 
factors in asset pricing models. A third potential explanation is that sound environmental 
performance may be a proxy for good corporate governance.    
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c. Stakeholder Relation Screening 
The empirical studies on corporate social responsibility have focused on the valuation 
effect of CSR. For instance, Hillman and Keim (2001) investigate the valuation effect of CSR by 
measuring firm value with market value added (MVA), which is the difference between market 
value of equity and book value of assets (Stewart, 1996). Their CSR data is obtained from KLD, 
a primary data source for SRI screening in the US. The authors argue that CSR consists of two 
components: one (called ‘stakeholder management’) refers to improving the relationships with 
primary stakeholders like employees, customers, suppliers and communities, while the other 
refers to ‘social issue participation’ like the ban on nuclear energy, the avoidance of ‘sin’ 
industries (such as gambling, pornography), and not doing business in countries with bad human 
rights records. The paper shows that management focusing on stakeholder value can also create 
shareholder value. In contrast, social issue participation often destroys shareholder value.  
Furthermore, Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003) conduct a meta-analysis to review 
findings from 52 previous studies on the relationship between CSR and corporate financial 
performance. The results show that across the existing studies, CSR is positively associated with 
financial performance. However, CSR appears to be more highly correlated with accounting-
based measures of financial performance than with market-based indicators.    
Moreover, the existence of a major shareholder may have an impact on the level of 
stakeholder management and social issue participation of a company. For instance, major 
shareholders are visible to outsiders and may therefore become the target of social activist. 
Using detailed ownership data and data on corporate social responsibility of the S&P 500 firms, 
Goergen and Renneboog (2002) investigate the impact of ownership on CSR. The authors do not 
find a relation between control concentration and CSR. 
To conclude this subsection, we summarize the empirical findings of corporate finance and 
strategy literature on corporate social responsibility. The following components of CSR can 
enhance shareholder value and thus social welfare: good corporate governance, sound 
environmental standards and, to a lesser extent, care of stakeholder relations. 
 
2.4.  Performance Evaluation of Mutual Funds 
In Section 2.3 we have discussed firm-level evidence on corporate social responsibility. 
Before introducing empirical findings of portfolio-level studies on socially responsible 
investments in Section 2.5, we review the econometric methodologies used to evaluate mutual 
fund performance.  
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2.4.1 Mean-Variance  Analysis 
Performance measurement refers to the practice of detecting whether a fund manager has 
special skills to beat a passive benchmark portfolio. We evaluate mutual fund performance from 
a portfolio perspective, where an investor desires to maximize the risk-adjusted returns of his 
portfolio. In this subsection we discuss the fundamentals of portfolio theory required to 
understand the performance measurement techniques.  
 
a. Mean-Variance Optimization 
Consider a mean-variance optimizing investor who currently invests in K risky assets. Let 
the expected return and the covariance matrix of the K-dimensional asset return vector Rt be 
given by  R μ  and   respectively, and the vector of initial portfolio weights is denoted as  . 
For a risk-averse investor, the mean-variance objective function in terms of certainty 
equivalence (i.e. the expected return that would make the investor indifferent from a riskless 
return), is: 
RR ∑ R w
R RR R R R w w w CE ∑ − = '
2
1
' γ μ         (2.1) 
where γ is the investor’s constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) coefficient (it is assumed that γ 
>0). A mean-variance efficient portfolio is obtained by maximizing Eq. (2.1) with respect to wR  
subject to the portfolio constraint  1 ' = K R w ι , where  K ι is a K-dimensional vector of ones. It 
follows that the optimal weighting vector  of the mean-variance portfolio is  R w
*
) (  
1 -1 *
K R RR R w ηι μ γ − ∑ =
−          ( 2 . 2 )  
where η is the expected return on the zero beta portfolio of  , which can be obtained as the 
intercept of the line tangent to the mean-variance frontier at  (in the mean-standard deviation 





1 ' = K R w ι , it is straightforward to show from Eq. (2.2) that the 
zero beta rate η depends on the risk aversion coefficient γ. This implies that each mean-variance 
efficient portfolio   is uniquely determined when either η or γ is known. The zero beta rate η 
also equals the inverse of the expectation of a stochastic discount factor (Cochrane (2001:108)). 
Note that when there exists a risk free asset in the economy, the zero beta rate η for every 




We now consider the case when an investor extends her initial set of K assets by adding a 
set of N mutual funds. The expected return and the covariance matrix of the N-dimensional fund 
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return vector rt is denoted by  r μ  and  rr ∑  respectively, and the covariance matrix with the set of 
initial assets is given by  . Below, the variables referring to the returns of initial assets (R rR ∑ t) 
and mutual funds (rt) are labeled with subscript R and r, respectively. Variables that refer to the 
larger return set (Rt, rt) do not have any subscript. Thus, the K+N dimensional weight vector of 
the extended set is referred to as w. If the investor cannot extend the mean-variance frontier by 
investing in the set of N mutual funds, the optimal weight on each of the N mutual funds would 
be zero. In this case, the extended optimal weight vector w









































      (2.3) 
where 0N is a N dimensional vector of zeros. Substituting (2.2) into (2.3) gives 
N K R N r B 0 ) ( ) ( = − − − ηι μ ηι μ         ( 2 . 4 )  
where  is an N×K matrix (see Ter Horst (1998: 40) for derivations). If Eq. (2.4) is 
valid, the optimal portfolio weight in the K+N assets coincides with the initial optional weight in 
K assets. In this case, it suggests that the two mean-variance frontiers will intersect at the 
investor’s initial portfolio location.  
1 − ∑ ∑ ≡ RR rR B
 
b. Generalized Jensen’s alpha 
Eq. (2.4) has important implications for the performance measurement of mutual funds. 
The left hand side of Eq. (2.4): 
) ( ) ( ) ( K R N r J B ηι μ ηι μ η α − − − ≡        ( 2 . 5 )  
generalizes the original Jensen’s alpha proposed by Jensen (1968). The original alpha-measure 
requires that an investor’s benchmark assets are a risk free deposit and the market portfolio (see 
Section 2.4.2 for details). In that case the zero-beta rate is equal to the risk free rate. In contrast, 
the generalized alpha-measure  ) (η αJ  does not assume that investors initially hold a risk free 
deposit and the market portfolio.  ) (η αJ  depends on the zero beta rate η  and thus the risk 
aversion coefficient γ. A positive  ) (η αJ  indicates that the corresponding mutual fund 
outperforms the benchmark assets, while a negative one detects underperformance of the mutual 
fund. It is straightforward to show that an investor who holds the K benchmark assets can extend 
the mean-variance frontier by taking a long position in a fund with a positive  ) (η αJ  and a short 
position in a fund with a negative  ) (η αJ .  
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When the generalized Jensen’s alpha equals zero (i.e. Eq. (2.4) holds), it is important to 
distinguish two cases. First, Eq. (2.4) only holds for one value of zero beta rate η. This implies 
that the mean-variance frontiers of the K assets and the K+N assets have only one point in 
common (i.e. the intersection). The initial mean-variance efficient portfolio   of the investor 
with zero beta rate η is also efficient for the extended set of K+N assets. Second, if Eq. (2.4) 
holds for any value of zero beta rate η, implying that the two mean-variance frontiers coincide at 
every point (i.e. mean-variance spanning). In this case the following testable condition holds, 
*
R w
0 = − R r Bμ μ  and  0 = − N K B ι ι       ( 2 . 6 )  
and the initial mean-variance efficient portfolio   is also efficient on the extended set of K+N 
assets, independent of the risk aversion coefficient.  
*
R w
The hypothesis that the generalized Jensen’s alpha equals zero can be tested with an OLS 
regression: 
t t t BR r ε α + + =           ( 2 . 7 )  
where  R r Bμ μ α − =  and  t ε is the idiosyncratic error term that is genetically uncorrelated with Rt 
and has a covariance matrix  . In this case,  εε ∑ η ι ι α η α ) ( ) ( K N J B − − = . Note that Eq. (2.7) is 
essentially a multifactor model. The null hypothesis that the initial efficient frontier intersects 
with the extended frontier at the point of zero beta rate being η can be formulated by: 
0 ) ( : 0 = − − η ι ι α K N B H        ( 2 . 8 )  
while the null hypothesis that the initial frontier spans the extended frontier is:  
0 : 0 = α H  and  0 = − N K B ι ι         ( 2 . 9 )  
Both hypotheses can be tested using a standard Wald test. A rejection of the hypotheses 
implies that the mutual fund outperforms or underperforms (in terms of mean-variance 
efficiency) the K benchmark assets. The intuition of the restriction in Eq. (2.9) is that the 
benchmark assets can form a portfolio that has the same expected return but lower variance than 
the mutual funds under consideration. Thus if Eq. (2.9) holds, any mean-variance investor 
initially holding the K risky assets cannot extend the investment opportunity set by investing in 
the N mutual funds.  
Note that when both rt and Rt in the regression (2.7) are excess returns or returns of zero-
investment spreads, the condition that benchmark assets form an investment portfolio, i.e. 
0 = − N K B ι ι , is satisfied automatically. In this case, a test of whether or not the initial frontier of 
benchmark assets spans or intersects the extended frontier by investing in mutual funds is 
equivalent to a test of whether  0 = α .    
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c. Generalized Sharpe Ratio 
Another frequently used measure of mutual fund performance is the Sharpe ratio which is 
defined as the excess return of a portfolio (i.e. expected return minus the risk free rate) per unit 
of standard deviation risk
11 (Sharpe (1966)). We can easily generalize the Sharpe ratio for a 













η θ          ( 2 . 1 0 )  
As discussed above, when a risk free asset exists, the zero beta rate η for every investor can 
be replaced by the risk free rate. Note that in a mean - standard deviation space, the Sharpe ratio 
of a mean-variance efficient portfolio w
* is the slope of the tangent line at w
*. Hence, the mean-
variance optimization of a portfolio is equivalent to maximization of the Sharpe ratio.  
The Sharpe ratio is obtained by using the expected return and variance of a portfolio, while 
the generalized Jensen’s alpha takes into account the covariance of a portfolio with an initial set 
of assets (Eq. (2.5)). The Sharpe ratios answer the question whether a portfolio should be 
preferred over another portfolio, whereas Jensen’s alpha answers the question whether an 
investor who currently holds K assets should invest in N new assets. However, there is a close 
relation between the two measures (as Ter Horst (1998: 41) derives): 
) ( )' ( ) ( ) (
1 2 2 η α η α η θ η θ εε J J K K N
−
+ ∑ + =        ( 2 . 1 1 )  
where   and   are the squared Sharpe ratios of the mean-variance efficient 
portfolios of N+K assets and K assets respectively, and where 
) (
2 η θ K N+ ) (
2 η θK
) (η αJ  and  can both be 
obtained from the regression (2.7).  
εε ∑
It follows from Eq. (2.11) that Jensen’s alpha determines the potential improvement in the 
maximum attainable Sharpe ratio, i.e. the Sharpe ratio of the mean-variance efficient portfolio 
including the N new assets. Thus a positive Jensen’s alpha also implies benefits from portfolio 
diversification: by combining the mutual funds under consideration and the benchmark assets, 
an investor can obtain a portfolio with a higher Sharpe ratio than the one that can be obtained by 
investing only in benchmark assets. 
 
2.4.2  Performance Evaluation Methodologies 
                                                 
11 A related performance measure is the Treynor Ratio, defined as a portfolio’s excess return per unit of its market 
risk, where the market risk exposure is measured as the  i β  of Eq. (2.12).    
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As discussed in Section 2.4.1, mutual fund performance evaluation requires an appropriate 
set of benchmark assets. Asset pricing models, from equilibrium models such as the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to models such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), use 
different benchmarks of assets. The benchmark assets can be interpreted as factor-mimicking 
portfolios of risk factors in the economy, such that a performance measure like the generalized 
Jensen’s alpha can be interpreted as a risk-adjusted return. The alpha represents a fund 
manager’s skill in selecting securities based on public and private information, to beat a passive 
factor-mimicking portfolio.    
 
a. CAPM 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model is an equilibrium model stating that the market risk is the 
only non-diversifiable risk factor in capital markets. If the CAPM holds, two benchmark assets, 
namely a market portfolio and a risk free asset, span the mean-variance frontier of all assets in 
the capital market. Although the validity of the CAPM has been questioned, the Jensen’s alpha 
computed using a single market index is still a popular measure for mutual fund performance 
(e.g. Morningstar reports alphas based on a single market index). In this traditional way of 
performance evaluation, the following regression is estimated by an OLS regression: 
         ( 2 . 1 2 )   t i t f
m
t i i M t f t i r r r r , , , , , ) ( ε β α + − + = −
where   is the return on mutual fund i over time t,   is the return of a broad market index and 
 is return on a risk free deposit. 
t i r ,
m
t r
t f r , i M , α  is the original Jensen’s alpha introduced by Jensen 
(1968) and is equivalent to the generalized Jensen’s alpha (Eq. (2.5)) with the zero beta rate 
being the risk free rate. As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, testing whether  0 , = i M α  is equivalent to 
testing whether a risk free deposit and the market portfolio span the extended efficient frontier 
including the possibility to invest in the mutual fund (in this case, the restriction of portfolio 
weights sum to one disappears as the risk free asset acts as a benchmark asset). A positive alpha 
implies that an investor who invests in a risk free deposit and a market portfolio can extend the 
investment opportunity set by taking a long position in the mutual fund, whereas a negative 
alpha suggests that indicates a short position in the fund yields a higher risk-adjusted return. If 
the CAPM holds,  i M , α  represents the skill of a fund manager in selecting mispriced securities. 
Alternatively,  i M , α  can be interpreted as the excess fund return adjusted for the market risk, 
while the mutual fund’s exposure to the market risk is measured by  i β  (in Eq. (2.12)).  
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b. Multifactor Models 
As a single factor of the market risk may not adequately characterize the behavior of 
expected equity returns, Fama and French (1993) propose a three-factor model to capture the 
cross-sectional variation in stock returns, which can also be used to evaluate mutual fund 





t si t f
m
t mi i FF t f t i r r r r r r , , , , , ) ( ε β β β α + + + − + = −      ( 2 . 1 3 )  
where  is the difference in returns between a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of big 
stocks, and   is the difference in returns between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks 





0 , = i FF α  is equivalent to 
testing whether or not the mean-variance frontier of the extended set of assets coincides with the 
frontier of a risk free deposit, the market portfolio, the spread between small and big stocks, and 
the spread between high and low book-to-market stocks. Note that as both   and  are 
zero-investment portfolios and a risk free asset exists, the portfolio constraint of the spanning 
test is satisfied. Alternatively,  ,   and   can be interpreted as three zero-
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i FF, α  is the fund return adjusted for the three 
risk factors.  
 Fama and French (1996) report that their three-factor model cannot explain the anomaly 
of the continuation of short-term returns. Carhart (1997) extends the Fama-French model by 
adding a momentum factor:  






t si t f
m
t mi i C t f t i r r r r r r r ,
1
, , , , ) ( ε β β β β α + + + + − + = −
where  is the current month’s difference in returns between the previous year’s best-
performing and worst-performing stocks. From the mean-variance framework described in 
Section 2.4.1, it follows that an investor initially holds a risk free deposit, a market portfolio, 







t r 0 , = i C α  is equivalent 
to testing whether the mean-variance frontier coincides with the initial frontier after adding the 
mutual fund. Alternatively, Eq. (2.14) can be interpreted as a pricing model with four risk 
factors, namely the market, size, book-to-market and momentum.  
 
c. Conditional Strategies 
Until now we have assumed that the expected returns and covariance of mutual funds and 
benchmark assets are constant over time. However, the expected returns of stocks and bonds 
vary over time (Keim and Stambaugh (1986)). Public information on the economic condition, 
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such as interest rates and stock dividend yields, can predict the changes in expected returns over 
time. In the mean-variance analysis framework introduced in Section 2.4.1, mean-variance 
optimizing behavior crucially depends on the first and second moments of returns. When 
expected returns change over time, so do the optimal portfolio weights and consequently the 
efficient frontier as well. This implies that an investor’s decision to invest in mutual funds 
depends on changing economic conditions. 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) propose a simple method to incorporate conditional information 
in measuring mutual fund performance. Consider the case of one mutual fund and two 
benchmark assets, namely a risk free deposit and a market portfolio. Assume that the exposure 
to market risk ( t i, β ) is a linear combination of a time-constant beta ( 0 i β ) and a time-varying 
beta ( 1 1 ' − t i z β ):  t i, β = 1 1 0 ' − + t i i z β β , where  is an information set including L variables that 
reflect the current state of the economy. Both 
1 − t z
1 i β  and  are L dimensional row vectors, and 
consequently 
1 − t z
1 1 ' − t i z β  and  t i, β  are time-varying scalars. Frequently used information variables 
are short-term T-bill rates, dividend yields of a market index, term spread (the difference in the 
yield between long and short term bonds), and the corporate bond yield spread (the difference in 
yield between low and high grade bonds). The following conditional one factor model is 
estimated via an OLS regression: 
t i t f
m
t t i t f
m
t i i FS t f t i r r z r r r r , , 1 1 , 0 , , , )) ( ' ( ) ( ε β β α + − + − + = − −     (2.15) 
where  can be interpreted as the excess return of investing  units in the market 
portfolio at period t. Compared to the unconditional one-factor model of Eq. (2.12), the 
conditional one-factor model has L+1 factors. It is straightforward to extend the above 
conditional model to a conditional K factor model. The model has (L+1)*K factors to estimate, 
which implies a disadvantage of this model induced by a degrees-of-freedom problem. Similar 
to other multifactor models with a risk free asset, a test on the abnormal performance of a mutual 
fund is equivalent to testing whether 
) ( ' , 1 t f
m
t t r r z − − 1 − t z
0 , = i FS α . A positive alpha indicates that an investor who 
follows a dynamic strategy to invest in the market portfolio and a risk free deposit, can extend 
the investment opportunity set by taking a long position in this fund, whereas a negative alpha 
implies a short position in the fund.  
 
d. Seemingly Unrelated Assets 
As discussed before, Eq. (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14) can be interpreted as (multi-)factor 
pricing models, in which the benchmark assets are factor mimicking portfolios. In this 
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framework, a common interpretation of alpha, conditional on the validity of a pricing model, is 
that it represents the skills of a fund manager in selecting securities. However, Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2002b) argue that a nonzero alpha need not reflect fund managers’ selection skills if 
some passive assets can also generate nonzero alphas. In that scenario, a fund manager could 
achieve a positive alpha without any selection skills by investing in non-benchmark passive 
assets with historically positive alphas. To evaluate the fund managers’ selection skills, Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2002a,b) propose to extend the Carhart (1997) model by adding returns of 
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t mi i PS t f t i r r r r r r r r ,
1
, , , , ' ) ( ε β β β β β α + + + + + − + = −  (2.16) 
where  is a 4-dimensional row vector of returns of the following four SUAs. The first 
seemingly unrelated asset is a characteristics-matched spread (denoted as CMS) with a long 
position in low 
sua
t r
hi β stocks (as measured by Eq. (2.13)) and a short position in high  hi β stocks. 
The other three seemingly unrelated passive assets (denoted as IP1, IP2, and IP3) are 
constructed from a universe a 20 value-weighted industry portfolios. The latter three portfolios 
mimic the first three principal components of the disturbances in the multiple regressions of the 
20 value-weighted industry returns on the other passive returns:  and 
. The inclusion of the passive asset CMS is motivated by the empirical evidence that CMS 
may be mispriced by the Fama-French three factors (Daniel and Titman (1997)). The returns of 









t r r r r r
1
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cms
t r
0 ≠ ui β . .   
In this model, an investor holds a risk free deposit, a market portfolio,   and  . She 
also follows a momentum strategy, and invests in four passive assets that could generate positive 





0 , = i PS α  is equivalent to testing whether the mean-variance frontier after adding the mutual 
fund coincides with that of the initial investment opportunity set. Note that Eq. (2.16) cannot be 
interpreted as a pricing model, because  is the return on the SUAs rather than on the 
mimicking portfolios of risk factors.  
sua
t r
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that the alpha in the Carhart (1997) model 
( i C, α in Eq. (2.14)) can also be computed from the estimates of Eq. (2.16): 
i ui i PS i C a ' , , β α α + =          ( 2 . 1 7 )  
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where  i PS, α and  ui β are obtained from regression (2.16), and ai is the intercept in a multiple 











i indicates mispricing of SUA, which would lead to a nonzero  i C, α  if  0 ≠ ui β . In Eq. 
(2.17), the Carhart (1997) alpha  i C, α  is decomposed into two elements: the manager’s skills in 
active stock selection ( i PS, α ) and the exposure to the seemingly unrelated passive assets 
( i ui a ' β ). 
 
e. Empirical Findings on Mutual Fund Performance 
Since the publication of Jensen (1968), academics have debated the issue whether or not 
active portfolio management adds value to investors. The majority of studies conclude that 
actively managed mutual funds, on average, underperform passively managed portfolios 
tracking market indices. For example, Gruber (1996) finds that the average mutual fund in the 
US underperformed the market indices by 65 basis points per year over the period from 1985 to 
1994. Furthermore, Carhart (1997) shows that fund returns are negatively correlated with fund 
expense levels and trading activities.  
Using a different approach, some studies investigate the performance of the stocks held in 
mutual fund portfolios, rather than the performance of mutual funds. These studies (e.g. 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989)) show that fund managers that actively trade possess significant 
stock-picking talent, i.e. fund managers have the ability to choose stocks that outperform their 
benchmarks. Wermers (2000) provides a comprehensive analysis of performance of US mutual 
funds over the period from 1975 to 1994. He finds that mutual funds hold stocks that outperform 
the market by 1.3% per annum, but the funds’ net returns (i.e. after deducting fees) 
underperform by 1% per annum. Of this 2.3% difference in performance, 0.7% is due to the 
underperformance of non-stock holdings (e.g. cash), 0.8% is due to fund expenses (i.e. 
management fees) and the other 0.8% can be explained by transaction costs. The results suggest 
that fund managers pick stocks well enough to cover their costs, which supports the claim that 
there is value in active portfolio management.  
 
2.4.3 Related  Performance  Measures 
The previous subsection presented various models which can evaluate whether or not a 
mutual fund manager has superior stock selection skills to beat a set of passive benchmark 
assets. In this section we discuss two additional methodologies used to evaluate mutual fund 
performance, namely a test of market-timing ability and return-based style analysis. 
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a. Market-Timing 
Asset pricing models such as the CAPM predict that a portfolio’s excess return is a linear 
function of the excess return of the market portfolio. However, if a mutual fund manager has a 
special ability to time the market, i.e. to increase the fund’s exposure to the market portfolio 
prior to a market increase and to decrease the exposure prior to a market decline, the fund’s 
return will be a non-linear function of the market return. To test for the “market-timing” ability 
of a fund manager, Treynor and Mazuy (1966) add a quadratic term to the standard CAPM 
regression in Eq. (2.12): 
t i t f
m
t i TM t f
m
t i i t f t i r r r r r r ,
2
, , , , , ) ( ) ( ε γ β α + − + − + = −      ( 2 . 1 8 )      
where  i TM , γ measures timing ability. If a mutual fund manager increases the fund’s market 
exposure prior to a market increase or reduces the market exposure prior to a market decline, the 
fund’s return will be a convex function of the market return, and  i TM , γ will be positive.  
Henriksson and Merton (1981) propose to test the market-timing ability by employing the 
following regression: 




t i HM t f
m
t i i t f t i r r r r I r r r r , , , , , , , ) }( { ) ( ε γ β α + − > + − + = −   (2.19)     
where   is an indicator variable that equals one if  and zero if  . In 
this model, a fund manager decides between two levels of market exposure: 
} { ,t f
m
t r r I > t f
m
t r r , > t f
m
t r r , ≤
i β is the fund’s 
market exposure when the excess return of the market portfolio is negative, and  i HM i , γ β + is the 
market exposure when the excess market return is positive. Consequently,  i HM , γ measures the 
difference in the exposures between during the market upturn and the downturn. A positive 
i HM , γ indicates that the fund manager is able to time the market.  
Note that the non-linear terms in Eq. (2.18) and (2.19) are not returns on benchmark assets 
or investment strategies, and consequently the alphas in both tests of timing ability do not 
answer the question whether or not an investor can extend the mean-variance frontier of initial 
assets by investing in the mutual fund. A positive  i TM , γ or  i HM , γ can be interpreted as market-
timing ability of a mutual fund manager. The above two studies analyze monthly returns of 
mutual funds and find little evidence of timing ability. However, using daily returns of mutual 
funds, Bollen and Busse (2001) demonstrate that mutual funds exhibit significant timing ability. 
 
b.  Return-based Style Analysis 
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It is widely known that asset allocation is important in determining the return of an 
investor’s portfolio. Asset allocation is referred to as the determination of the portfolio weights 
across a number of asset classes. Examples of such asset classes are growth stocks, value stocks, 
bonds, sector portfolios or country portfolios. Although mutual funds report their investment 
objectives (styles), the actual asset allocation of mutual funds does not always correspond to the 
reported style (Brown and Goetzmann (1997)). Return-based style analysis, introduced by 
Sharpe (1992), is a popular way to estimate mutual funds’ investment styles and exposures to 
major asset classes. In style analysis, the following regression is estimated:   
t i t i i t i R r , , ε β α + + =          ( 2 . 2 0 )  
s.t. 1 ' = K i ι β           ( 2 . 2 0 a )  
0 ≥ i β            (2.20b) 
where ri,t is the return of mutual fund i in period t, Rt is the return of K asset classes, and  t i, ε is 
the idiosyncratic fund return independent of all K asset classes, implying that OLS estimates of 
i α  and  i β are consistent.  
Regression (2.20) under both the portfolio restriction (Eq. (2.20a)) and the no short-selling 
constraint (Eq. (2.20b)) is referred to as strong style analysis.  t i i , ε α + is also known as the 
tracking error, which measures the difference in expected return between the mutual fund and 
the mimicking portfolio. Thus,  i α  is the average tracking error.  i β  reflects the relative portfolio 
weight of the mimicking portfolio, a portfolio that yields the lowest tracking error variance. 
Semi-strong style analysis refers to the case when only a portfolio constraint is imposed, and 
weak style analysis is referred to the case without constraints.  
In the semi-strong style analysis, De Roon, Nijman and Ter Horst (2004) show that the  i α  
equals the generalized Jensen’s alpha (Eq. (2.5)) of an investor with the zero-beta rate being the 
expected return on the Global Minimum-Variance (GMV) portfolio. If one of the benchmark 
assets is a risk free deposit, the return on the GMV portfolio equals the risk-free rate. In this 
case, ri,t and Rt in Eq. (2.20) can be replaced by the returns in excess of the risk-free rate, and 
testing whether  0 = i α  is equivalent to testing whether the initial frontier of K benchmark assets 
spans the frontier of the extended assets.   
In the strong style analysis, the interpretation of alpha is similar to semi-strong style 
analysis, except that the benchmark portfolios become the subset of benchmark assets for which 
the positive constraints are not binding. Note that if the actual factor loadings are positive, the no 
short-selling constraint leads to efficiency gains; otherwise imposing the no short-selling 
 Chapter 2  34
constraint may lead to biased estimates of factor loadings. Moreover, given that the estimated 
style coefficients are truncated at zero, the confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients 
should to be adjusted as the standard errors are not normally distributed. 
Note that style analysis uses a multifactor model to explain fund returns, which only works 
well if fund returns are highly correlated with the returns of benchmark assets. Sharpe (1992) 




2.5.  Portfolio-level Analysis on SRI 
Most academic research on socially responsible investments focuses on analyzing their 
performance. Whether SRI portfolios underperform or outperform their conventional peers is the 
major research question. In this section, we review the empirical findings on the performance 
and money-flows of socially responsible mutual funds. 
 
2.5.1  Research Hypotheses and Methodologies 
Ethical funds apply various screening processes to retain stocks complying with specific 
social, environmental, ethical and corporate governance criteria. These screens may have 
important implications for the performance of ethical funds. Essentially, there are three 
hypotheses about the performance of SRI portfolios relative to non-SRI portfolios. The first two 
hypotheses are about risk-adjusted returns (alphas), while the last hypothesis is about the risk 
exposures (betas) of SRI portfolios. 
The first hypothesis is that SRI portfolios underperform conventional portfolios. SRI 
screens impose a constraint on the investment universe that is available to non-SRI investors. 
This constraint limits the diversification possibilities and consequently shifts the mean-variance 
frontier towards less favorable risk-return tradeoffs than those of conventional portfolios. Hong 
and Kacperczyk (2005) nevertheless show that ‘sin’ stocks in the US, i.e. companies involved in 
producing alcohol, tobacco and gambling, have historically outperform the stock market by 
9.1% per annum. Divesting from this underpriced ‘sin’ part of the stock market may negatively 
influence the risk-return tradeoffs of the SRI funds in comparison to conventional funds. 
Moreover, the SRI screening processes bring about additional expenses to fund investors, which 
                                                 
12 In the case of hedge funds, there should be no short-selling constraint (Eq. (2.20b)). The portfolio constraint (Eq. 
(2.20a)) can bias the estimates of style analysis as hedge funds actually use leverage and short-selling strategies. In 
addition, hedge funds have low correlations with major asset classes. To account for this problem, Fung and Hsieh 
(1997) extract five principal components from hedge fund returns, and construct five style factors whose returns are 
highly correlated with the principal components. 
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also reduce SRI returns. Note that this hypothesis implies that more stringent social screening 
will lead to a less favorable financial performance.  
The second hypothesis is that SRI portfolios outperform their conventional peers. As 
discussed in Section 2.3, the empirical research shows that the information on corporate 
governance and environmental performance may be underpriced by the stock markets. Portfolios 
constructed by means of corporate governance, environmental and social criteria may 
outperform their benchmarks. Therefore, SRI screening processes generate value-relevant non-
public information that helps fund managers to select securities and consequently generate better 
risk-adjusted returns (alphas) than conventional mutual funds. This is the case where investors 
are doing (financially) well while doing (socially) good, i.e. investors earn positive risk-adjusted 
returns while at the same time participating in a good cause. There are two arguments supporting 
this ’outperformance’ hypothesis: first, sound social and environmental performance is a 
positive signal of good managerial skills, which translates into favorable financial performance; 
second, social and environmental screening reduces the possibility of incurring high costs during 
corporate social crisis or environmental disasters. These arguments imply that more stringent 
social screening may lead to better financial performance. A key assumption underlying the 
‘outperformance’ hypothesis is that conventional portfolio managers do not use the above value-
relevant information, which is at odds with the market efficiency story.  
The third hypothesis is that SRI portfolios have different risk exposures and therefore 
different expected returns from conventional portfolios. Social and environmental factors may 
be correlated with pricing risk factors. For example, companies with sound environmental 
performance may have a lower book-to-market ratio than companies with poor environmental 
performance (Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000)). Consequently an environmentally responsible 
portfolio may have a lower risk exposure to the book-to-market factor in the Fama-French 
(1993) pricing model than a conventional portfolio. Therefore the risk exposures and expected 
return of an SRI portfolio may be different from those of a conventional portfolio. Note that 
social, environmental or ethical screens may have a different impact on the risk exposures of 
SRI portfolios. 
The above hypotheses are in line with the arguments used by investors to choose 
conventional funds. The first hypothesis that SRI has a diversification cost implies that 
conventional mutual funds also have a diversification cost as they invest in a subset of assets 
that are included in the market portfolio. The second hypothesis that SRI screens help fund 
managers selecting securities is comparable to the argument that conventional mutual funds can 
outperform the market as fund managers receive private information and have special skills in 
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selecting mispriced securities. Moreover, whether the third hypothesis, i.e. the social and 
environmental factors correlate with the pricing risk factors, holds or not, has important 
implications for asset allocation decisions. For instance, particular SRI screens may affect funds’ 
investment styles such as small-cap versus large-cap, or value versus growth stocks.   
Finally, the methodology used to evaluate SRI fund performance has evolved over time. 
Early research measures the performance of an SRI portfolio using a single index model like the 
CAPM (Luther, Matatko and Corner (1992), Hamilton, Joe and Statman (1993) and Sauer 
(1997)). In addition, most studies compare the performance of SRI funds with that of a reference 
group of conventional mutual funds. It was common to identify the reference group by a 
“matched-pair” analysis: an SRI fund is matched to a conventional mutual fund with similar 
investment objective and fund size (Mallin et al. (1995), Gregory et al. (1997), Statman (2000), 
and Kreander et al. (2005)). Recently, several studies applied multifactor models, such as the 
four-factor model proposed by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) to evaluate SRI 
performance. Multifactor models provide important insights into the exposure of SRI mutual 
funds to pricing risk factors such as size, book-to-market and momentum factors (Bauer et al. 
(2005), and Geczy et al. (2003)). All the studies use monthly data except Kreander et al. (2005) 
who use weekly data. We will discuss the methodologies and findings of these papers in the 
following sections.  
 
2.5.2  Performance of SRI Funds in the US 
a. Risk-Adjusted Returns of SRI funds 
There are several studies evaluating SRI fund performance in the US. Hamilton, Joe and 
Statman (1993) investigate the performance of 32 SRI funds and 320 randomly selected non-SRI 
funds in the US for the period of 1981-1990. The CAPM-based Jensen’s alpha is measured 
against the value-weighted NYSE index. For the 17 SRI funds with a longer history, i.e. 
established before 1985, the average alpha is –0.06% per month, which is higher than the 
average monthly alpha (–0.14%) of the corresponding 170 non-SRI funds. Meanwhile for the 15 
SRI funds with a shorter history, i.e. established after 1985, the average alpha is –0.28% per 
month, which is worse than the average monthly alpha (–0.04%) of the corresponding 150 non-
SRI funds. Note that the difference in average alphas between SRI funds and non-SRI funds is 
not statistically significant. 
For the period of 1990-1998, Statman (2000) investigates the performance of 31 SRI funds 
in the US. The reference group contains 62 non-ethical funds that have similar fund size to 
ethical funds. The two groups of funds have similar average expense ratios: 1.50% for SRI funds  
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Table 2.4: Research methodologies of SRI studies 
 
This table summarizes the research methodologies of studies on socially responsible mutual funds.  
 




Market Indices  Reference Group  
(non-SRI funds) 
Luther, Matatko and 
Corner (1992) 
UK  1984-1990  15  CAPM   FT All Share Index  
or MSCI World 
Index 
No comparisons with 
non-SRI funds. 
Luther and Matatko 
(1994) 
UK  1984-1992  9  CAPM   FT All Share Index  
or a Small Cap 
Index 
No comparisons with 
non-SRI funds. 
 




32 CAPM   Value-weighted 
NYSE Index 
320 non-SRI funds, 
randomly selected 
 
Mallin, Saadouni & 
Briston (1995) 
UK  1986-1993  29  CAPM  FT All Shares Index  29 non-SRI funds, 
matched by fund size 
and age 
Gregory, Matatko and 
Luther (1997) 
UK 1986-1994  18  A  two-factor 
model with 
two indices 
FT All Shares Index 
and Hoare Govett 
Small Cap index 
18 non-SRI funds, 
matched by fund size, 




and Diltz (1999) 
US 1981-1997  49 
 
CAPM   Wilshire 5000 
Equity Index (for 
equity funds) 
180 non-SRI funds, 
matched by 
investment objective, 
fund size and market 
beta. 
 
Statman (2000)  US  1990-1998  31   CAPM   S&P 500 
or DSI 400 Index 
62 non-SRI funds, 
matched by fund size. 
 
Geczy, Stambaugh 
and Levin (2003) 














894 non-SRI funds, 
including dead funds  


















MSCI World Index 
and  Salomon Smith 




S&P 500 and 
Wilshire Small Cap 
250 Index (for 
domestic US funds) 
 
 
No comparisons with 
non-SRI funds. 
Kreander, Gray, 


















MSCI World Index.  40 non-SRI funds, 
matched by fund size, 
age, country, and 
investment universe. 
Bauer, Koedijk and 
Otten (2005) 
Germany, 







MSCI World Index 
or DJ Sustainability 
Global Index (for 
international funds); 
4384 non-SRI funds 
(Germany 114, UK 
396, US 3874), 
including dead funds 











FT All Share Index 
or EIRIS ethical 
balance (for UK 
domestic funds) 
 
S&P 500 or DSI 



















649 non-SRI funds in 
the UK 
Bauer, Otten and 
Tourani Rad, (2006) 










index or Westpac 
Monash Eco Index 
281 non-SRI funds 
including dead funds. 
Bauer, Derwall and 
Otten (2006) 










Index or Jantze 
Social Index 
267 non-SRI funds 
including dead funds. 
Barnett and Salomon 
(2006) 







No comparisons with 
non-SRI funds. 



















716 non-SRI funds in 
the UK and 12,624 




and 1.56% for non-SRI funds. Note that the author reports that there are no dead SRI funds in 
the sample period, and therefore the SRI fund sample is survivorship free. The Jensen’s alpha is 
measured against the S&P 500 Index, while the author also shows that choosing the Domini 400 
Social Index (DSI 400), the most well known SRI Index, as a benchmark does not change the 
results.  The average monthly alpha is –0.42% for SRI funds and –0.62% for non-SRI funds, 
while the difference between them is not significant (the t-statistic is 1.84). The finding suggests 
that the performance of SRI funds is not significantly different from that of non-SRI funds, 
although investing in neither SRI funds nor non-SRI funds can extend the mean-variance 
frontier of initial assets including the market portfolio and a risk-free deposit. In addition, the 
paper also documents that the DSI 400 index has a higher Sharpe ratio than the S&P 500 index 
 Socially Responsible Investments: Methodology, Risk Exposure and Performance  39
(0.97 vs. 0.92), which indicates that a mean-variance optimizing investor should prefer investing 
in the first index. 
 
b.  Diversification Cost of Investing in SRI Funds 
  Comparing the average performance of SRI funds to that of non-SRI funds does not 
necessarily provide useful information to an investor who can selectively invest in a subset of 
mutual funds. Unlike the above-mentioned studies, Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003) 
investigate the diversification cost of an investor who invests in SRI funds but not in 
conventional mutual funds for the period 1963-2001. The authors construct optimal portfolios of 
mutual funds for mean-variance investors with short-sale constraints. In a Bayesian framework, 
each optimization uses the predictive distribution of fund returns conditional upon a range of 
prior beliefs about model mispricing and manager skills. Then, the optimal portfolio of funds 
selected from 35 SRI funds is compared to the optimal portfolio selected from a universe of 894 
non-SRI funds. The diversification cost of imposing the SRI constraint is measured by the 
difference between the certainty-equivalent returns (Eq. (2.2)) on the two portfolios. This 
financial cost can be interpreted as a lower bound on the value of the non-financial utility that an 
investor should derive from socially responsible investing.  
This study reveals the significant financial costs of imposing the SRI constraint on mean-
variance optimizing investors. It also demonstrates that the SRI cost depends on investors’ 
believes in asset pricing models and fund managers’ stock-picking skills. To an investor who 
strongly believes in the CAPM and rules out selection skill, i.e. a market index investor, the 
financial cost of the SRI constraint is just 5 basis points per month. To an investor who still 
disallows skill but instead believes in multifactor pricing models such as the four-factor model 
proposed by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), the cost of the SRI constraint is at 
least 30 basis points per month. The SRI constraint imposes large costs, more than 1.5% per 
month, on investors whose beliefs allow selection skill, i.e. investors who rely heavily on 
individual funds’ historical risk-adjusted returns to predict future performance. Moreover, 
further restricting the SRI universe to the funds that screen out “sin” stocks (e.g. alcohol, 
tobacco or gambling) increases the monthly cost of the SRI constraint by an additional 10 basis 
points. 
 In addition, Geczy et al. (2003) also show that there are important differences in some 
basic characteristics and the risk exposures between SRI and non-SRI funds. For the funds in 
their sample, the average expense ratio of SRI funds is higher than that of non-SRI funds (1.33% 
vs. 1.10%), whereas the average annual turnover of SRI funds is much lower than that of non-
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SRI funds (81.5% vs. 175.4%). The SRI funds have a smaller size than non-SRI funds: the 
average asset under management (across time and across funds) amounts to $149 million and 
$257 million, respectively. In order to make their results comparable to earlier research, the 
authors also compare the performance of an equally weighted portfolio of 35 SRI funds to an 
equally weighted portfolio of 894 non-SRI funds. The monthly alpha, measured by the Carhart 
(1997) model extended with seemingly unrelated assets (Eq. (2.16)), of the first portfolio is 
higher than that of the second one (0.21% vs. 0.08%), but the difference is insignificant. This 
finding is consistent with the results of other studies, namely that SRI funds perform no worse 
than non-SRI funds. Meanwhile, the risk exposure of the SRI portfolio to the size factor (SMB 
factor) is higher than that of the non-SRI portfolio (0.20 vs. 0.16). This implies that SRI funds 
are biased towards small-cap companies. The exposures to the momentum factor and book-to-
market factor are similar for the two portfolios.  
 
c.  Impact of Investment Screens on SRI Fund Performance 
The above-mentioned studies compare the performance of SRI funds with non-SRI ones, 
but they do not distinguish between SRI funds that use different investment screens. However, 
as discussed in Section 2.5.1, investment screens may affect the risk-exposures and risk-adjusted 
returns of SRI funds. In the academic literature, few attempts have been made to investigate the 
impact of investment screens on SRI fund performance. Goldreyer, Ahmed and Diltz (1999) 
study the performance of 49 SRI funds for the period of 1981–1997, which include 29 equity 
funds, 9 bond funds and 11 balanced funds. The average Jensen’s alpha of the 29 SRI equity 
funds is –0.49% per annum, whereas that of 20 non-SRI equity funds is 2.78%. The difference 
between the two average alphas is not significant, which indicates the performance of these two 
groups of funds is not dissimilar. Perhaps the most interesting finding of this paper is that the 
SRI funds using positive screens outperform SRI funds that do not employ positive screens. The 
average monthly alpha for equity SRI funds with and without positive screens is –0.11% and –
0.81%, respectively. The difference is statistically significant (the t-statistic is 3.36). This 
finding, although based on a small sample of 29 funds, supports the hypothesis that investments 
screens affect the performance of SRI funds.  
A recent study by Barnett and Salomon (2006) examines whether or not more stringent 
social screens lead to better financial returns of 67 SRI funds. The authors document a non-
linear relationship between fund performance and investment screens. When the number of 
social screens (both positive and negative ones) increases, the fund’s annual return declines at 
first, but then rebounds as the number of screens reaches a maximum. Note that this paper  
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Table 2.5: Empirical findings of SRI studies  
 
This table summarizes the empirical findings of studies on socially responsible mutual funds.  
 




UK  The Jensen’s alphas of ethical funds have mean of 0.03% per month (not significantly different from 





UK  The Jensen’s alphas of ethical funds are measured against the FT All Share Index or against a Small-
Cap Index. R-squared is higher in the first regression than the second one, which implies that the SRI 
portfolio is biased towards small-caps. The average alphas measured in both ways are not 





US  For 17 SRI funds established before 1985, the average alpha is –0.06% per month, which is higher 
than the average monthly alpha (–0.14%) of 170 non-SRI funds (the difference is not significant). 
Meanwhile for the 15 SRI funds with shorter history, i.e. established after 1985, the average alpha is 
–0.28% per month, which is worse than the average monthly alpha (–0.04%) of the corresponding 





UK  The monthly alphas of ethical funds range from -0.28% to 1.21%, while 22 out of the 29 alphas are 
positive. Alphas of non-ethical funds, 23 of which being positive, range from -0.41% to 1.56% per 





UK  The alphas of ethical funds range from –0.71% to 0.24% per month (almost all are not significant). In 
a regression with both ethical and non-ethical funds, the ethical fund dummy does not have a 
significant impact on fund performance after controlling for fund age, size, and the market risk. Most 





US  The average Jensen’s alpha of 29 SRI equity funds is –0.49% per annum, whereas that of 20 non-SRI 
equity funds is 2.78%. The difference is not significant. SRI funds using positive screens outperform 
the SRI funds that do not (the average monthly alphas are –0.11% and –0.81%, respectively, and the 




US  The average monthly alpha is –0.42% for SRI funds and –0.62% for non-SRI funds; the difference is 
not significant (t-statistics = 1.84). The DSI 400 index has a higher Sharpe ratio than the S&P 500 








The monthly alphas range from –2.06% to 0.87%. 38 out of the 46 alphas are negative; only 4 of 
them are significant at 0.05 level. SRI funds do not significantly underperform the benchmark 
portfolio consisting of both large stocks and small stocks. Note that 11 out of the 16 German and 
Swiss funds have higher exposures to the small-cap index than to the large-cap index. Only 5 out of 
the 46 funds have positive timing ability, while 7 fund managers time the market in the wrong 






US  The average expense ratio of SRI funds is higher than that of non-SRI funds (1.33% vs. 1.10%), 
whereas the average annual turnover of SRI funds is much lower than that of non-SRI funds (81.5% 
vs. 175.4%). The SRI funds have much smaller size than non-SRI funds: the average asset under 
management (across time and across funds) is $149 million and $257 million respectively.  
 
The monthly alpha of the SRI portfolio is higher than that of the non-SRI portfolio (0.21% vs. 
0.08%), but the difference is insignificant. Meanwhile, the risk exposure of the SRI portfolio to the 
size factor (SMB factor) is higher than that of the non-SRI portfolio (0.20 vs. 0.16). .  
 
To a market index investor the financial cost of the SRI constraint is 5 basis points per month. The 
SRI constraint imposes large costs, more than 1.5% per month, on investors whose beliefs allow 
selection skill. Moreover, further restricting the SRI universe to the funds that screen out “sin” stocks 







 Europe  The average Jensen’s alphas of SRI and non-SRI funds are 0.20% and 0.12% per month, respectively 
(difference is statistically insignificant). In addition, the market timing coefficients are similar for the 
two types of funds (-0.29 vs. –0.28), and each of them is significant at the 0.05 level. However, the 
signs of the timing coefficients are negative, which implies that both SRI and non-SRI fund managers 
time the market in the wrong direction. 
 
Bauer,  Germany Ethical funds have smaller size and higher expense ratio than conventional funds. The average 




and US  
monthly alphas of SRI funds are 0.29%, 0.09% and –0.05% for Germany, UK domestic and US 
domestic funds, respectively. The US domestic ethical funds significantly underperform conventional 
domestic funds, while for US international funds the difference in returns between ethical and 
conventional funds is insignificant. The UK ethical funds, both domestic and international funds, 
significantly outperform conventional funds. The difference in average alphas between German SRI 
and non-SRI funds is insignificant. Overall, there is little evidence of significant differences in risk-
adjusted returns between SRI and non-SRI funds. 
 
For German and US ethical funds: after significant underperformance in the early 1990s, they match 
conventional fund performance over 1998-2001. Older ethical funds (launched before 1998) 
outperform younger ethical funds. German and UK ethical funds are heavily exposed to small-cap 
stocks while US funds are less so. All SRI funds are more growth- than value-oriented.  
 
Renneboog, 




Ethical money chases past returns. In contrast to conventional funds’ investors, SRI investors care 
less about the funds’ risks and fees. Funds characterized by shareholder activism and by in-house SRI 
research attract more stable investors. Membership of a large SRI fund family creates higher flow 
volatility due to the lower fees to reallocate money within the fund family. SRI funds receiving most 
of the money-inflows perform worse in the future, which is consistent with theories of decreasing 
returns to scale in the mutual fund industry. Finally, funds employing a higher number of SRI screens 
to model their investment universe receive larger money-inflows and perform better in the future than 





Australia  Domestic ethical funds underperform domestic conventional funds by –1.56% per year. International 






Canada  The difference in average alphas is insignificant between the SRI funds and non-SRI funds (-0.21% 





US  When the number of social screens used by an SRI fund increases, the fund’s annual return declines 
at first, but rebounds as the number of screens reaches a maximum.  
 
Zhang (2006)  World-
wide 
Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in many European and Asia-Pacific 
countries strongly underperform domestic benchmark portfolios. For instance, the risk-adjusted 
returns of the average SRI funds in Belgium, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden 
are on average less than –5% per annum. SRI investors are unable to identify the funds that will 
outperform in the future, whereas they show some fund-selection ability in identifying ethical funds 
that will perform poorly in the future. SRI funds are gradually converging to conventional funds by 
holding a more diversified range of assets in their portfolios. Finally, the screening activities of SRI 
funds have a significant impact on funds’ risk-adjusted returns and loadings on risk factors. 
 
 
examines expected returns rather than risk-adjusted returns. Given that the expected return 
consists of both risk-adjusted returns and loadings on risk premium, it would be interesting to 
see how investment screens influence each of these two components separately.   
   
2.5.3  Performance of SRI Funds in the UK 
A few studies investigate the performance of ethical funds in the UK. Luther, Matatko and 
Corner (1992) study 15 ethical funds in the UK for the 1984-1990 period. The Jensen’s alphas of 
the ethical funds, obtained by regressions on either FT All Share Index or MSCI World Index, 
have a mean of 0.03% per month, which is not significantly different from zero. This implies 
that ethical funds have a similar performance as the benchmark assets. The authors also 
document that the ethical funds have relatively high portfolio weights on small-cap companies. 
To control for the potential small-cap bias of ethical funds, Luther and Matatko (1994) measure 
the Jensen’s alphas of 9 ethical funds in two ways, either against the FT All Share Index or 
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against a Small-Cap Index. The authors find that the R-squared is higher in the first regression 
than the second one, which supports the hypothesis that the SRI portfolio is biased towards 
small-caps. Moreover, the average alphas measured in both these ways are not significantly 
different from zero.  
Unlike the above-mentioned UK studies, Mallin, Saadouni and Briston (1995) compare the 
Jensen’s alphas of 29 ethical funds to those of 29 non-ethical funds with a similar fund size and 
age. The monthly alphas of ethical funds range from -0.28% to 1.21%, while 22 out of the 29 
alphas are positive. The alphas of non-ethical funds, 23 of which being positive, range from -
0.41% to 1.56% per month. There is little evidence that the two groups of funds have different 
risk-adjusted returns. Gregory, Matatko and Luther (1997) examine 18 ethical funds out of the 
above 29 funds for the 1986-1994 period. The reference group contains 18 non-ethical funds that 
have similar fund size, age, and investment area to the ethical funds. To account for the small-
cap bias, Jensen’s alphas are calculated based on two factors, namely the FT All Shares Index 
and the Hoare Govett Small Cap Index. The authors find that the two-factor model has a higher 
adjusted R-squared than a single-factor model, and that most of the ethical funds have a 
significant exposure to the small-cap factor. The alphas of ethical funds range from –0.71% to 
0.24% per month, but almost all are not significant. Moreover, in a regression with both ethical 
and non-ethical funds, the indicator variable of ethical funds does not have significant impact on 
fund performance after controlling for fund age, size, and the market risk. This implies that the 
difference in performance between an SRI fund and a non-SRI fund is not statistically 
significant.  
 
2.5.4  Performance of International SRI Funds 
There are several recent studies investigating the performance of SRI funds in countries 
other than the US and UK. For the short period of 1996-1998, Kreander, Gray, Power and 
Sinclair (2005) study the performance of 40 SRI funds in Europe using weekly data. The 
countries covered in the  
 
sample include Belgium (1 fund), Germany (4 funds), Netherlands (2 funds), Norway (2 funds), 
Sweden (11 funds), Swiss (2 funds) and the UK (18 funds). The reference group to the SRI 
funds consists of 40 non-SRI funds that are from the same countries and have similar fund size, 
age, and investment universe with the SRI funds. The average Jensen’s alpha of SRI funds and 
non-SRI ones is similar (0.20% vs. 0.12% per month), and the difference is statistically 
insignificant. This finding is consistent with the results of previous studies showing that the 
performance of SRI funds and non-SRI funds are very similar. In addition, the authors test the 
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market timing ability of SRI and non-SRI fund managers, using the Henriksson and Merton 
(1981) model (Eq. (2.19)). The timing coefficients are also similar for the two types of funds (-
0.29 vs. –0.28), and each of them is significant at the 0.05 level. However, the signs of the 
timing coefficients are negative, which seems to signify that both SRI and non-SRI fund 
managers time the market in the wrong direction.  
Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2005) compare the performance of 103 SRI funds with 4,384 
non-SRI funds for the 1990-2001 period. The SRI funds were taken from the following 
countries: Germany (16 funds), UK (32 funds) and US (55 funds). The sample is survivorship 
free, as it includes dead funds (all of which are non-SRI funds). Ignoring dead funds would 
overestimate the average returns of the non-SRI funds in by 0.01%, 0.02%, 0.03% per month for 
the three countries respectively. Fund performance is measured by the Carhart (1997) model 
(Eq. (2.14)). As documented in previous studies, ethical funds have a smaller size and charge 
higher management fees than conventional funds. The average monthly alphas of SRI funds are 
0.29%, 0.09% and –0.05% for German, UK domestic and US domestic funds, respectively. The 
US domestic ethical funds significantly underperform conventional domestic funds, while the 
difference between the US international ethical funds and the US international conventional 
funds is insignificant. The UK ethical funds, both domestic and international funds, significantly 
outperform conventional funds. The difference in average alphas between German SRI and non-
SRI funds is insignificant. The authors conclude that there is little evidence that SRI funds 
significantly over- or underperform non-SRI funds. 
In addition, Bauer et al. (2005) also document that German and US ethical funds passed 
through a learning phase: after significant underperformance in the beginning of the 1990s, they 
matched conventional fund performance over the 1998-2001 period. Older ethical funds 
(launched before end of 1997) outperform younger ethical funds (launched after end of 1997). 
Meanwhile, SRI funds have different risk exposures than non-SRI funds. German and UK 
ethical funds typically invest more in small-cap stocks while US funds do so to a lesser extent. 
All SRI funds are more growth- than value-oriented. Another interesting finding is that while the 
older ethical funds clearly deviated from conventional funds with respect to the exposures to the 
market risk, size and book-to-market factors, the younger funds follow less pronounced 
investment styles.  
Another performance study of international SRI funds is performed by Schroder (2004). 
His sample includes 30 US funds and 16 German and Swiss funds. The author reports that the 
sample does not suffer from attrition bias. The authors use a two-factor model with both a blue-
chip index and a small-cap index as benchmarks to estimate the alphas. The monthly alphas 
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range from –2.06% to 0.87%. Thirty-eight out of the 46 alphas are negative, but only 4 are 
significant at the 5% level. This suggests that SRI funds do not significantly underperform the 
benchmark portfolio consisting of both large stocks and small stocks. Using the strong-form 
style analysis as introduced in Section 2.4.3 (Eq. (2.20)), Schroder (2004) also studies the 
exposures of SRI funds to the small-cap index and a number of industry indices. For a portfolio 
minimizing the tracking-error risk, the average exposures to the small-cap index are 42% for 
German and Swiss SRI funds and 32% for the US funds. This finding confirms the small-cap 
bias for SRI funds, especially for the German and Swiss funds. More interestingly, the average 
exposure to non-cyclical service and consumer goods (such as food, beverage, healthcare and 
telecom) industries is relatively high for all SRI funds. In addition, German and Swiss funds also 
have high exposures to utilities (such as electricity, gas and water), whereas the US funds have 
high exposures to financial sector and the IT sector. 
Some of Schroder’s results are consistent with those of Bauer et al. (2005): the European 
SRI funds are biased towards small stocks, while the US ones are biased towards large firms. 
The paper also tests the market timing ability of SRI fund managers by a conditional version of 
the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model (Eq. (2.18)). The significance level of the timing 
coefficients suggests that only 5 out of the 46 funds demonstrate positive timing ability, while 7 
fund managers time the market in the wrong direction (6 of whom are German and Swiss fund 
managers).   
There are two studies investigating the performance of SRI funds outside the US and 
Europe. Both studies measure the risk-adjusted returns by the conditional version of Carhart 
(1997) model. Bauer, Otten and Tourani Rad (2006) find that, for the period of 1992-2003, 
Australian domestic ethical funds underperform their domestic conventional counterparts by –
1.56% per year, while the Australian international ethical funds outperform their conventional 
peers by 3.31% per year. However, none of these differences are statistically significant. For 
Canadian SRI funds, Bauer, Derwall and Otten (2006) show that the difference in average alphas 
is insignificant between the 8 SRI funds and 267 non-SRI funds (-0.21% vs. –0.18% per month). 
Hence, their findings suggest that SRI and non-SRI funds do not outperform or underperform in 
Australia and Canada.  
Using a database consisting of 463 SRI mutual funds in the US, UK, Continental Europe 
and Asia-Pacific, Zhang (2006) studies the risk and return characteristics of SRI mutual funds 
around the world. He hypothesizes ethical considerations influence stocks prices and investors 
pay a price for ethics due to aversion to unethical/asocial corporate behavior. The author also 
provides evidence in support of this hypothesis. SRI funds in many European and Asia-Pacific 
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countries strongly underperform domestic benchmark portfolios by about 5% per annum. SRI 
investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the future, whereas they show 
some fund-selection ability in identifying ethical funds that will perform poorly. Finally, the 
screening activities of SRI funds have a significant impact on funds’ risk-adjusted returns and 
loadings on risk factors.
13
 To conclude, in this subsection we present empirical evidence of the performance of SRI 
mutual funds. For SRI funds in the US and UK, there is little evidence that the risk-adjusted 
returns of SRI funds are different from those of conventional funds. However, SRI funds in 
Continental Europe and Asia-Pacific strongly underperform benchmark portfolios. Furthermore, 
SRI funds have specific tilts in industry compositions and risk exposures.  
 
2.5.5  Money-Flows of International SRI Funds 
As described in the Sections 2.5.2 to 2.5.4, most of the existing empirical studies on SRI 
funds focus on SRI fund performance. In spite of the fact that these SRI funds experienced a 
tremendous growth in most developed economies around the world, little is known about how 
investors select funds with explicit non-financial attributes. Investors in SRI funds may care 
more about social or ethical issues in their investment decisions than about fund performance.  
Some recent studies on the behavior of investors in conventional mutual funds show that 
both financial and non-financial fund attributes affect the choice of a particular mutual fund or 
hedge fund. Risk-adjusted as well as raw past performance significantly affect the money-flows 
of mutual funds (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 
1998; Goriaev, Nijman and Werker, 2005). While the top performing mutual funds attract most 
of the inflows, the weakly performing funds are hardly affected by outflows. This indicates that 
once money is invested, it tends to be rather sticky (Gruber, 1996). Furthermore, non-financial 
attributes like mutual fund visibility (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and mutual fund advertising (Jain 
and Wu, 1999) have a significant impact on the money-flows to mutual funds. Berk and Green 
(2004) introduce a Bayesian model to explain why investors chase past performance. According 
to this model, rational investors use past performance to update their information on managerial 
ability, which explains the strong money-flows to the best performing funds. 
                                                 
13 There is also another line of research that investigates the performance of SRI portfolios by constructing 
portfolios using firm-level information. For instance, Grossman and Sharpe (1986) compare the returns of a value-
weighted South Africa-free portfolio to those of a comparable unscreened portfolio, and find that the difference in 
returns between these two portfolios is insignificant. Using KLD social data at the firm level, Guerard (1997) and 
Stone, Guerard, Gultekin, and Adams (2001) document that there are no statistically significant differences in 
returns between SRI screened portfolios and unscreened portfolios. Given that we focus on the performance of 
ethical mutual funds, we do not discuss these studies in detail. 
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The first study on the determinants of money-flows in the SRI fund industry was 
conducted by Bollen (2006), which concentrated on a univariate analysis of money-flows and 
past returns for US SRI funds. This study shows that, in the US, the volatility of money-flows is 
lower in SRI funds than in non-SRI funds. Furthermore, money-flows of socially responsible 
funds are less sensitive to lagged negative returns than flows in conventional funds, but more 
sensitive to lagged positive returns. 
Using a database consisting of 410 SRI mutual funds in 17 countries around the world, 
Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2005) study the money-flows into and out of the SRI fund 
industry. They find that SRI investors chase past returns, past return rankings, and persistence in 
past performance, as do investors in conventional mutual funds. In particular, SRI funds that can 
be denoted as persistent winners receive about 30% more money inflows than persistent losers. 
Unless a fund persistently underperforms, SRI investors care more about past positive returns 
than about past negative returns. They also show that a higher screening intensity attracts more 
money-inflows than funds employing few screens. An interesting difference between SRI funds 
and conventional funds is the effect of fund fees on the money-flows. The decision to invest in 
an SRI fund is less affected by management fees and load fees than the decision to invest in 
conventional funds. This may incentivize fund management companies to enter the SRI market 
as ethical investors seem to be willing to pay for the management of portfolios consistent with 
their social objectives.    
The variability in the money-flows is a serious concern of mutual fund managers because it 
can depress fund performance due to the costs of trading the shares of the funds’ portfolios 
which are triggered by the net purchases or sales of shares in the funds. Renneboog, Ter Horst, 
and Zhang (2005) find that smaller, younger or riskier SRI funds have higher money-flow 
volatility, partly resulting from the higher marketing efforts of these funds. Furthermore, the 
money-flow volatility is higher for SRI funds that experienced good recent performance, belong 
to a larger fund family or to a family with top performing funds. This may be due to the fact that 
myopic investors prefer funds belonging to a large family because switching between funds 
within the family can usually be done at low cost. An interesting result is that shareholder 
activism and in-house research of an SRI fund significantly lowers the monthly flow volatility 
by 1.4% and 0.6%, respectively. Apparently, these two attributes attract more stable investors to 
the fund.   
The authors also examine whether or not SRI investors are able to select (invest their 
money in) funds that will generate high future performance. The results show that the SRI funds 
attracting most flows are not generating higher returns. This finding is reinforced by the analysis 
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of the impact of past flows on persistence in (future) returns: they demonstrate that the 
probability that funds arise as persistent winners is reduced when these funds attract large past 
money inflows. They interpret this evidence by the emergence of decreasing returns of scale in 
fund investments. Thus, it seems that ethical money is not financially smart in the sense that the 
mutual fund reallocation decisions of SRI investors reduce their wealth. But there is one caveat 
to this conclusion: they find a positive relation between the use of SRI screens and future 
performance: the screening intensity of SRI funds improves returns. In particular, an SRI fund 
with 8 more screens is expected (all else equal) to have a higher abnormal return of 38 basis 
points per month (i.e. 4.6% annually) than SRI funds employing few screens. Apparently, funds 
with more SRI screens attracting higher money-inflows, have better returns in the future than the 
funds focusing on few investment screens.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter surveys the literature on socially responsible investments (SRI). Over the past 
decade, SRI has experienced an explosive growth around the world, and national governments in 
many western countries have taken regulatory initiatives regarding SRI. Particular to the SRI 
funds is that both financial goals and social objectives are pursued. The empirical literature on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) shows that, in general, good corporate governance, sound 
environmental standards and, to a lesser extent, good management towards stakeholder relations 
can create value for shareholders. Most existing research on SRI fund performance finds little 
evidence that the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds in the US and UK are different from those of 
conventional funds. However, there is some evidence that SRI funds in continental Europe and 
Asia-Pacific strongly underperform benchmark portfolios. Finally, the studies on the money-
flows of SRI funds show that the volatility and money-flows is lower in SRI funds than in 
conventional funds, and that SRI investor’s decision to invest in an SRI fund is less affected by 









“Invest with your brain and heart. Invest for our planet… The Funds give investors the ability to 
unite their financial goals with environmental progress” 
            -- from the prospectus of Sierra Club Funds  
 
Particular to the socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, often also more narrowly 
called ethical funds, is that both financial goals and social objectives are pursued. Over the past 
decade, these SRI funds experienced a tremendous growth in most developed economies around 
the world.
1 SRI comprises assets under management worth $2.1 trillion, representing 
approximately 11% of the total assets under professional management in the US (Social 
Investment Forum, 2003).
2  
This chapter studies the money-flows into and out of the SRI mutual funds around the 
world. Some recent studies on the behavior of investors in mutual funds show that both financial 
and non-financial fund attributes affect the choice of a particular mutual fund or hedge fund. 
Risk-adjusted as well as raw past performance significantly affect the money-flows of mutual 
funds (see, e.g. Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 
1998; Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002). While the top performing mutual funds attract most of the 
inflows, the weakly performing funds are hardly affected by outflows. This indicates that once 
money is invested, it tends to be rather sticky (Gruber, 1996). Furthermore, non-financial 
attributes like mutual fund visibility (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and mutual fund advertising (Jain 
                                                 
1 The terms SRI funds and ethical funds are often used interchangeably, although strictly speaking ethical funds are 
a subset of SRI funds. The latter comprise funds whose investment universe is confined by environmental, ethical, 
corporate governance or social screens. Ethical screens are based on a specific ideology or religion. For example, 
“The investment objective of the Ave Maria Catholic Values Fund is to seek long-term capital appreciation from 
equity investments in companies that do not violate the core values and teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.” 
2 The quality of data on the institutional SRI market (i.e. the SRI assets under professional management by pension 
funds, insurance companies, etc.) is poor and does not allow a thorough analysis. Chapter 3  50
and Wu, 1999) have a significant impact on the money-flows to mutual funds. For hedge funds 
similar results are reported by Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004).   
In spite of the fact that SRI has become a multi-trillion dollar market, little is known 
about how investors select funds with explicit non-financial attributes.
3 Investors in SRI mutual 
funds may care more about ethical, social, environmental, or corporate governance aspects in 
their investment decisions and pay less attention to past fund performance.   
In addition to the fact that we study the behavior of investors around the world who 
explicitly care about non-financial investment screens in portfolio selection, and that we hence 
contribute to the type and geographical scope of mutual fund research, we make the following 
contributions to the literature.  First, we study the determinants of money-flows in the SRI fund 
industry in a multivariate framework. To our best knowledge, Bollen (2006) wrote the only 
study on this issue, but concentrated on a univariate analysis of money-flows and past returns for 
US SRI funds. In contrast, we analyze the question whether or not investors chase past returns, 
while we study simultaneously other dimensions of the SRI decision: fund size, age, risk, the 
reputation of fund families and, most importantly, the fund fees. The existing research on SRI 
funds has not yet examined the impact of fund characteristics, beyond past performance, on the 
investors’ fund selection process.
4 In addition, investors may evaluate a fund’s performance 
relative to other funds in their home country (Sirri and Tufano, 1998), and consider trends in 
past performance (Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). This emphasizes the importance to 
study the determinants of money-flows in a multivariate framework.  
Second, we examine the determinants of the volatility of money-flows of SRI funds. 
Massa (2003) states that a high volatility of flows suggests that the funds’ investors are myopic 
in making investment decisions, whereas low flow volatility implies that investors have longer 
investment horizons. Bollen (2006) documents that, in the US, the flow volatility is lower in SRI 
funds than in non-SRI funds. However, little is known about the determinants of the flow 
volatility of SRI funds. We contribute to this line of research by relating flow volatility to past 
performance and various fund characteristics.  
                                                 
3 Most of the existing empirical studies on SRI focus on fund performance. For instance, Hamilton, Joe and Statman 
(1993) and Statman (2000) study US SRI funds; Luther, Matatko and Corner (1992) and Gregory, Matatko and 
Luther (1997) examine UK SRI funds; Bauer, and Derwall, Otten (2006) study Canadian SRI funds; Bauer, Otten 
and Tourani Rad (2006) analyze Australian SRI funds; and Kreander, Gray, Power and Sinclair (2005) and Bauer, 
Koedijk and Otten (2005) examine international SRI funds. These studies suggest that the average risk-adjusted 
returns of SRI mutual funds do not differ significantly from the average performance of non-SRI mutual funds. 
Using a Bayesian approach, Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003) show that the fund selection process of ethical 
investors determines the performance of the SRI funds relative to a conventional portfolio. 
4 Bollen (2006) compares the flow-past performance relation of SRI funds to a sample of US conventional funds 
matched by fund size, age and risk. In contrast, we model explicitly the impact of various financial and non-
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Third, we investigate whether or not money-flows can predict future fund performance. 
Berk and Green (2004) introduce a Bayesian model in which rational investors use past 
performance to update their information on managerial ability. According to this model, 
investors chase past performance which explains the strong money-flows to the best performing 
funds. However, if fund managers face decreasing returns to scale, money-flows into the better 
performing funds may reduce future abnormal returns. In that case, we would not expect 
performance persistence. In addition, given the fact that SRI screens constrain the investment 
universe, we expect the emergence of decreasing returns to scale in the SRI fund industry. 
Specifically, we investigate whether or not the SRI funds receiving more inflows will perform 
better in the future, and how future performance depends on fund characteristics and the type of 
SRI screens employed. Put differently, we ask the question whether ‘ethical’ money is 
financially smart.  
Fourth, related to this question is our analysis of the impact of various types of SRI 
screens on SRI fund flows and performance. As mentioned above, investors may derive utility 
from investing in companies implementing corporate policies which are congruent with the 
investors’ social or ethical concerns. The fact that SRI screens constrain the investment universe 
may influence fund performance. In spite of the fact that SRI screens play a central role in the 
SRI fund industry, the existing research on SRI funds has not yet investigated the impact of 
screens on flows and future performance. The analysis of the predictive power of money-flows 
and the use of screening activity to generate superior returns (the above issues three and four) 
enable us to answer the question whether or not ethical money is financially smart.  
The main findings of our paper can be summarized as follows. First, SRI funds with 
better past returns or higher return rankings attract higher money-inflows, whereas the flow-
performance relation is weaker when past performance has been poor. In line with Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998), SRI investors direct more money to funds exhibiting persistence of 
good performance. These results imply that SRI investors chase past performance and that they 
are more sensitive to good than to poor past performance. In addition, we demonstrate that 
higher inflows arise in SRI funds that are smaller, younger or are members of large fund 
families. The latter result may reflect the impact of fund family reputation but also the fact that 
investors are usually allowed to switch at low cost to other funds of the family. In contrast to 
conventional investors, SRI investors are not sensitive to the fund fees (i.e. management fees 
and load fees), which may encourage fund management companies to enter the SRI niche.  
Second, the flow volatility of SRI funds is higher when past returns have been strong and 
is higher for smaller and younger SRI funds with higher risk and lower fees. In addition, the Chapter 3  52
volatility increases when the funds belong to a large fund family, when this family is the 
domestic market leader, and when the family includes a top performing fund. We also document 
that funds characterized by shareholder activism and by in-house SRI research attract more 
stable investors.  
Third, the future performance of SRI funds is worse when these funds attract more 
money-flows, or when they are larger. A two-standard deviation shock in average money-flows 
yields –4.6% abnormal returns (annually) in the future. It suggests that, by reallocating across 
different SRI funds, individual investors reduce their wealth. Our finding is consistent with the 
theories formulating the decreasing returns to scale in the mutual fund industry (Berk and Green, 
2004).  
Fourth, screening intensity matters: funds with more SRI screens attract more money-
flows and have better returns in the future. Consequently, the question ‘Is ethical money 
financially smart’ receives a nuanced answer. SRI investors chase past returns and they are not 
able to select funds that will generate superior performance. Still, high SRI screening intensity 
yields higher future performance than funds with few screens.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives the institutional 
background of the SRI mutual fund industry. In Section 3.3 we discuss the methodology and 
introduce the data. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 examine the determinants of money-flows and flow 
volatility, respectively. Section 3.6 focuses on the relation between money-flows and future fund 
performance, and Section 3.7 concludes.   
 
3.2. Institutional  Background 
Modern ethical investing roots in the growing social awareness of investors over the past 
decades.
5 As SRI investors have diverse social objectives, SRI funds usually employ a 
combination of negative or positive SRI screens in the process of constructing portfolios. A 
typical negative screen is applied to an initial asset pool, such as S&P 500 stocks from which 
specific sectors (i.e. alcohol, tobacco and defense industries) are excluded. Positive screens are 
employed to select companies meeting superior standards on issues such as corporate 
governance or environmental protection. The use of positive screens is often combined with a 
                                                 
5 Traditional SRI investing has religious origins. The first modern ethical mutual fund, the Pax World Fund, was 
founded in 1971 in the US. Created for investors opposed to the Vietnam War (and militarism in general), the fund 
avoided investments in weapons contractors. In the 1980s, the concerns about the racist system of apartheid in 
South Africa became a focal point of ethical investors. SRI investors urged funds not to include South-African firms 
nor western firms with South-African subsidiaries into their portfolios. Since the early 1990s, issues like 
environmental protection, human rights, and labor relations have become common in the investment screens of SRI 
funds. Furthermore, a series of corporate scandals has turned corporate governance and responsibility into a focal 
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‘best in class’ approach: firms are ranked within each industry based on social criteria; 
subsequently, only those firms passing a minimum threshold in each industry are selected as 
potential candidates for inclusion into a portfolio. For instance, the chemical firms polluting 
least are selected as candidates for SRI portfolios. Moreover, SRI funds often engage in 
shareholder activism, where fund managers attempt to influence the company’s actions through 
direct dialogue with the management or by voting at annual general meetings. SIF (2003) reports 
that, in 2002, SRI investors in the US filed 292 shareholder resolutions on ethical, social or 
environmental issues.  
It is also important to denote that mutual fund managers generally have different 
objectives than funds’ investors. The former are mainly interested in money-inflows and the 
resulting management fees, while the latter desire high risk-adjusted returns at low fees. 
Furthermore, fund investors are not formally trained in portfolio analysis, and their investment 
decision is influenced by the marketing efforts of investment funds and by the media attention 
the funds receive (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Consequently, mutual fund managers may implement 
strategies that enhance their own revenues but are not in the best interest of the funds’ investors. 
These conflicts of interests may induce excessive risk-taking by the fund managers (Chevalier 
and Ellison, 1997).
6 Given that the sales of funds’ shares to new shareholders require high 
marketing expenses, the growth in fund assets does not necessarily generate value for the 
incumbent shareholders (Sirri and Tufano, 1998).  
The introduction of new investment products, e.g. SRI funds, may be motivated by fund 
families’ strategic considerations such as product differentiation. Massa (2003) finds that the 
degree of product differentiation negatively affects fund performance, but fund families have 
incentives to invent new funds because ‘the more fund families are able to differentiate 
themselves in terms of non-performance-related characteristics, the less they need to compete in 
terms to performance’. Khorana and Servaes (2004) confirm that product innovation generates 
business if the new fund is more differentiated from the existing funds and is in a specific niche.  
SRI funds differ from conventional mutual funds in several ways. First, SRI funds 
employ SRI screens that restrict their investment opportunity set. The exclusion of companies 
based on social, environmental, corporate governance or ethical screens may reduce the 
                                                 
6 In terms of governance, there are important differences between a mutual fund and a corporation. Tufano and 
Sevick (1997) state that the fund’s board of directors oversees the fund management and represents the interests of 
shareholders. However, this board is not elected by the fund’s shareholders but is elected by the fund management 
company. Even the independent directors are elected by the fund management company and serve on many funds of 
the same company. In addition, the fund’s board has little contact with the fund’s shareholders and is not required to 
hold annual meetings. It is also very rare that the boards remove underperforming fund managers. Finally, mutual 
fund shareholders have little or no bargaining power to set the fund management’s compensation.  
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diversification possibilities and negatively influence the performance of the SRI funds in 
comparison to conventional funds (see, e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk, 2005). Alternatively, the use 
of investment screens can also be regarded as an active selection strategy of firms with 
characteristics that are believed to yield superior performance. They are used as filters to 
determine e.g. managerial competence, superior corporate governance etc. (Bollen, 2006). 
Second, investors in SRI funds may also derive non-financial utility by investing in companies 
adopting specific social, environmental or ethical policies which correspond to these investors’ 
concerns. For example, an investor who feels committed to protecting the environment may 
decide not to invest in companies causing high pollution, even though such companies may 
provide interesting investment opportunities in terms of risk-return tradeoff. Consequently, SRI 
funds may attract specific types of investors. For example, Beal and Goyen (1998) report that 
SRI funds’ investors in Australia are more likely to be female, older, and more highly educated 
than the investors investing in the whole universe of stocks listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange. Bollen (2006) reports similar evidence for the US. To the extent that the types of 
investors in SRI funds are different from those investing in conventional funds, the determinants 
of the money-flows into and out of SRI funds and conventional funds may also differ. Third, 
over the past decade, national governments in Europe and elsewhere passed regulations 
regarding social and environmental investments and savings, which had a positive impact on the 
growth of the SRI mutual fund industry.
7  
Given the above differences between SRI and conventional mutual funds, it is interesting 
to investigate the determinants of money-flows in the SRI fund industry, and the relation 
between money-flows and future fund performance. In the following section we will discuss our 
data and research methodology.  
 
3.3. Data  and  Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample  Selection 
In order to examine the determinants of the money-flows in the SRI mutual fund industry 
around the world, we construct a database that contains socially responsible equity mutual funds 
                                                 
7 Since the early 1990s, the German and Dutch governments have granted tax advantages to investments in 
renewable energy. In the UK, the Amendment to the 1995 Pensions Act came into force in 2000 and required the 
trustees of occupational pension funds in the UK to disclose in the Statement of Investment Principles “the extent 
(if at all) to which social, environmental and ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention 
and realization of investments”. Since 2001, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Sweden, have passed similar 
regulations regarding the disclosure of the extent to which pension funds adopt SRI screens in their investment 
decisions. Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  55
domiciled in 17 countries and 4 offshore jurisdictions
8. We gather data on SRI funds from: (i) 
Europe (excluding the UK), more specifically: from  Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, (ii) the UK, including 
Guernsey and the Isle of Man, (iii) the US, and (iv) the Rest of the World, more specifically: 
Australia, Cayman Islands, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands Antilles, Singapore, and South 
Africa. We also collect data on conventional equity mutual funds in the UK, which serve as our 
reference group. Our primary data source is the Standard & Poors’ Fund Service (Micropal). For 
each fund, the database contains monthly Net Asset Value
9 (NAV), monthly Assets Under 
Management (AUM), and other fund characteristics such as the management fees, load fees and 
the inception date. Our sample period is from January 1992 to December 2003. We focus on this 
period for two reasons: first, the number of SRI mutual funds prior to our sample period is tiny. 
Second, prior to 1992, the AUM in the S&P database is recorded on a quarterly basis rather than 
on a monthly one.  
To determine the universe of SRI funds, we create a list of mutual funds, domiciled in 21 
countries and offshore jurisdictions, which bear labels such as  ‘ethical’, ‘socially responsible’, 
‘ecology’, ‘Christian value’ or ‘Islamic’ in the Standard & Poors’ Fund Service database. S&P 
classifies mutual funds as ethical or socially responsible investment funds if the fund managers 
specify in the fund prospectuses that they have social, environmental or ethical investment goals.  
Our sample includes a small number of religious funds. These funds typically employ 
traditional, negative SRI screens such as the exclusion of tobacco and alcohol-producing firms 
combined with screens based on religious convictions, such as avoiding insurance companies 
covering non-married couples (e.g. by some US Christian funds) or avoiding pork producers 
(e.g. by Islamic funds).
10  
When a mutual fund is sold in two or more countries, the S&P list of socially responsible 
funds reports it as two or more funds. To avoid the double accounting of AUM, we exclude such 
duplicated records.  For the same reason, we exclude multiple share classes for a given fund if 
the total AUM across all share classes is reported rather than the AUM of the individual share 
classes. The above procedure reduces our sample size from the starting sample of 1,343 funds to 
718 socially responsible mutual funds issued all around the world.  
                                                 
8 We collect data on socially responsible mutual funds for 26 countries and 4 offshore jurisdictions. However, 
because monthly data on assets under management of funds are not available for five countries, we exclude the 
funds domiciled in Canada, Finland, Hong Kong (China), Norway and Spain. The four offshore jurisdictions 
included in our sample are the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, and the Netherlands Antilles. 
9 The Net Asset Value is defined as the per share value of a fund’s portfolio. The NAV in the S&P database is net of 
annual management fees, inclusive of any distributions and denoted in local currency. 
10   Restricting our sample to non-religious funds does not affect our results (both the estimates and the significance 
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Table 3.1:  Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) screens 
 
This table reports the 21 investment screens used by SRI funds around the world which are classified into 4 broad 
categories. SRI funds often use a combination of the screens. ’N’ represents a negative screen (funds avoid specific 
industries or firms); ’P’ denotes a positive screen (funds select firms based on relative criteria). 
 
Categories Type  Screens  Definitions 
Sin  N Tobacco  Avoiding  manufacturers of tobacco products 
  N  Alcohol  Avoiding producers of alcoholic beverages 
  N  Gambling  Avoiding casinos and suppliers of gambling equipment 
  N  Weapons   Avoiding firms producing weapons or firearms 
  N  Pornography    Avoiding publishers of pornographic magazines or video 
tapes, or firms that provide adult-entertainment services  
Ethical   N  Animal Test  Avoiding firms providing animal-testing services or involved 
in intensive farming of animals 
  N  Abortion   Avoiding providers of abortion and manufacturers of abortion 
drugs or insurance companies that pay for elective abortions 
  N  Genetic Engineering  Avoiding firms developing genetically modified products 
  P  Healthcare  Selecting firms whose products improve human health 
  N  Non-Marital  Avoiding insurance companies providing coverage to non-
married couples 
  N  Islamic  Avoiding pork producers and commercial banks (Used by 
funds managed according to Islamic principles) 
Social  P  Business Practice  Selecting firms emphasizing product safety and quality 
  P Corporate 
Governance 
Selecting firms demonstrating best practices related to board 
independence, executive compensation, or other governance 
issues 
  P  Community    Selecting firms with an active involvement in local 
communities  
  P/N  Diversity  Selecting firms pursuing active policies in employing 
minorities, women, gays/lesbians, and/or disabled persons; or 
Avoiding firms discriminating on gender/race  
  P/N Labor  Relations  Selecting  firms providing good workplace conditions, 
empowering employee and/or strong union relationships; or 
Avoiding firms with poor labor relations 
  P/N  Human  Rights  Selecting firms with policies to protect human rights; or 
Avoiding firms with bad records on human rights issues  
  P/N  Foreign  Operations  Selecting firms with human rights policies for foreign 
operations; or Avoiding firms employing child labor overseas 
or operating in countries with oppressive regimes 
Environmental  P/N  Environment  Selecting firms with high environmental standards; or 
Avoiding firms with low environmental standards 
  P  Renewable Energy  Selecting firms producing power from renewable energy 
  N  Nuclear  Avoiding companies operating nuclear power plants 
Activism  
Policy 
SRI funds attempt to influence company actions through direct dialogue with management 
and/or voting at the annual general meetings 
In-House  
SRI Research 
Screening activity is based on in-house SRI research  
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We subsequently verify the SRI screening policies of these funds. We first develop a list 
of SRI screens used by SRI funds around the world. Combining the information from a variety 
of data resources
11, we identify 21 screening criteria, which are further classified into four major 
categories. Table 3.1 reports the four main categories and the underlying screens. The first 
category, denoted as ‘Sin’, contains funds that avoid investing in firms from the so-called ‘sin-
industries’, which produce e.g. tobacco, alcohol, or weapons. The funds in the ‘Ethical’ category 
exclude e.g. firms that test their products on animals, produce equipment facilitating abortion, 
develop genetically modified products, or violate Islamic or Christian principals. Funds that 
employ screens checking for superior corporate governance, good labor relations or a good 
human rights track record (e.g. no child labor) are denoted as ‘Social’ funds. Finally, funds that 
avoid utilities operating nuclear power plants or that invest in environmentally friendly firms are 
referred to as ‘Environmental’ funds. Note that an SRI fund usually employs a combination of 
screens from several categories. For instance, the TIAA-CREF Social Choice Equity Fund 
excludes companies that derive any revenues from alcohol, tobacco, gambling or weapons, and 
invests in companies meeting high standards in labor relations, corporate governance, 
environmental performance. For each fund in our initial sample, we hand-collect and verify the 
information on social screens using the fund prospectuses and websites, and gather in many 
cases more information by direct contact with fund managers (by phone, by email or via on-site 
interviews). Furthermore, we also collect information on whether a fund engages in shareholder 
activism and whether the fund bases its screening activities on an in-house SRI research team. 
Hence, the mutual funds we accept as SRI funds employ at least one of the above screens as part 
of their investment policy.  
Consistent with prior studies on the money-flows of mutual funds, we restrict our sample 
to equity mutual funds, excluding fixed-income, balanced, and money-market mutual funds. We 
also do not include funds that are not available to individual investors directly, but are only 
available through institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies, or charities and 
foundations. The above process results in a sample of 461 equity SRI funds. Finally, after 
dropping the funds for which data on assets under management are not available, our final 
sample of SRI funds comprises 410 equity mutual funds domiciled in 21 countries or offshore 
                                                 
11 Our information sources are Social Investment Forum (2003), Natural Capital Institute 
(www.responsibleinvesting.org), SiRi SRI Fund Service (www.avanzi-sri.org), and Sustainable Investment 
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Table 3.2: Cross-sectional characteristics of equity SRI funds 
 
Panel A of Table 3.2 reports the number of funds, the number of fund families, the average and median age (years since 
funds’ inception), and the average and median assets under management (in million €) per fund for SRI funds around the 
world at the end of 2003. A fund family consists of the funds issued by the same financial institution. Panel B reports the 

















Panel A: Sample of SRI funds by country 
(1) Europe (excluding UK)        
Austria  16  6  2.0 1.6 3.4 2.7 54 
Belgium 18  5  3.6  3.0  24.4  9.1  438 
France 55  32  3.9  3.3  22.7  10.3  1250 
Germany 2  2  8.0  8.0  51.5  51.5  103 
Ireland  9  6  4.3 2.8 5.5 1.5 50 
Italy 7  7  4.4  1.8  83.1  9.8  582 
Luxembourg 55  29  4.6  3.4  41.3  11.0  2273 
Netherlands 13  9  4.0  3.4  61.3  20.5  797 
Sweden 3  2  7.6  8.9  33.5  7.6  100 
Switzerland 4  2  3.6  3.4  45.1  29.2  180 
Total  182 100 4.1  3.1 32.0 8.8 5828 
(2) US         
US 93  32  8.0  6.7  142.1  17.9  13211 
(3) UK         
UK 49  21  9.2  7.5  100.7  49.8  4932 
Isle  of  Man  2  1  3.8 3.8 2.4 2.4  5 
Guernsey 1  1  9.5  9.5  27.8  27.8  28 
Total  52 23 9.0  7.2  95.5  48.4  4964 
(4) Rest of the World         
Australia  36  11 5.2 2.8 7.9 1.7 285 
Cayman  Islands  1  1  3.8 3.8 2.4 2.4  2 
Japan 13  10  5.0  4.2  42.8  24.8  556 
Malaysia 26  19  6.2  2.4  42.6  22.9  1109 
NL Antilles  1 1  6.0  6.0  119.0  119.0  119 
Singapore  2  2  3.9 3.9 0.7 0.7  1 
South Africa  4  3  5.0  3.1  28.2  14.4  113 
Total 83  47  5.4  2.8  26.3  6.9  2186 
         
Panel B: Sample of SRI funds and non-SRI funds 
SRI (World)  410  202  5.9  4.0  63.9  14.1  26189 
Non-SRI (UK)  649  121  12.5  10.0  270.0  71.4  175230 
 
 
jurisdictions around the world. Our benchmark sample of conventional funds consists of 649 
non-SRI equity mutual funds in the UK.
12 
The cross-sectional characteristics of the equity SRI fund industry across countries as 
captured by our sample are described in Table 3.2. We identify a mutual fund’s nationality by its 
legal domicile. It should be noted that the domicile may be different from the countries where 
the funds are sold. For funds in the four offshore jurisdictions, the investors’ nationalities are 
                                                 
12  In the regression analyses throughout the paper, we control for the differences in fund characteristics between 
SRI and non-SRI funds by including fund size, age, risk, fees and fund family characteristics as control variables. Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  59
unobservable. Another extreme case is Luxembourg, whose funds are sold across Europe. Fund 
managers choose Luxembourg and offshore jurisdictions as their domiciles mainly because of 
favorable tax laws.
 13  
Table 3.2 reports the number of funds, the number of fund families (i.e. the financial 
institution that issue mutual funds), the average and median age of funds, and the average and 
median assets under management per fund for our sample of SRI and non-SRI funds in 
December 2003. The largest number of SRI funds in our sample comes from Europe excluding 
the UK (in total 182 funds, part of 100 different fund families), followed by the US (93 funds), 
the UK (49 funds), and Australia (36 funds). The SRI fund industry of the UK and the US is the 
most mature as reflected by the median age of about 7 years, whereas the industry in Europe 
(excluding the UK) and the Rest of the World is young with a median age of about 3 years since 
the fund’s inception. Furthermore, the US and UK SRI funds are much larger than those in 
Europe and the Rest of the World. While the average size of SRI funds in the US is € 142 
million, in Europe (excluding the UK) the average size is € 32 million. In terms of total assets 
under management, the US has the largest SRI mutual equity funds industry, which manages 
assets of € 13.2 billion. By contrast, the total assets managed by SRI funds in all the other 
countries amount to € 13.0 billion. Finally, Panel B of Table 3.2 shows that, the reference group 
of non-SRI funds in the UK is much older and larger, with a median age of 10 years and an 
average size of € 270 million per fund. While an SRI fund family manages on average 2 SRI 
equity funds, the average number of non-SRI equity funds per family in the UK is 5 funds. 
As the S&P’s Fund Service does not maintain data on funds that cease to exist, we 
investigate whether or not our sample of SRI funds suffers from survivorship bias. While most 
papers of the SRI literature report that there is no fund attrition
14, we learnt from discussions 
with several industry experts and fund managers that over our sample period eight socially 
                                                 
13 In the analysis of Section 3.4, we use the following rules to identify the nationality of funds domiciled in 
Luxemburg and the four offshore jurisdictions: based on the countries of origin of their fund management 
companies, we assign 41 out of the 55 funds domiciled in Luxemburg to: Switzerland (11 funds), Germany (10), 
UK (6), France (4), Netherlands (4), Belgium (3), Sweden (2), and Austria (1). Funds domiciled in Guernsey and 
Isle of Man are assigned to the UK group; funds domiciled in Cayman Islands and Netherlands Antilles are 
considered a separate group. Identifying a fund’s nationality is necessary when ranking a fund relative to other 
funds in the same country. The construction of most of the indicator variables in Section III, including D(Young), 
D(High Costs), D(Top Performer Family), D(Market Leader Family), D( Persistent Winner), D(Persistent Loser) 
and D(Loser to Winner), and the Rank Quintiles variables, involves the above process.  
14  Statman (2000) reports that none of the socially responsible mutual funds in the US have disappeared in the 
sample period of 1990-1998. Schroder (2004) documents that no SRI funds have been closed in the US, Germany 
and Switzerland for the sample period of 1990-2002. Similarly, Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003), Bauer, 
Koedijk and Otten (2005) and Bollen (2006) also do not report on the existence of dead SRI funds in the US, UK 
and Germany for their sample periods, although they do capture the attrition of conventional mutual funds when 
creating a reference group. Chapter 3  60
responsible equity mutual funds
15 ceased to exist. Given the very low attrition rate (on average 
0.25% on an annual basis), it is unlikely that survivorship bias will affect our results. 
Nevertheless, we collect data for these dead funds from a number of sources including CRSP 
Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database and Datastream ‘dead’ mutual funds research files. 
Including data of the dead funds into analysis does not materially affect our results (neither the 
coefficient estimates not the significance levels). Moreover, prior studies on mutual fund 




3.3.2 Summary  Statistics 
Fund flows are defined as the net change in fund assets beyond reinvested dividends. As 
in Sirri and Tufano (1998), we compute money-flows of fund i during month t as:   
 
1 ,







t i t i t i
t i AUM
Return AUM AUM
Flow       (3.1) 
 
where AUMi,t and AUMi,t-1 are the assets under management (in local currency) for fund i at the 
end of month t and month t-1, Returni,t is the raw return for fund i during month t, defined as the 
difference in the natural logarithms of net asset values of fund i at the end of month t and month 
t-1. The returns are net of annual management fees, inclusive of any distributions and denoted in 
local currency. This measure of fund flows assumes that all flows occur at the end of month t.
17 
Figure 3.1 shows the number of SRI funds and their total assets under management over 
time. Our dataset shows that the number of SRI equity funds around the world has grown rapidly 
to 410 in just one decade, and that the total AUM has augmented from € 1.7 billion in December 
1992 to € 26.2 billion by December 2003. Europe (excluding the UK) has experienced the 
highest growth in the number of SRI funds, while the country with the fastest growth in SRI 
assets in equity mutual funds is the US. In order to have an impression of the relation between 
                                                 
15 The eight ‘dead’ equity SRI funds are: ‘Cruelty Free Value Fund’, ‘Friends Ivory European Social Awareness 
Fund’, ‘Neuberger Berman Socially Responsive Assets Fund’, ‘North American Funds: Socially Responsible’, ‘NPI 
Social Index Tracker Fund’, ‘Rightime Fund: Social Awareness Fund’, ‘Stratton Special Value Fund’, and ‘Victory 
Funds: LakeFront Fund’.  
16 For example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) perform 
their analyses on a survivorship-bias free sample and find no difference in results for samples not corrected for fund 
attrition. 
17 To reduce the effect of outliers, we remove the observations of fund flows beyond the 99.5th percentile or below 
the 0.5th percentile. This is similar to other studies of fund flows such as Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) and 
Bollen (2006).  Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  61
Figure 3.1: Growth of the SRI fund industry 
 
The figure shows the year-end number of funds and assets under management (in € million) of the SRI fund 
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Figure 3.2: Flows and lagged returns 
    
The figure shows the annual net flows (Flow) and the one-year-lagged annual returns (LagRet) of SRI funds in 
Europe (excluding the UK), the US, the UK and the Rest of the World.  
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past performance and money-flows, we depict in Figure 3.2 the average annual flows against the 
prior-year’s average annual returns. Although the average return of SRI funds around the world 
was strongly negative in 2001 and 2002, i.e. –16% and –21% respectively, the SRI fund industry 
still experienced a strong inflow of new money of 41% and 38% in these two years. Figure 3.2 
also suggests that, although in almost all years the average flows are positive, they seem to 
depend on the recent returns of SRI funds for all four regions. 
Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics over the sample period 1992–2003. Panel A of 
Table 3.3 reports the average and standard deviation of money-flows, the returns, the flow 
volatility (measured in 12-month rolling windows), the risk (the standard deviation of returns in 
12-month rolling windows), the fund size (the natural logarithm of fund assets in €), the total 
fees (the sum of the annual management fee and one seventh of the load fees
18), the number of  
funds per fund family, the fraction of funds investing in particular geographical areas, and the 
number of SRI screens used per fund. The statistics are computed over time and across funds. 
Panel A shows that the SRI industry has experienced a strong growth all over the world with the 
average monthly growth rate ranging from 2.7% in the UK to 3.6% in the US. The average fund 
size is the largest in the UK. Furthermore, the average annual total fees range from 1.7% in 
Europe (excluding the UK) to 2.1% in the Rest of the World. There are important differences in 
the components of fund fees across regions: SRI funds in the US have the highest average 
management fee of 1.6% per year and the lowest load fees (defined as the sum of front- and 
back-end fees), namely 1.8%. The load fees are the highest in the Rest of the World, on average 
4%. European SRI funds are the most internationally diversified ones: 33% of the funds invest 
across Europe, 61% invest around the world and only 6% invest in the domestic country. In 
contrast, only 16% of the SRI funds in the US invest overseas. Finally, Panel B shows that our 
benchmark non-SRI funds in the UK have experienced 1.9% less money-inflows per month than 
the SRI funds, in spite of the fact that the average monthly return of non-SRI funds is 0.5% 
higher. This suggests that the strong growth of the SRI industry is not merely driven by returns, 
and that non-financial investment attributes may play an important role in attracting investors.  
 Panel C highlights the differences in screening activity across the four regions. In the 
UK SRI funds employ on average about 9.5 investment screens simultaneously, 6 of which are 
so-called negative screens which exclude firms or industries with undesirable ethical 
                                                 
18 Load fees include front-end fees (share subscription fees) and back-end fees (share redemption fees). We 
amortized loads fees over a seven-year holding period, which is the average holding period for equity mutual funds. 
While load fees are mainly used to pay for trading costs and marketing expenses (e.g. distribution payments to 
brokers or advertising), management fees are used to cover operating expenses including managerial compensation 
as well as part of the marketing expenses (called the 12B1 fee in the US). Like Sirri and Tufano (1998), Total Fees 
captures the total fees charged to investors.  Chapter 3  64
Table 3.3: Summary statistics 
Panel A: SRI Funds by region 
   Europe ex. UK  US  UK  Rest of World 
Variable  Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
Flow 0.028  0.142  0.036  0.145  0.027  0.140  0.030  0.160 
Return -0.006  0.060  0.001  0.057  -0.001  0.049  0.002  0.048 
Flow Volatility  0.088  0.109  0.071  0.123  0.070  0.120  0.089  0.132 
Size 2.454  1.664  3.111  1.934  3.784  1.509  1.610  2.888 
Risk 0.057  0.020  0.053  0.023  0.047  0.016  0.042  0.022 
Total Fees  0.017  0.006  0.019  0.008  0.018  0.006  0.021  0.006 
Management Fees  0.013  0.005  0.016  0.007  0.013  0.004  0.015  0.005 
Load Fees  0.028  0.020  0.018  0.024  0.035  0.022  0.040  0.027 
Number of Funds in Family  3.443  3.293  6.161  6.038  3.788  3.244  3.530  3.240 
D European Diversification  0.328  0.471  0.000  0.000  0.038  0.194  0.000  0.000 
D Global Diversification  0.607  0.490  0.161  0.370  0.404  0.495  0.169  0.377 
D Domestic investment  0.066  0.248  0.839  0.370  0.558  0.502  0.831  0.377 
Number of Screens  6.623  3.973  8.140  4.560  9.519  4.128  5.590  2.692 
 
Panel B: SRI and Non-SRI funds 
   SRI (Overall)  Non-SRI (UK) 
Variable Mean  St.Dev.  Mean  St.Dev. 
Flow 0.035  0.162  0.016  0.117 
Return 0.000  0.054  0.005  0.055 
Flow Volatility  0.079  0.121  0.064  0.087 
Size 2.601  2.214  4.182  1.569 
Risk 0.050  0.022  0.049  0.018 
Total Fees  0.018  0.007  0.018  0.006 
Management Fees  0.014  0.005  0.013  0.004 
Load Fees  0.029  0.024  0.039  0.019 
Number of Funds in Family  4.119  4.200  10.119  7.088 
D European Diversification  0.151  0.358  0.026  0.160 
D Global Diversification  0.392  0.489  0.536  0.499 
D Domestic Investment  0.457  0.499  0.438  0.500 
Number of Screens  7.124  4.098  N/A N/A 
 
Panel C: Screening activity by SRI funds 
 
Europe ex. 
UK  US UK 
Rest of 
World  Overall 
By fund: Average number of         
Screens  6.62 8.14  9.52 5.59 7.12 
Negative  screens  3.00 4.55  5.85 3.51 3.81 
Positive  screens  3.62 3.59  3.67 2.08 3.31 
Sin  screens  1.73 3.31  3.60 2.69 2.52 
Ethical screens  0.56 0.67  1.40 0.53 0.68 
Social  screens  2.70 2.71  2.62 1.49 2.45 
Environmental  screens  1.63 1.45  1.90 0.88 1.47 
Fraction of funds with         
Negative  screens  0.56 0.97  0.85 0.72 0.72 
Positive  screens  0.92 0.69  0.87 0.58 0.79 
Sin  screens  0.54 0.92  0.85 0.67 0.69 
Ethical screens  0.38 0.57  0.85 0.52 0.51 
Social  screens  0.78 0.68  0.85 0.47 0.70 
Environmental  screens  0.88 0.72  0.94 0.60 0.80 
Islamic  screens  0.03 0.03  0.02 0.36 0.09 
Activism policy  0.18  0.47  0.31 0.06 0.24 
In-house  SRI  research  0.22 0.55  0.27 0.11 0.28 Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  65
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports the average and standard deviation of money-flows, the returns, the flow volatility 
(measured in 12-month rolling windows), the risk (the standard deviation of returns in 12-month rolling windows), 
the fund size (the natural logarithm of fund assets in €), the total fees (the sum of the annual management fee and 
one seventh of the load fees) expressed as a percentage of the money invested, the number of funds per fund family, 
the fraction of funds investing in particular geographical areas (domestic, European or global), and the number of 
SRI screens used per fund over our sample period 1992–2003. The statistics are computed over time and across 
funds. Panel B reports the same statistics for all SRI and non-SRI funds in our sample. Panel C shows the average 
number of screens used per fund, the average number of negative or positive screens used, the average number of 
sin, ethical, social and environmental screens used. Furthermore, it reports the fraction of the funds that use 
negative, positive, sin, ethical, social, environmental or Islamic screens, and of those engaging in activism or basing 
their screening activity on in-house research.  
 
 
characteristics. In contrast, SRI funds in the Rest of the World apply on average 5.5 screens. 
Negative screens are employed by more than 97% of SRI funds in the US. In particular, 93% of 
US SRI funds use at least one of the Sin screens, including tobacco, alcohol, gambling, weapons 
and pornography. In contrast, social and environmental screens are more popular in the UK and 
the rest of Europe (used by 87% and 92% of the funds, respectively). It should be noted that 
Islamic funds account for 36% of SRI funds in the Rest of the World, which includes Asia-
Pacific and Africa. Interestingly, 47% of the US SRI funds report that they make active use of 
their shareholder voting rights, while in Europe (excluding the UK) only 18% of the funds are 
involved in shareholder activism. Finally, 55% of the US SRI funds base their SRI screening 
activities on in-house research, compared to only 11% of SRI funds in the Rest of the World.  
 
3.4.  The Determinants of Money-Flows 
3.4.1  Flows and Past Performance 
Although prior research on mutual fund performance reports little evidence of 
outperformance by conventional funds and of persistence in performance (see, e.g. Carhart, 
1997), there is strong evidence that investors chase funds with high historical performance. As 
stated by Sirri and Tufano (1998), individual investors tend to use rudimentary performance 
measures like raw historical returns to select mutual funds. Berk and Green (2004) state that 
considering past performance may be justified provided that fund managers possess differential 
stock-picking abilities. For these reasons, we include past performance in our model explaining 
the funds’ money-flows. Investors may also consider other factors in addition to past 
performance: fund size and age, its return volatility, the fee structure, past money-flows and the 
reputation of the fund family. All this information is readily available to investors through 
newspapers, websites and specialized data providers, such as Morningstar or S&P. In addition, 
investors of SRI funds may value the use of screens used by SRI funds. Some investors may 
particularly care about purely ethical issues such as animal tests or genetic engineering, whereas 
others may give priority to social responsibility or good corporate governance. Chapter 3  66
Therefore, we examine the determinants of SRI fund flows around the world and of our 
benchmark funds (the conventional (non-SRI) UK mutual equity funds), by estimating the 
following regression:   
 
Flowi,t = β0 + β1 Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] + β2 Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] * D(Negative 
Returni,[t-1,t-12])+ β3 Average Returni,[t-13,t-24]+ β4 Average Returni,[t-13,t-24] * D(Negative Returni,[t-
13,t-24])+ γ Control Variablesi,t-1  + ui,t           (3.2) 
 
where Flowi,t is the money-flow of fund i in month t in local currency, Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] 
and Average Returni,[t-13,t-24] are the average returns of fund i over the months t-1 to t-12 and t-13 
to  t-24  in local currency, D(Negative Returni,[t-1,t-12])  and  D(Negative Returni,[t-13,t-24])  are 
indicator variables that are equal to one if  Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] and Average Returni,[t-13,t-24] 
are negative, respectively.
 19 
The reason why we include an indicator variable D(Negative Return) in Equation (3.2) is 
to allow for different flow-return sensitivities subsequent to positive or negative returns. The 
coefficients in Equation (3.2) can now be interpreted as follows: β1 captures the sensitivity of 
flows to positive average returns in the previous year, (β1+β2) expresses the sensitivity of flows 
to negative average returns in the previous year. Likewise, β3 stands for the sensitivity of flows 
to positive average returns in year –2, while (β3+β4) captures the sensitivity of flows to negative 
average returns in year –2. The t-statistics are calculated using White standard errors to account 
for heterogeneity.
20  
The vector of control variables in Equation (3.2), denoted as Control Variablesi,t-1, 
captures the impact of seven groups of variables: Fund Characteristics, Past Flows, Fund 
Family, International Diversification, Screening Activity, Geographical Location and Time 
Effect. The Fund Characteristics consist of: (i) Sizei,t-1, the size of the fund (the natural logarithm 
of AUM in €) at month t-1, (ii) Riski,[t-1,t-12], the total risk of the fund measured as the standard 
deviation of monthly fund returns from months t-1 to t-12, (iii) Agei,t-1, (the number of years 
since its inception), (iv) Agei,t-1* D(Youngi,t-1),  a term interacting the age with  an indicator 
variable equalling one if the funds’ age is below the median of all SRI funds (or conventional 
                                                 
19 We also used Jensen’s alpha as a performance measure. Tables are available upon request. The results are similar 
to the ones reported in Table 3.4.  
20 When estimating an equation similar to Equation (3.2) for mutual funds, Sirri and Tufano (1998) recommend the 
use of the Fama and MacBeth (FM) procedure, which estimates a cross-sectional regression for each month and 
allows for potential cross-sectional dependence between fund observations. When we apply the FM procedure on a 
subsample including only the monthly data of the last 5 years of our sample (because there are few funds in the 
early months of our sample period), we obtain similar results. Our approach of using OLS estimates is consistent 
with that of Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) and Bollen (2006). Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  67
ones – depending on the regression) in its domicile for month t-1, (v) Total Feesi, defined as the 
sum of the annual management fee and one seventh of the sum of the front- and the back-end 
load fees, (vi) Total Feesi *D(High Feesi), a term interacting the total fees with an indicator 
variable equalling one if the funds’ total fees are above the median total fees of all SRI funds (or 
conventional ones) in its domicile. Moreover, we include the past flows, Flowi,t-1  (the money-
flows of the fund in month t-1), as a control variable.  
Subsequently, we use three variables to proxy for the reputation of fund families in the 
SRI or conventional fund industries: (i) D(Top Performer Familyi,t-1),  an indicator variable 
equalling one if the raw return of at least one SRI (or conventional) fund in the funds’ family 
belongs to the top 20% of all SRI or conventional funds in its domicile at month t-1, (ii) Number 
of Funds in Familyi, t-1 ,  the number of SRI (or conventional) funds managed by the funds’ 
family at month t-1, (iii) D (Market Leader Familyi,t-1), an indicator variable equalling one if the 
funds’ family has the highest market share of SRI (or conventional) assets among all fund 
families in its domicile at t-1.  
Furthermore, the International Diversification variables include two mutually exclusive 
indicators, denoted as D(European Diversificationi) and D(Global Diversificationi), which equal 
one if the fund invests across Europe or Globally, respectively. The reference group is the funds 
investing in their domestic countries. 
For the SRI funds, the Screening Activity comprises the following variables: (i) Number 
of Screensi is the number of SRI screens (listed in Table 3.1) used by a fund, (ii) D(Sin Screensi), 
D(Ethical Screensi), D(Social Screensi)  and D(Environmental Screensi)  are four indicator 
variables which equal one if the fund uses at least one of the SRI screens from a broad screening 
area, i.e. sin, ethical, social or environmental screens, respectively
21, (iii) D(Islamic Fundi) is an 
indicator variable capturing whether the fund is designed for Islamic investors, (iv) D(Activism 
Policyi) is an indicator variable which equals one if the fund intends to influence corporate 
behaviour through direct engagement or proxy voting, (v) D(In-House SRI Researchi) is an 
indicator variable which equals one if the screening activities of the fund are based on in-house 
SRI research.  
In order to capture differences in the money-flows across geographical locations, we 
include mutually exclusive indicator variables based on the domicile of the fund, denoted as 
D(Europei ex. UK), D(USi) and D(Rest of Worldi). The SRI funds in the UK are the reference 
                                                 
21 These four indicator variables are not mutually exclusive. All of them may equal one in case that a fund employs 
screens from the four main screening categories. Chapter 3  68
group.
22 Finally, we also include fixed time effects to control for the bubble and recession 
periods, i.e. nine year dummies and eleven month dummies, denoted as D(Yeari,t)  and 
D(Monthi,t).  
In Panel A of Table 3.4 we present the estimation results of Equation (3.2) for the SRI 
funds, while we show the results for the benchmark mutual funds in Panel B. We find that the 
money-flows of SRI funds are more sensitive to past returns when these returns are positive than 
when they are negative. In particular, the money-flows of SRI funds increase 0.95% per month 
for a 1% increase in the previous year’s average monthly returns, provided that the return is 
positive. In case of negative average returns, the corresponding money-flows decrease by a 
modest 0.20% for a 1% decrease in return. This result corresponds to the one by Bollen (2006) 
who also documents that the flow-return sensitivity for US SRI funds is stronger for positive 
past returns than for negative ones. Moreover, we also report that the money-flows are sensitive 
to the returns of both the previous two years. For instance, when the first and second return lags 
are positive, a 1% difference in average monthly returns in both these years is associated with a 
1.55% difference per month in money-flows. Thus, it appears that ethical money chases past 
returns, moving disproportionately more to SRI funds that performed very well in the past. The 
flow-performance relationship is weaker when past performance is poor.  
The convex relation between flow and past performance, in combination with the 
compensation structure in the mutual fund industry where management fees depend on fund 
size, gives fund companies a payout that resembles a call option (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Fund 
managers have incentives to increase the volatility of fund returns in order to maximize the 
value of this call option (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). In the conventional mutual fund industry, 
the risk of the fund generally has a negative impact on money-flows (see, e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 
1998; Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005). Surprisingly, we do not find evidence for the hypothesis 
that ethical money is sensitive to the past risk of investments, i.e. higher fund return volatility 
does not significantly reduce the money-flows into SRI funds.  
The money-flows of SRI funds are also influenced by the other fund characteristics. As 
new SRI funds may be more innovative and exert more marketing efforts than existing funds, 
younger SRI funds may attract more flows than older funds. In addition, smaller funds may 
attract a larger percentage of inflows. Consistent with studies on money-flows of conventional 
mutual funds (see, Sirri and Tufano, 1998, and Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005), we find that 
smaller and younger SRI funds attract more inflows than bigger and older funds. Using a 
                                                 
22 We also used indicator variables for individual countries to control for country effects, and the estimation results 
(not reported in the paper) are very similar to the ones using the three region indicators, i.e. Europe ex. UK, US, and 
Rest of World. Tables are available upon request. Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  69
Table 3.4: Money-flows and past performance 
 
    Panel A: SRI   Panel B: Non-SRI 
Dependent variable   Money-Flow  Money-Flow 
  Constant  1.912  2.378  3.999  5.352 
Past Performance  Average Return (t-1, t-12)  0.948  7.279  0.776  7.460 
  Average Return (t-1, t-12) *  
D Negative Return (t-1, t-12)  -0.746 -4.269  -0.461  -3.031 
  Average Return (t-13, t-24)  0.598  4.278  0.228  3.040 
  Average Return (t-13, t-24) *  
D Negative Return (t-13, t-24)  -0.514 -2.752  0.108  0.725 
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  -0.003 -5.040  -0.003  -5.098 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)i 0.068  1.214  0.172  2.754 
  Age (t-1)  -0.048 -3.536  -0.033  -4.484 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.099  1.436  -0.015  -0.611 
  Total Fees  0.381  1.378  -0.897  -3.795 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -0.470 -3.061  0.332  4.020 
Past Flows  Flow (t-1)  -0.009 -0.804  -0.122  -6.914 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  0.348  1.492  0.306  2.020 
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  0.060  2.143  0.040  1.776 
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  -0.220 -0.855  0.594  1.731 
International Diversification  D European Diversification  0.985  1.634  -0.685  -1.690 
  D Global Diversification  0.169  0.641  -0.478  -3.266 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  0.124  3.128    
  D Sin Screens  0.572  1.520    
  D Ethical Screens  -1.011 -3.675    
  D Social Screens  -0.288 -1.125    
  D Environmental Screens  -0.930 -3.353    
  D Islamic Fund  0.365  0.765    
  D Activism Policy  -0.506 -1.906    
  D In-House SRI Research  0.331  1.468    
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  -1.023 -2.598    
  D US  -0.872 -2.181    
  D Rest of World  -1.658 -3.371    
Time Effect  D Year  Yes   Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes   
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.021  7.873  0.029  22.110 
  Observations 15364    24105   
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relation between money-flows and past performance (Equation (3.2)) 
for SRI funds (Panel A) and Non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the money-flow of fund 
i in month t (Flowi,t) in local currency as by Equation (3.1). The independent variables include: the average returns 
of fund i over the months t-1  to  t-12 and t-13  to  t-24  in local currency (Average Returni,[t-1,t-12]  and  Average 
Returni,[t-13,t-24] ), interaction variables of the average returns and indicator variables that are equal to 1 if Average 
Return i,[t-1,t-12] and Average Return i,[t-13,t-24] are negative (D(Negative Return i,[t-1,t-12]) and D(Negative Return i,[t-13,t-
24])). Size is measured as the natural logarithm of AUM in € (Sizei,t-1). The total risk is the Std. Dev. of monthly fund 
returns (Riski,t-1)). Age is the number of years (Agei,t-1). We also include an interaction term of age and a dummy 
equalling 1 if the age is below the median of all SRI (or conventional) funds in its domicile (Agei,t-1* D(Youngi,t-1 )). 
Total Feesi is the sum of the annual management fee and 1/7
th of the sum of front- and the back-end load fees. We 
also include an interaction term of total fees and an dummy equalling 1 if the total fees are above the median total 
fees of all funds in the domicile (Total Feesi *D(High Feesi)). The money-flow in month t-1 is Flowi,t-1. D(Top 
Performer Familyi,t-1)  equals 1 if the raw returns of at least one SRI (or conventional) fund in the funds’ family 
belongs to the top 20% of all funds in its domicile. Number Funds Familyi, t-, is the number of SRI (or conventional) 
funds managed by the funds’ family, D(Market Leader Familyi,t-1) equals 1 if the funds’ family has the highest 
market share in its domicile, D(European Diversificationi) and D(Global Diversificationi) equal 1 if the fund invests 
across Europe or Globally. Number of Screensi is the number of SRI screens employed and 4 dummies equal 1 if 
the fund uses at least 1 of the main SRI screens (D(Sin Screensi),D(Ethical Screensi),D(Social Screensi)  and 
D(Environmental Screensi)).D(Islamic Fundi) captures whether the fund is designed for Islamic investors, 
D(Activism Policyi) equals 1 if the fund aims at actively influencing corporate behaviour, D(In-House SRI 
Researchi) equals 1 if the fund has in-house SRI research. We include dummies based on the domicile of the fund 
(D(Europe ex. UKi), D(USi) and D(Rest of Worldi)), and 9 year dummies and 11 month dummies. Note that the Chapter 3  70
coefficients on indicator variables (denoted with a prefix “D”) and the count variables (i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D 
Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) are multiplied by 100. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated 
with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 
5%.  
      
subsample of US SRI funds as these funds report data on marketing expenses (the ‘12B1 fees’), 
we find that funds with higher marketing expenses attract more flows. The impact of marketing 
expenses on money-inflows is indeed stronger for younger SRI funds.
23 Our results are 
consistent with those of Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) for conventional US funds and may 
also explain why older funds (which spend less on marketing) attract fewer flows.  
 A striking finding is that increases in the total fees to SRI investors do not significantly 
reduce the money-flows. When the total fees are above the country median in its domicile 
country, the flows are 0.1% lower (though not statistically significant based on a Wald test) for a 
1% increase in fees. This is in contrast to the findings for conventional mutual funds where high 
fees significantly reduce flows (see, Sirri and Tufano, 1998, and Barber, Odean and Zheng, 
2005). Our results indicate that SRI investors pay less attention to fund fees than conventional 
investors, which implies that SRI investors are willing to pay for holding assets consistent with 
their social objectives. The insignificant impact of costs on flows may incentivize fund families 
to enter into the SRI niche market and to increase fund fees. As argued by Massa (2003) and 
Khorana and Servaes (2004), price competition is lower for more differentiated funds. Thus, 
given that SRI investors care less about fees, fund managers have incentives to follow costly 
marketing strategies in order to attract investors and hence enhance management fees.  
Panel A of Table 3.4 also documents that SRI investors do not chase past flows. This 
does not come as a surprise as information on past money-flows (in contrast to information on 
past performance) is not readily available to most retail investors.  
Most SRI funds are members of fund families. For example, ‘Calvert’ is the largest SRI 
fund family in the US, which manages more than 10 SRI funds. As suggested by Sirri and 
Tufano (1998) and Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004), stellar performance of a mutual fund may 
generate money-flows for other funds in its family. However, we do not find such a spillover 
effect in the SRI fund industry. It is common that fund families offer investors the option of 
switching to other funds belonging to the same family at low cost. Thus, the higher the number 
of funds in the family, the greater the value of this option (Massa, 2003). We find that the total 
number of SRI funds in the family has a significant positive impact on the money-flows: a one-
standard deviation increase in the number of funds (i.e. 4.2 funds) is associated with 0.3% higher 
money-flows per month. We also find that market leadership in the SRI industry (as a proxy for 
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family reputation) has no impact on the money-flows. Table 3.4 (Panel A) also shows that 
money-flows of SRI funds are not significantly affected by whether or not the funds invest 
abroad.  
Interestingly, we find that the number of SRI screens used affects the money-flows in a 
significantly positive way, even after controlling for the type of screens. Suppose that a fund 
employs 10 SRI screens based on social and environmental criteria, whereas a second fund uses 
only one social screen and one environmental screen (i.e. the difference in the number of screens 
between the funds is about two-standard deviations). The fund with more screens attracts about 
1% higher money-flows per month. However, some screens, namely ethical and environmental 
screens, seem less attractive relative to other SRI screens. For instance, a fund that uses ethical 
criteria, such as animal testing, anti-abortion, or Islamic screens, receives 1% less money per 
month compared to funds not using such screens, and a fund using environmental screens attract 
0.9% less money per month.
24 Funds engaging in shareholder activism receive 0.5% less flows 
per month (significant at the 6% level). Moreover, stock picking based on in-house SRI research 
has little impact on the money-flows. This implies that SRI funds have few incentives to 
influence company behavior via activism or to conduct SRI research themselves.  
Finally, the negative coefficients for the regional dummies indicate that, after controlling 
for performance and non-financial attributes, SRI funds in the UK attract significantly more 
money than their counterparts in the other European countries, the US and the Rest of the 
World. The strong growth of the SRI industry in the UK may be partially attributed to the 
regulation regarding SRI, as discussed above.  
When we compare the results of Panel A of Table 3.4 with the determinants of money-
flows of conventional UK mutual funds (reported in Panel B), some striking differences emerge. 
First, past average returns matter for conventional funds, but their impact on money-flows is 
smaller in magnitude. Specifically, the money-flows of conventional funds increase 0.78% per 
month for a 1% increase in the average monthly return over the prior year when this return is 
positive. In case of a negative return over the previous year, the money-flows increase by only 
0.31%. Consistent with Bollen (2006), we find that money-flows of SRI funds are more 
sensitive to lagged positive returns than flows in conventional funds, but less sensitive to lagged 
negative returns. Second, in contrast to SRI funds, the total fees of conventional funds have a 
negative affect on the money-flows. The annual money-flows of conventional funds are 10.8% 
                                                 
24 We also investigate whether employing more SRI screens is associated with higher fees. We find that larger funds 
charge lower total fees to investors, whereas funds employing sin screens or Islamic screens charge higher fees than 
funds without these screens. Contrary to our expectations, funds employing a higher number of screens, engaging in 
shareholder activism or conducting SRI research in-house do not charge higher fees. The tables are available upon 
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lower for a 1% increase in total fees when the fees are above the country median in its domicile 
country, while they are 6.8% lower in case the fees are above the country median (see Panel A 
of the Appendix for a summary of the economic effects in Tables 3.4-3.6). Our results suggest 
that ethical money is less sensitive to the fund fees than money invested in conventional mutual 
equity funds. Furthermore, while past flows do not significantly affect ethical money-flows, 
conventional funds’ investors invest significantly less in funds with high inflows over the 
previous year. Third, we find a ‘spillover’ effect for conventional UK funds: having a star 
performer in the fund family increase flows by 0.3% per month. Furthermore, family reputation 
matters. The conventional funds of whom the fund family is a market leader attract 0.6% more 
money-flows per month (marginally significant at the 10% level). Finally, while international 
diversification does not influence the money-flows of SRI funds, it has a significant negative 
impact on the money-flows of conventional UK funds. 
 
3.4.2  Flows and Past Relative Performance 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) argue that investors categorize risky assets into different 
broad classes such as value stocks and growth stocks, and allocate money to these asset classes 
rather than to individual securities. Hence, investors may regard SRI funds as a separate 
category of mutual funds and evaluate the performance of an SRI fund relative to that of other 
SRI funds in their country. In addition, investors often use return rankings published in 
newspapers and financial magazines to select mutual funds (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Therefore, 
we repeat the analysis in Section 3.4.1 with alternative performance measures: we classify a 
fund’s monthly returns into five performance quintiles relative to the returns of all other SRI 
funds in the fund’s domicile.  
  In order to examine whether relative performance affects the money-flows for SRI 
mutual funds around the world as well as of conventional (non-SRI) UK mutual funds, we 
estimate the following regression:   
 
Flowi,t = β0 + β1 Rank Bottom Quintilei,[t-1,t-12] + β2 Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-1,t-12] + β3 
Rank Top Quintilei,[t-1,t-12]+β4Rank Bottom Quintilei,[t-13,t-24] + β5 Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-13,t-24] + 
β6 Rank Top Quintilei,[t-13,t-24] + γ Control Variablesi,t-1 + ui,t             (3.3) 
 
where Rank Bottom Quintile, Rank Middle Quintile and Rank Top Quintile are the fractional 
rank quintiles, constructed as follows. First, for each month t, the average returns over month t-1 
to month t-12 (Average Returni,[t-1,t-12]) are ranked relative to all funds in the domicile, and each Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  73
fund is assigned a fractional rank (Ranki,[t-1,t-12]) ranging from 0 (the poorest performance in the 
domicile) through 1 (the best performance in the domicile). For instance, a Rank of 0.7 implies 
that the fund is better than 70% of all SRI funds in the domicile based on the previous year’s 
return. Subsequently, the bottom quintile of fractional rank (Rank Bottom Quintilei, [t-1,t-12]) is 
defined as Min (0.2, Ranki,t-1), the middle three fractional rank quintiles are combined into one 
(Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-1,t-12]) defined as Min (0.6, Ranki,[t-1,t-12] - Rank Bottom Quintilei,[t-1,t-
12]), and the top quintile of fractional rank (Rank Top Quintilei,[t-1,t-12]) is defined as Min (0.2, 
Ranki,[t-1,t-12] - Rank Bottom Quintile i,[t-1,t-12] - Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-1,t-12]). Similarly, Rank 
Bottom Quintilei,[t-13,t-24],  Rank Middle Quintilei,[t-13,t-24], and Rank Top Quintilei,[t-13,t-24] are 
defined on the basis of the ranking of average returns over month t-13 to month t-24 (Average 
Returni,[t-13,t-24]). As in Equation (3.2), the vector Control Variablesi,t-1 is included in order to 
examine whether other factors in addition to past relative performance affect the decision to 
invest in an SRI fund or a conventional one. In Panel A of Table 3.5 we present the estimation 
results of Equation (3.3) for the SRI funds, while in Panel B we present the results for the 
conventional UK mutual funds.  
Panel A of Table 3.5 shows that relative past performance matters and that outstanding 
relative performance matters proportionally more. If an SRI fund is ranked in the top-quintile 
among the SRI funds in its country, the fund can expect about 1.1% more flows per month for 
every 10-percentile improvement in performance ranking (say from the 85
th to the 95
th 
percentile). Only 0.2% extra money per month can be expected if the fund is ranked in the 
middle quintiles in the previous year (i.e. for an improvement in performance ranking from the 
45
th to the 55
th percentile). An overview of the economic significance is given in Panel A of the 
Appendix. The insignificant coefficient on the bottom quintile indicates that money-flows into 
or out of the bottom 20% of SRI funds are not sensitive to poor past performance. Furthermore, 
if an SRI fund was consistently in the top-quintile during the previous two years, the fund can 
expect about 1.7% more inflows per month. Our results are of similar economic magnitude as 
those reported by Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) for 
conventional mutual funds and hedge funds, respectively. Moreover, the relations between fund 
characteristics and the money-flows into and out of SRI mutual funds are in line with those 
presented in Panel A of Table 3.4.  
For non-SRI UK funds, we find that strong relative performance significantly affects the 
money-flows to the funds. A consistent top performer during the previous two years can expect 
about 1.3% more flows per month for every 10-percentile improvement in performance ranking.  
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Table 3.5: Flows and past relative performance  
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relation between fund flows and past relative performance (Equation 
(3.3)) for SRI funds (Panel A) and Non-SRI funds (Panel B). The dependent variable is the money-flow of fund i in 
month t in local currency, Flowi,t, defined as the net change of fund assets beyond reinvested dividends (Equation 
(3.1)). The independent variables include lagged fractional rank quintiles (Rank Bottom Quintile, Rank Middle 
Quintile and Rank Top Quintile). The calculation of these rank quintiles is given in Section 3.4. Other independent 
variables are defined in Table 3.4. The coefficients of the indicator variables (denoted with a prefix “D”) and count 
variables (i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) have been multiplied by 
100. T-statistics are in Italics and are calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold 
coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%.  
 
    Panel A: SRI   Panel B: Non-SRI 
Dependent variable   Money-Flow  Money-Flow 
  Constant 0.266  0.277  4.845  5.568 
Relative Past Performance  Rank Bottom Quintile (t-1, t-12)  0.028  1.261  -0.012  -0.711 
  Rank Middle Quintile (t-1, t-12)  0.021  4.154  0.019  4.524 
  Rank Top Quintile (t-1, t-12)  0.108  3.193  0.098  4.626 
  Rank Bottom Quintile (t-13, t-24)  0.024  1.104  0.017  0.872 
  Rank Middle Quintile (t-13, t-24)  0.018  3.530  0.010  2.454 
  Rank Top Quintile (t-13, t-24)  0.064  1.744  0.029  1.763 
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  -0.003  -5.165  -0.003  -4.855 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)  0.056  1.198  0.050  0.855 
  Age (t-1)  -0.040  -2.823  -0.032  -4.307 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.118  1.732  -0.014  -0.593 
  Total Fees  0.455  1.623  -0.928  -3.894 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -0.500  -3.213  0.338  4.097 
Past Flows  Flow (t-1)  -0.010  -0.837  -0.123  -6.921 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  -0.254  -0.985  0.134  0.889 
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  0.092  3.081  0.049  2.160 
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  -0.290  -1.075  0.555  1.617 
International Diversification  D European Diversification  1.055  1.728  -0.588  -1.442 
  D Global Diversification  0.370  1.350  -0.359  -2.447 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  0.104  2.569    
  D Sin Screens  0.555  1.443    
  D Ethical Screens  -0.917  -3.254    
  D Social Screens  0.010  0.039    
  D Environmental Screens  -0.947  -3.437    
  D Islamic Fund  0.779  1.607    
  D Activism Policy  -0.668  -2.484    
  D In-House SRI Research  0.350  1.552    
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  -0.970  -2.423    
  D US  -0.819  -2.004    
  D Rest of World  -1.656  -3.309    
Time Effect  D Year  Yes   Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes   
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.022  8.024  0.029  21.195 
  Observations 15110    24105   
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3.4.3  Flows and Persistence in Past Performance 
In addition to past returns and rankings, trends in past performance may also influence 
investor behavior. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) develop a model of investor sentiment 
where investors hold the belief that the return process switches between a ‘continuation’ regime 
(in which asset returns are persistent) and a ‘reversal’ regime (in which asset returns tend to 
reverse in sign). Investors observe the trends and patterns in past performance to determine 
which regime currently regulates performance, and make their investment decisions accordingly. 
Therefore, we examine whether investors pay attention to persistence in past performance of SRI 
funds and direct more money to the funds of a persistently winning regime.  
An SRI fund is considered as a persistent winner (loser) if its return is higher (lower) 
than the return of the median fund in the domicile over the previous two years (see e.g. Brown, 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson, 1999 and Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2004). To investigate how 
investors react to information on winners and losers, we estimate the following regression: 
 
Flowi,t = β0 + β1 D(Persistent Winneri, [t-1,t-24]) +β2 D(Persistent Loseri, [t-1,t-24]) +β3 
D(Loser to Winneri, [t-1,t-24]) + γ Control Variablesi,t-1 + ui,t        (3.4) 
 
We label a fund as a winner when the indicator variable D(Winneri,[t-1,t-12]) equals one; this is the 
case when the average return for fund i over month t-1 to month t-12 (Average Return i,[t-1,t-12]) is 
higher than the average return over the same period of the median fund in its domicile (see 
Section 3.3 for our definition of funds’ nationality)
25. Likewise, D(Persistent Winneri, [t-1,t-24]) is 
an indicator variable capturing that a fund is a persistent winner. This dummy equals one if fund 
i is a winner over both the periods t-1 to t-12 and t-13 to t-24 (i.e. D(Winneri,[t-1,t-12]) =1 and 
D(Winneri,[t-13,t-24]) =1) and is zero otherwise. D(Persistent Loseri, [t-1,t-24]) is an indicator variable 
that reflects that a fund is a persistent loser: it equals one if fund i is not a winner for both the 
above periods (i.e. D(Winneri,[t-1,t-12])  =0 and D(Winneri,[t-13,t-24])  =0)  and is zero otherwise. 
Finally, D(Loser to Winneri, [t-1,t-24]) is an indicator variable that equals one if fund i is a winner 
over the same periods (i.e. D(Winneri,[t-1,t-12])  =1 and D(Winneri,[t-13,t-24])  =0)  and is zero 
otherwise. The vector of Control Variablesi,t-1 is defined as in Equations (3.2) and (3.3). The 
specification of Equation (3.4) allows us to estimate the difference in money-flows between the 
following four categories of SRI funds: (i) persistent winners; (ii) persistent losers; (iii) losers in 
                                                 
25 Note that Loser to Winner has correlation coefficients of 0.59 and –0.56 with Persistent Winner and Persistent 
Loser, respectively. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity, we also exclude Loser to Winner from Equation 
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year Y–2 turning into winners in year Y–1; and (iv) winners in year Y–2 turning to losers in 
year Y–1. The coefficients in Equation (3.4) can be interpreted as follows: β1 is the difference in 
money-flows between persistent winners and funds reversing from winner to loser, β2 captures 
the difference between persistent losers and funds reversing from winner to loser, and β3 
measures the difference in flows between funds reversing from loser to winner and those 
reversing from winner to loser. 
Panel A of Table 3.6 presents the estimation results of Equation (3.4) for the SRI funds, 
while Panel B shows those for our benchmark of conventional UK mutual funds. We find that 
persistence in fund returns has a significant impact on money-flows. SRI funds that are 
persistent winners can expect money-flows that are about 0.8% higher on a monthly basis (or 
about 10% annually) than funds reversing from winner to loser. More importantly, persistent 
losers experience significantly more outflows of money, i.e. about 1.6% on a monthly basis 
(19.2% annually) than funds reversing from winner to loser. Thus, funds that are persistent 
winners receive about 30% more money-flows than persistent losers. Consistent with Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998), our results suggest that investors direct more flows to funds that are 
believed to be in a positive ‘continuation’ regime than ‘reversal’ funds. Interestingly, the 
coefficient for the ‘in house’ dummy indicates that SRI funds which rely on SRI research 
performed by an ‘in house’ team can expect about 0.43% higher monthly inflows (significant at  
the 6% level), ceteris paribus. All other estimates of the coefficients for the control variables are 
in line with the specifications of above subsections.  
For conventional funds, we find similar results (see Panel B), although persistent 
conventional losers are less affected than persistent SRI losers. For persistent winners the effect 
is stronger than in case of SRI funds. Persistent winners can expect about 1.1% higher monthly 
inflows than the reversal conventional funds.  
The results from Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show that, similar to conventional investors, SRI 
investors chase past returns, return rankings and persistence in performance. SRI investors are 
less sensitive to negative returns than positive returns unless poor performance persists. One of 
the most important differences between SRI funds and conventional funds is the impact of fund 
fees on the money-flows. In contrast to conventional funds’ investors, ethical investors are not 
so sensitive to the magnitude of the fees (management fees and load fees). This fact may 
incentivize fund families to enter into the SRI niche market. In addition, the fact that ethical 
money is not sensitive to risk may influence the risk-taking incentives of SRI fund managers.  Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  77
Table 3.6: Money-flows and persistence in past performance 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relationship between fund flows and persistence in past performance 
(Equation (3.4)) for SRI funds (Panel A) and non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the 
money-flows of fund i in month t in local currency, Flowi,t, defined as the net change of assets beyond reinvested 
dividends (Equation (3.1)). The independent variables include an indicator variable which equals 1 if fund i is a 
‘return winner’ for both the period from t-1 to t-12 and the period from t-13 to t-24 and zero otherwise 
(D(Persistent Winner i, [t-1,t-24])), where a winner is a fund whose average return over month t-1 to month t-12 is 
higher than the average return of the median fund in the domicile. D(Persistent Loser i, [t-1,t-24]) is an indicator 
variable that equals one if fund i is a loser for both the periods from t-1 to t-12 and from t-13 to t-24 and zero 
otherwise, and D(Loser to Winner i, [t-1,t-24]) is an indicator variable that equals one if fund i is a winner over the 
period from t-1 to t-12 and a loser from t-13 to t-24 and zero otherwise. Other independent variables are defined in 
Table 3.4. The coefficients of the indicator variables (denoted with a prefix “D”) and count variables (i.e. Constant, 
Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) have been multiplied by 100. The t-statistics are in 
Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold coefficients denote a significance 
level of at least 5%. 
 
    Panel A: SRI  Panel B: Non-SRI 
Dependent variable   Money-Flow  Money-Flow 
  Constant  2.932  3.845  5.614  7.621 
Performance Persistence  D Persistent Winner (t-1, t-24)  0.782  3.098  1.081  5.233 
  D Persistent Loser (t-1, t-24)  -1.601 -6.932  -0.814  -4.119 
  D Loser to Winner (t-1, t-24)  -0.195 -0.720  -0.595  -3.245 
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  -0.003 -4.668  -0.003  -4.851 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)  0.052  1.132  0.098  1.747 
  Age (t-1)  -0.045 -3.324  -0.032  -4.240 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.117  1.710  -0.012  -0.487 
  Total Fees  0.419  1.503  -0.870  -3.684 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -0.469 -3.036  0.359  4.319 
Past Flows  Flow (t-1)  -0.009 -0.774  -0.121  -6.832 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  0.282  1.212  0.320  2.120 
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  0.054  1.883  0.037  1.625 
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  -0.193 -0.734  0.604  1.762 
International Diversification  D European Diversification  0.958  1.598  -0.422  -1.028 
  D Global Diversification  0.253  0.934  -0.266  -1.829 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  0.114  2.823    
  D Sin Screens  0.476  1.257    
  D Ethical Screens  -0.723 -2.647    
  D Social Screens  -0.070 -0.272    
  D Environmental Screens  -1.003 -3.659    
  D Islamic Fund  0.650  1.361    
  D Activism Policy  -0.603 -2.244    
  D In-House SRI Research  0.431  1.915    
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  -0.970 -2.421    
  D US  -0.710 -1.767    
  D Rest of World  -1.754 -3.552    
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes  
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.021  7.999  0.027  21.749 
  Observations 15291   24105   
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3.5. Money-Flow  Volatility 
High volatility of money-flows is a burden for fund managers, because they have to buy 
or sell the shares of their portfolios following the net purchases or sales of shares in the funds. 
Such liquidity-motivated trading increases the trading costs and may thus depress fund 
performance (Edelen, 1999). High volatility of money-flows may also be a burden for long-term 
investors. Goetzmann, Ivkovich and Rouwenhorst (2001) show that speculators adopt market-
timing strategies by trading mutual funds at high frequency (e.g. on a daily basis) in order to 
exploit the valuation errors of funds’ daily share prices related to underlying security prices. 
They show that such trades may be at the expense of long-term investors. Furthermore, to the 
extent that high volatility of money-flows results from the presence of myopic investors who 
reallocate their assets frequently, flow volatility is a proxy for the investment horizons of 
investors whereby high volatility proxies for shorter time horizons (Massa, 2003). Therefore, 
both fund managers and investors prefer less volatile flows.  
Bollen (2006) documents that US SRI fund flows are less volatile than conventional fund 
flows. We extend this line of research by relating flow volatility to past performance and various 
fund characteristics and estimate the following equation: 
 
Flow Volatilityi,[t,t-11] = β0 + β1 Average Returni,[t-12,t-23] + β2 Average Returni,[t-12,t-23] 
*D(Negative Returni,[t-12,t-23]) + γ Control Variablesi,t-12 + ui,t       (3.5) 
 
where Flow Volatilityi,[t,t-11] is the standard deviation of monthly money-flows of fund i over 
months t to t-11. The returns and the control variables are defined in Equation (3.2), with Flowi,t-
12 replaced by Average Flowi,[t-12,t-23]. The coefficients in Equation (3.5) can be interpreted as 
follows:  β1  measures the sensitivity of flow volatilities to positive average returns of the 
previous year, and β1+β2 measures the sensitivity of flow volatilities to negative average returns 
of the previous year. Panel A of Table 3.7 presents the estimation results of Equation (3.5) for 
the SRI funds, while Panel B reports the ones for our benchmark of conventional UK funds.  
From Panel A, we learn that positive returns over the previous year lead to higher flow 
volatility: monthly flow volatility is 0.8% higher for a 1% increase in returns. It suggests that 
inflows of ethical money are more volatile than outflows, which is in line with the fact that 
investors flock to SRI funds when returns are high but attach less importance to negative returns 
unless poor performance persists. However, we find that there is a non-linear relationship 
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Table 3.7: Determinants of flow volatility 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the determinants of flow volatility (Equation (3.5)) for SRI funds (Panel A) 
and Non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the standard deviation of monthly money-flows 
of fund i over months t to t-11 in local currency (Flow Volatility I,[t,t-11]). The independent variables have been 
defined in Table 3.4. Note that the coefficients on indicator variables (denoted with a prefix “D”) and the count 
variables (i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) have been multiplied by 
100. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold 
coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%. 
 
   Panel A: SRI  Panel B: Non-SRI 
Dependent variable    Flow Volatility  Flow Volatility 
 Constant 7.412  10.831  9.205  18.110 
Past Performance  Average Return (t-12, t-23)  0.789  6.654  0.368  5.250 
  Average Return (t-12, t-23) *  
D Negative Return (t-12, t-23)  -0.211  -1.273  -0.811  -7.026 
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-12)  -0.008  -12.584  -0.009  -17.951 
  Risk (t-12)  0.330  7.591  0.120  2.693 
  Age (t-12)  -0.096  -8.045  -0.042  -6.786 
  Age (t-12) * D Young (t-12)  -0.077  -1.362  -0.036  -1.915 
  Total Fees  0.381  1.597  -0.045  -0.266 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -0.696  -5.463  0.321  4.924 
Past Flows  Average Flow (t-12,t-23)  0.034  3.235  0.177  8.211 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-12)  0.421  2.142  0.716  5.631 
  Number Funds in Family (t-12)  0.057  2.196  0.169  8.838 
  D Market Leader Family (t-12)  0.907  3.258  2.098  7.704 
International Diversification D European Diversification  2.068  4.751  -1.031  -3.098 
  D Global Diversification  -0.538  -2.259  -0.086  -0.668 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  0.175  5.093    
  D Sin Screens  -0.139  -0.466    
  D Ethical Screens  -1.446  -6.795    
  D Social Screens  -0.059  -0.279    
  D Environmental Screens  -0.786  -3.670    
  D Islamic Fund  0.099  0.265    
  D Activism Policy  -1.356  -5.682    
  D In-House SRI Research  -0.559  -3.145    
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  -0.709  -1.957     
  D US  -2.299  -6.592    
  D Rest of World  -2.028  -4.317    
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes  
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.088  31.216  0.094  67.582 
  Observations 14043    21870   
 
volatility is 0.4% higher for a 1% increase in returns when past returns are positive; but flow 
volatility goes up 0.4% for a 1% decrease in returns when past returns are negative (see Panel B 
of the Appendix for a summary of the economic effects of Table 3.7). 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show that money-flows of young funds are more sensitive 
to past returns than those of old funds. We expect therefore that younger funds have a higher 
flow volatility. Likewise, smaller funds may have a higher standard deviation of flows. 
Furthermore, the volatility of fund returns may attract myopic investors and increase flow Chapter 3  80
volatility. In line with our expectations, we find that smaller, younger or riskier SRI funds are 
associated with higher flow volatility. Fund fees, especially load fees, increase the transaction 
costs for SRI investors who want to invest or transfer money across funds frequently, such that 
the money-flow volatility is expected to be lower for the more expensive funds (Massa, 2003). 
We find that this is indeed the case for the SRI funds: an increase of 1% in total fees moves 
down the flow volatility by 0.3%. In contrast, the volatility of the most expensive conventional 
funds is higher (Panel B of Table 3.7). We also find that SRI funds with higher past flows have 
more volatile flows. 
As discussed above, fund families usually offer investors the option to switch to funds 
belonging to the same family at low cost. Due to the reduced transaction fees of reallocating 
assets across funds, myopic investors may prefer mutual funds belonging to a big family. 
Indeed, we find that the total number of SRI funds in the family has a significant positive impact 
on flow volatilities, implying that larger families attract less stable flows. Furthermore, monthly 
flow volatility is 0.4% higher for SRI funds belonging families with top performers, and 0.9% 
higher for families occupying a leading position in the domestic SRI market. Global 
diversification strategies by SRI funds attract investors with a longer investment horizon. Panel 
B shows that the impact of fund family characteristics on flow volatilities is twice as high for 
conventional funds. This shows that conventional fund investors attach more importance to fund 
family characteristics, such as whether or not having a top performer, number of funds and 
market leaderships, than SRI investors.  
It appears that SRI screens have a strong impact on the flow volatility of the SRI funds. 
A one standard deviation increase in the number of screens (i.e. 4 screens) moves up flow 
volatility by 0.7% per month. The monthly flow volatility of funds applying ethical or 
environmental screens is lower by 1.4% and 0.8%, respectively, compared to other types of SRI 
funds. Most interestingly, shareholder activism and in-house SRI research attract more stable 
investors to the fund: the monthly flow volatility is significantly reduced by 1.4% and 0.6%, 
respectively. These effects are also economically significant given the average flow volatility of 
7.9% in our sample. Finally, ethical money in the UK is more volatile that in the rest of Europe 
and much more volatile than in the US and the Rest of the World. 
 
3.6.  Money-Flows and Future Performance 
We have shown in Section 3.4 that the money-flows of SRI funds are affected by many 
factors including past performance and the use of SRI screens. While SRI investors chase past 
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flows perform well in the future. Or put differently, is ethical money financially smart? A 
number of studies on conventional mutual funds document a ‘smart money’ effect where 
money-flows can predict short-term fund performance (Gruber, 1996; Zheng, 1999), while Sapp 
and Tiwari (2004) show that this effect can be explained by the momentum effect of stock 
returns. In contrast to the smart money effect, Frazzini and Lamont (2005) document a ‘dumb 
money’ effect where individual investors invest their money in mutual funds which own stocks 
that perform poorly over subsequent years. In their model with rational investors and 
competitive capital markets, Berk and Green (2004) assume that the mutual fund industry has 
decreasing returns to scale, i.e. fund returns decrease with fund size and new money-inflows 
chasing past performance may have a negative impact on future performance. Furthermore, 
Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) confirm that fund size erodes performance due to 
liquidity and organizational diseconomies, and the relation is more pronounced for funds 
investing in small and illiquid stocks. We expect that this effect is even stronger for SRI mutual 
funds, since SRI screens constrain the investment universe. This limitation may force large 
funds or funds receiving substantial money-flows to invest part of their money in firms with low 
risk-adjusted returns. Consequently, large SRI funds may perform worse in the future.  
 
3.6.1  Money-flows and Future Returns 
We investigate the impact of flows and fund characteristics on future fund returns by 
estimating the following equation: 
 
Returni,t = β0 + β1 Average Flowi,[t-1,t-12] +β2 Sizei,t-1 +β3 Sizei,t-1 * Average Flowi,[t-1,t-12] + 
γControl Variablesi,t-1 + u i,t             (3.6) 
 
where, Returni,t is the raw return of fund i in month t in local currency, Average Flowi,[t-1,t-12] is 
the  average money-flow of fund i from months t-1  to  t-12  in local currency, and Control 
Variablesi,t-1 is a vector of lagged variables of fund characteristics defined similarly as before in 
Equation (3.2), but in which we have replaced Flowi,t-1 by Average Returni,[t-1,t-12]. In addition to 
raw returns, we also use the abnormal returns as a dependent variable.
26  
We report the estimation results of Equations (3.6) and (3.7) for SRI funds in Panel A of 
Table 3.8, while Panel B shows those for the conventional UK funds. We find some interesting 
                                                 
26 Abnormal Returni,t = Returni,t - Rf,t - βi (Rm,t - Rf,t)  (3.7), where Rf,t is the one-month inter-bank interest rate 
(offering rate or middle rate) in month t in the country where fund i domiciles,  Rm,t is the return for MSCI indices 
(dividend reinvested) in month t in the country where fund i domiciles, and βi is estimated via the OLS regression, 
Returni,t - Rf,t =  αi + βi (Rm,t - Rf,t) + ui,t , for fund i with at least 12 months history. Chapter 3  82
Table 3.8: Money-flows and future returns 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relationship between future returns and past money-flows (Equation 
(3.6)) for SRI funds (Panel A) and Non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variables are the raw return 
of fund i in month t in local currency (Returni,t), and the Abnormal Return. The independent variables have been 
defined in Table 3.4. The coefficients on indicator variables (denoted with a prefix “D”) and the count variables (i.e. 
Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of Screens) have been multiplied by 100. The t-
statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate 
a significance level of at least 5%. 
 
 
   Panel A: SRI  Panel B: Non SRI 
Dependent variable    Raw Return  Abnormal Return Raw Return  Abnormal Return
 Constant  -0.413  -1.208  -0.723  -2.155  0.001  -0.001  -0.497  -1.706 
Past Flows   Average Flow (t-1, t-12)  -0.011  -1.890  -0.012  -1.995  -0.012  -0.533  -0.001  -0.043 
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  -0.001  -2.519  -0.001  -2.254  -0.001  -4.622  -0.001  -4.346 
  Size (t-1)*Average Flow (t-1,t-12) 0.002  0.699  0.002  1.026  0.000  0.024  -0.001  -0.236 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)  -0.082  -2.656  -0.108  -3.529  -0.038  -1.249  -0.046  -1.516 
  Age (t-1)  -0.002  -0.260  -0.003  -0.348  0.002  0.696  0.002  0.707 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.020  0.671  0.022  0.742  0.003  0.240  0.002  0.143 
  Total Fees  0.008  0.079  0.028  0.266  -0.052  -0.578  -0.042  -0.463 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -0.077  -1.271  -0.089  -1.485  0.105  2.817  0.104  2.772 
Past Performance  Average Return (t-1, t-12)  0.074  2.056  -0.025  -0.696  0.023  0.833  -0.042  -1.513 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  0.191  2.239  0.283  3.336  0.098  1.347  0.140  1.917 
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  -0.013  -1.139  -0.019  -1.753  0.003  0.310  -0.001  -0.052 
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  0.185  1.606  0.198  1.732  0.039  0.294  0.053  0.398 
Internat. Diversification D European Diversification  -0.086  -0.461  -0.130  -0.704  0.006  0.031  0.013  0.064 
  D Global Diversification  -0.112  -1.116  -0.139  -1.397  -0.345  -5.528  -0.342  -5.452 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  0.042  2.101  0.046  2.320      
  D Sin Screens  -0.159  -1.201  -0.237  -1.788      
  D Ethical Screens  -0.039  -0.341  -0.019  -0.172      
  D Social Screens  -0.111  -0.884  -0.166  -1.337      
  D Environmental Screens  -0.271  -1.934  -0.257  -1.840      
  D Islamic Fund  0.058  0.273  0.048  0.229      
  D Activism Policy  -0.009  -0.082  -0.004  -0.035      
  D In-House SRI Research  0.072  0.769  0.093  0.988      
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  -0.277  -1.930  -0.164  -1.157      
  D US  0.104  0.740  0.223  1.608      
  D Rest of World  -0.042  -0.267  0.036  0.232      
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes  
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.184 93.817 0.175 88.292 0.187 188.630 0.172 170.560
  Observations  18516  18488  27692  27663  
 
differences between SRI funds and conventional funds. It appears that past average money-flows 
have a significant negative impact on future returns of SRI funds. An increase by one standard 
deviation in past average flows (i.e. 16% per month) to an SRI fund predicts a reduction of the 
raw returns and abnormal returns by about 20 basis points per month (2.3% annually). For 
conventional UK funds we find no relation between past average flows and next month’s return 
(see Panel C of the Appendix for a summary of the economic effects of Tables 3.8-3.9).  Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  83
Furthermore, in line with Berk and Green (2004) and Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik 
(2004), we find that fund size has a negative impact on future returns of both SRI and 
conventional funds: all else equal, a one standard deviation increase in size (i.e. 2.21) erodes 
future raw returns as well as abnormal returns by 22 basis points per month (2.6% annually). 
Both SRI funds and conventional ones are confronted with decreasing returns to scale.  
Moreover, risk has a negative impact on SRI fund returns. Adopting an increase in total 
risk by 2% (equivalent to an increase by one standard deviation) reduces next month’s raw 
return and abnormal return of SRI funds by 16 basis points (1.9% annually) and 22 basis points 
(2.6% annually), respectively. In contrast, the impact for conventional funds is insignificant. 
Total fund fees do not significantly affect the returns of SRI funds. An interesting result is that 
SRI fund returns (in contrast to those of conventional funds) are to some extent predictable. It 
appears that average past SRI returns have a significant positive impact on future returns: a 1% 
higher average past return gives about 7 basis points extra expected return in the next month 
(0.8% annually), but the momentum is economically small. Furthermore, SRI funds benefiting 
from the membership of an SRI family that includes top performers can expect an additional 
return of about 19 basis points per month (2.3% annually) or an additional abnormal return of 28 
basis points per month (3.4% annually). Despite the fact that SRI investors allocate more flows 
to larger families, a standard deviation increase in the number of funds in a family reduces next 
month’s abnormal return by 8 basis points (significant within the 10% level).  
Finally, fund returns increase with screening intensity (proxied by the number of SRI 
screens applied). All else equal, funds with 8 more SRI screens (i.e. a two standard deviation 
difference) are associated with 38 basis points higher abnormal return per month (4.6% 
annually). This supports the hypothesis that the screening process of SRI funds generates value-
relevant non-public information, and SRI criteria help fund managers to pick stocks. 
 
3.6.2  Money-Flows and Persistence in Future Performance 
In the previous subsection, we concluded that bigger funds with higher inflows generate 
lower returns in the near future. In order to examine whether such funds have also a lower 
probability of persistence in future performance, we estimate the following equations using a 
probit model: 
 
      Persistent Winneri,[t,t-23]=β0 +β1 Average Flowi,[t-24,t-35] +γControl Variablesi,t-24+ ui,t      (3.8) 
      Persistent Loseri,[t,t-23]=β0 +β1 Average Flowi,[t-24,t-35] +γControl Variablesi,t-24 + ui,t           (3.9)    
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where, Persistent Winner and Persistent Loser are defined as in Equation (3.4), Average Flowi,[t-
24,t-35] is defined in Equation (3.6), and Control Variablesi,t-24 are  defined as in Equation (3.2) 
however with  Flowi,t-1 replaced by Average Returni,[t-24,t-35] . 
The estimation results of the probit specification of persistent winners (Equation 3.8) are 
shown in Panels A (SRI funds) and C (conventional funds) of Table 3.9, while Panel B (SRI 
funds) and D (conventional funds) report the estimation results for persistent losers (Equation 
(3.9)). Our results show that larger funds with high inflows are less likely to be persistent 
winners: a one standard deviation increase in fund size or in money-flows is associated with a 
decrease in the probability of being a persistent winner by about 7% and 3%, respectively. The 
result is also economically significant, given that the unconditional probability of being a 
persistent winner is 25%.
27 Our findings are in line with Berk and Green (2004) who argue that 
the absence of persistence in performance in the mutual fund industry is due to decreasing 
returns to scale caused by investors chasing past performance. 
While risk has an insignificant impact on being a persistent winner in the case of SRI 
funds, we find that high risk decreases the probability of being a persistent winner for 
conventional funds. Being a persistent winner is also less likely for older funds, funds with 
higher fees and funds with low past returns, whereas the probability augments when the number 
of funds belonging to the same fund family is large and when the fund family of the SRI fund is 
the market leader. In terms of economic significance, an increase by one standard deviation in 
the number of funds in the family (i.e. 4 funds) is associated with an increase in the probability 
of being a persistent winner by 7%. This result can be explained by the fact that fund families 
may subsidize the performance of the ‘favourite’ funds, i.e. who performed well in the past or 
have high fees, in order to attract money-inflows to those funds (Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 
2006). The cross-fund subsidization, such as allocation of underpriced IPO deals and opposite 
trades across member funds, may generate persistence in performance of funds in bigger or 
market-leading families. Investing globally has a negative effect on return persistence for both 
SRI funds and conventional ones. Moreover, the probability of being a persistent winner goes 
down by 2% when 1 additional SRI screen is employed. This is congruent with the hypothesis 
that SRI screens limit the diversification possibilities and thus increase portfolio risks.  
 
                                                 
27 As discussed in Section 3.4.3, we classify funds into four categories depending on the persistence in performance: 
persistent winners, persistent losers, winners turning into losers, or losers turning into winners. Is Ethical Money Financially Smart?  85
Table 3.9: Money-flows and persistence in future returns 
 
This table presents the Probit estimates of the relationship between persistent in future returns and past flows 
(Equations (3.8) and (3.9)). The dependent variable for Panels A and C is an indicator variable equalling one if fund 
i is a winner for both the periods from t-1 to t-12 and from t-13 to t-24, and zero otherwise (D(Persistent Winner i, [t-
1,t-24])), where a winner is defined in Table 3.6. The dependent variable for Panels B and D is D(Persistent Loser i, [t-
1,t-24]), an indicator variable that equals one if fund i is a loser for both the periods from t-1 to t-12 and from t-13 to t-
24, and zero otherwise. The independent variables have been defined in Table 3.4. The coefficients on continuous 
independent variables (i.e. Average Flow, Size, Risk, Total Fees, Total Fees* D Young, and Average Return) have 
been divided by 100. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for 
heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%. 
 
   Panel A: SRI  Panel B: SRI  Panel C: Non-SRI Panel D: Non-SRI
Dependent variable    Persistent Winner Persistent Loser  Persistent Winner  Persistent Loser 
 Constant 0.322  2.186  -1.886  -12.337 0.429  4.020  -1.045  -9.842 
Past Flows   Average Flow (t-24, t-35)  -0.005  -2.127  0.007  2.924  -0.013  -4.609  0.009  3.469 
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-24)  -0.001  -7.347  0.001  7.147  -0.001  -12.206  0.001  11.572 
  Risk (t-24)  -0.001  -1.131  0.001  1.446  -0.082  -10.076  0.009  1.146 
  Age (t-24)  -0.072  -9.043  0.072  9.633  -0.001  -0.660  0.002  1.499 
  Age (t-24) * D Young (t-24)  -0.004  -1.499  0.011  4.391  -0.016  -4.771  0.012  3.700 
  Total Fees  0.003  0.233  -0.020  -1.619  -0.082  -2.407  0.079  2.271 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -0.173  -4.227  0.103  2.323  0.080  6.247  -0.025  -1.941 
Past Performance  Average Return (t-24, t-35)  -0.057  -2.493  0.098  4.064  -0.049  -6.252  0.077  10.439 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-24)  -0.007  -0.644  0.008  0.778  0.078  3.084  -0.140  -5.547 
  Number Funds in Family (t-24)  0.067  2.077  -0.051  -1.491  0.015  4.299  -0.011  -2.973 
  D Market Leader Family (t-24)  0.008  2.088  -0.006  -1.299  0.063  1.554  -0.073  -1.769 
Internat. Diversification  D European Diversification  0.128  3.075  -0.018  -0.408  -0.001  -0.018  0.055  0.727 
  D Global Diversification  -0.691  -7.853  0.245  2.764  -0.390  -15.986  0.574  22.782 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  -0.425  -9.967  0.276  6.464      
  D Sin Screens  0.051  6.347  -0.064  -7.805      
  D Ethical Screens  -0.253  -4.699  0.245  4.424      
  D Social Screens  -0.227  -5.127  0.355  8.068      
  D Environmental Screens  -0.113  -2.459  0.163  3.479      
  D Islamic Fund  -0.190  -3.699  0.267  5.012      
  D Activism Policy  0.127  1.608  -0.257  -3.142      
  D In-House SRI Research  -0.105  -2.477  0.098  2.199      
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  0.148  2.415  0.080  1.260      
  D US  -0.173  -3.095  0.174  3.060      
  D Rest of World  -0.091  -1.366  0.161  2.305      
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes    Yes  Yes  
  D Month  Yes    Yes    Yes  Yes  
  MF R
2 /Likelihood Ratio  0.064 815.470 0.066 757.100 0.057 1251.9 0.062 1356.1 
  Observations  10163    10163    18304  18304  
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3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on the behavior of investors in mutual 
funds. First, we study the behavior of ‘ethical’ investors, namely of those investing in Socially 
Responsible Investment funds. This group of investors explicitly cares about non-financial 
investment screens used in the portfolio selection. Second, we analyze whether SRI screens 
affect the money-flows in SRI funds in a multivariate framework which also includes the size, 
age, risk, past returns, degree of diversification, geographical location and the fee structure of 
these funds as well as the role of the fund family they belong to. Finally, we study the volatility 
of the money-flows and examine whether money-flows are able to predict future fund 
performance. We use a comprehensive dataset consisting of nearly all SRI equity funds around 
the world, as well as of conventional mutual funds from the UK (as a benchmark) over the 
sample period 1992–2003.  
The results suggest that SRI (or ‘ethical’) investors chase past returns, past return 
rankings, and persistence in past performance, as do investors in conventional mutual funds. In 
particular, SRI funds that can be denoted as persistent winners receive about 30% more money 
inflows than persistent losers. Unless a fund persistently underperforms, SRI investors care more 
about past positive returns than about past negative returns. We also show that a higher 
screening intensity attracts more money-inflows than funds employing few screens. The funds 
that use environmental screens (e.g. restricting investments in firms producing or using non-
renewable energy) or ethical screens (e.g. limiting investments in firms using animal testing or 
producing abortion drugs) attract fewer money-flows. An interesting difference between SRI 
funds and conventional funds is the effect of fund fees on the money-flows. The results show 
that the decision to invest in an SRI fund is less affected by management fees and load fees than 
the decision to invest in conventional funds. This may incentivize fund management companies 
to enter the SRI market as ethical investors seem to be willing to pay for the management of 
portfolios consistent with their social objectives.    
The variability in the money-flows is a serious concern of mutual fund managers because 
it can depress fund performance due to the costs of trading the shares of the funds’ portfolios 
which are triggered by the net purchases or sales of shares in the funds. In line with our 
expectations, we find that smaller, younger or riskier SRI funds have higher money-flow 
volatility, partly resulting from the higher marketing efforts of these funds. Furthermore, our 
results indicate that the money-flow volatility is higher for SRI funds that experienced good 
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More specifically, monthly flow volatility is about 0.9% higher for families with a leading 
position in the domestic market and an additional 0.4% per month higher when the fund family 
includes a star fund. This may be due to the fact that myopic investors prefer funds belonging to 
a large family because switching between funds within the family can usually be done at low 
cost. An interesting result is that shareholder activism and in-house research of an SRI fund 
significantly lowers the monthly flow volatility by 1.4% and 0.6%, respectively. Apparently, 
these two attributes attract more stable investors to the fund.   
While we show that SRI investors chase past returns, we also examine whether or not 
SRI investors are able to select (invest their money in) funds that will generate high future 
performance. One the one hand, the use of SRI screens constrains the investment universe of 
mutual funds and there is evidence that conventional funds are confronted with decreasing 
returns to scale (Berk and Green, 2004; Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik, 2004). On the other 
hand, active fund management by using (positive) screens may generate superior returns. Our 
results show that the SRI funds attracting most flows are not generating higher returns: the 
future abnormal return is 2.3% (annually) lower for SRI funds attracting money-flows exceeding 
the average flow by one standard deviation. This finding is reinforced by our analysis of the 
impact of past flows on persistence in (future) returns: we demonstrate that the probability that 
funds arise as persistent winners is reduced when these funds attract large past money inflows 
and that the probability of being persistent losers augments for popular SRI funds. We interpret 
this evidence by the emergence of decreasing returns of scale in fund investments. Thus, it 
seems that ethical money is not financially smart in the sense that the mutual fund reallocation 
decisions of SRI investors reduce their wealth. But there is one caveat to this conclusion: we 
find a positive relation between the use of SRI screens and future performance: the screening 
intensity of SRI funds improves returns. In particular, an SRI fund with 8 more screens is 
expected (all else equal) to have a higher abnormal return of 38 basis points per month (i.e. 4.6% 
annually) than the SRI funds with few screens. Apparently, funds with more SRI screens 
attracting higher money-inflows, have better returns in the future than funds employing one or a 
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Summary of economic effects 
 
This table summarizes the economic effects of a standardized change (e.g. a change of one percent, an event (a 
dummy variable of 1), or a change of one standard deviation (1 S.D.)) in the explanatory variables (which are 
statistically significant at the 5% level) in Tables 3.4-3.9. Panel C of the table reports the marginal effect of the 
Probit estimates in Tables 3.9. 
 
Panel A: Determinants of money-flows (Tables 3.4-3.6) 




Impact on money-flows 
(per month) 
Impact on money-flows 
(per annum) 
      SRI Non-SRI SRI  Non-SRI 
Past Performance           
Average  Return  Positive  +  1%  0.95% 0.78% 11.4% 9.3% 
Average Return Negative  +  1%  0.20%  0.31%  2.4%  3.7% 
Rank Top Quintile  +  10%  1.08%  0.98%  13.3%  11.8% 
Rank Bottom Quintile  +  10%         
D Persistent Winner  +  1  0.78% 1.08%  9.4% 13.0% 
D  Persistent  Loser  -  1  -1.60% -0.81% -19.2% -9.7% 
Fund Characteristics           
Size  -  1 S.D. (2.2)  -0.66%  -0.66%  -7.9%  -7.9% 
Risk  -  1 S.D. (2.2%)    0.37%    4.5% 
Age  -  1 S.D. (5.3)  -0.25%  -0.17%  -3.0%  -2.1% 
Total Fees Low  -  1%    -0.90%    -10.8% 
Total Fees High  -  1%    -0.57%    -6.8% 
Past Flows           
Average  Flow   1%   -0.12%    -1.4% 
Fund Family           
D Top Performer Family  +  1    0.31%    3.7% 
Number Funds in Family  +  1 S.D. (4.2)  0.30%  0.17%  3.6%  2.1% 
D Market Leader Family    1         
Int. Diversification           
D European Diversification    1         
D Global Diversification    1    -0.48%  0  -5.8% 
Screening Activity           
Number of Screens    1 S.D. (4.1)  0.51%    6.1%   
D Sin Screens    1         
D Ethical Screens    1  -1.01%    -12.0%   
D Social Screens    1         
D Environmental Screens    1  -0.93%    -11.1%   
D Islamic Fund    1         
D Activism Policy    1  -0.67%    -8.0%   
D In-House SRI Research    1         
Geographical Location           
D Europe (ex. UK)    1  -1.02%    -12.1%   
D  US    1  -0.87%  -10.4%   
D Rest of World    1  -1.66%    -19.9%   
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Panel B: Determinants of flow volatility (Tables 3.7) 




Impact on flows volatility 
(per month) 
Impact on flow volatility 
(per annum) 
      SRI Non-SRI SRI  Non-SRI 
Past Performance           
Average Return Positive  +  1%  0.79%  0.37%  9.5%  4.4% 
Average Return Negative  +  1%  0.79%  -0.45%  9.5%  -5.4% 
Fund Characteristics          
Size  -  1 S.D. (2.2)  -1.76%  -1.98%  -21.1%  -23.8% 
Risk  +  1 S.D. (2.2%)  0.73%  0.26%  8.8%  3.1% 
Age  -  1 S.D. (5.3)  -0.51%  -0.22%  -6.1%  -2.6% 
Total Fees Low  -  1%         
Total Fees High  -  1%  -0.32%  0.28%  -3.8%  3.4% 
Past Flows          
Average Flow    1%  0.03%  0.18%  0.4%  2.2% 
Fund Family          
D Top Performer Family  +  1 0.42%  0.72%  5.0%  8.6% 
Number Funds in Family  +  1 S.D. (4.2)  0.24%  0.71%  2.9%  8.5% 
D Market Leader Family    1  0.91% 2.10% 10.9%  25.2% 
Int. Diversification          
D European Diversification    1  2.07%  -1.03%  24.8%  -12.4% 
D Global Diversification    1  -0.54%    -6.5%   
Screening Activity          
Number of Screens    1 S.D. (4.1)  0.72%    8.6%   
D Sin Screens    1         
D Ethical Screens    1  -1.45%    -17.4%   
D Social Screens    1         
D Environmental Screens    1  -0.79%    -9.5%   
D Islamic Fund    1         
D Activism Policy    1  -1.36%    -16.3%   
D In-House SRI Research    1  -0.56%    -6.7%   
Geographical Location          
D Europe (ex. UK)    1  -0.71%    -8.5%   
D  US    1  -2.30%  -27.6%   
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Panel C: Determinants of abnormal returns and persistence (Tables 3.8-3.9) 




Impact on abnormal 
returns (per month) 
Impact on abnormal 
returns (per annum) 
Impact on probability 
being a persist. winner 
     SRI  Non-SRI  SRI  Non-SRI  SRI  Non-SRI 
Past Flows               
Average Flow  -  1 S.D. (16%)  -0.20%    -2.3%    -3%  -6% 
Fund Characteristics            
Size  -  1 S.D. (2.2)  -0.22%  -0.22%  -2.6%  -2.6%  -7%  -7% 
Risk  -  1 S.D. (2.2%)  -0.22%    -2.6%      -5% 
Age    1 S.D. (5.3)          -9%   
Total Fees Low  -  1%            -2% 
Total Fees High  -  1%    0.06%    0.72%  -5%   
Past Performance            
Average Return    1%          -2%  -2% 
Fund Family            
D Top Performer Family    1 0.28%    3.4%     2% 
Number Funds in Family    1 S.D. (4.2)          7%  2% 
D Market Leader Family    1             
Int. Diversification            
D European Diversification    1          1%   
D Global Diversification    1    -0.34%    -4.1%  -3%  -2% 
Screening Activity            
Number of Screens    1 S.D. (4.1)  0.19%    2.3%    -8%   
D Sin Screens    1             
D Ethical Screens    1          -2%   
D Social Screens    1          -2%   
D Environmental Screens    1          -1%   
D Islamic Fund    1          -1%   
D Activism Policy    1             
D In-House SRI Research    1          -1%   
Geographical Location            
D Europe (ex. UK)    1          1%   
D US    1          -1%   










“The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the 
good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else.” 
       --  Aristotle,  written  around  350  B.C.
1
 
Although economics textbooks tell us that human behavior is driven by maximization of 
self-interest, there is considerable evidence that a substantial fraction of people deviate from 
exclusively selfish behavior (see, e.g., Fehr and Gachter, 2000 and 2002). For example, recent 
experimental evidence indicates that altruism, or selflessness, is a powerful feature of human 
behavior and is unique to humans.
2 An individual’s utility partially depends on the utility of 
other members of the community, and ethical and social considerations may be important 
determinants of economic behavior.
3 Economic theories of social norms (see Akerlof, 1980, and 
Romer, 1984) point out that, even when individuals maximize self-interest, social norms that are 
financially costly to the individual may nevertheless persist in the economy if individuals are 
sanctioned by loss of reputation when disobeying the norm.
4 Using a repeated game framework, 
Bovenberg (2002) formalizes various roles of social norms and values in facilitating economic 
cooperation, and argues that social considerations of corporate stakeholders (including 
consumers, employees, shareholders, etc.) may induce corporations to care for public goods, like 
the natural environment, even though this does not yield a direct benefit to the stakeholders 
themselves.  
In this paper, we study the economic effects of ethics by focusing on the money-
management industry. Over the past decade, ethical mutual funds, or often also called socially 
                                                 
1 The Nicomachean Ethics, Book I.5; in the translation by Ross (1980). 
2 Human societies represent a huge anomaly in the animal world (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). They are based on a 
detailed division of labor and cooperation between genetically unrelated individuals in large groups. In contrast, 
most animal species exhibit little division of labor, and their cooperation is often limited to small family groups. 
3 In fact, economics was for a long time seen as a branch of ethics (see Sen, 1987). For example, Adam Smith, the 
‘father of modern economics’, was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow.  
4 Elster (1989) provides a review of the literature on social norms and economic theory, and argues that self-interest 
does not provide a full explanation for adherence to social norms. Following Akerlof (1980), social norms are 
defined as acts whose utility to the agent depends on the beliefs or actions of other members of the community. 
Social values are preferences that value particular social norms (Bovenberg, 2002).    Chapter 4  92
responsible investment (SRI) funds, have experienced an explosive growth around the world: the 
assets in the socially screened portfolios reached $2.3 trillion in 2005 or approximately 9.4% of 
the total universe of professionally managed assets in the US (Social Investment Forum, 2005). 
SRI funds screen their investment portfolio based on ethical, social or environmental criteria. 
This provides an ideal setting to study the economic effects of ethics for the following reasons. 
First, investors of SRI funds explicitly deviate from the economically rational goal of wealth-
maximization. SRI investors are socially conscious and derive non-financial utility by holding 
assets consistent with their ethical and social values. Second, by investing in mutual funds rather 
than giving money to charity, SRI investors still desire to improve their financial utility as they 
expect positive risk-adjusted returns on their investments. 
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we study the risk and 
return characteristics of SRI funds using a unique dataset consisting of nearly all SRI mutual 
funds in Europe, the United States, Asia-Pacific and Africa. To our best knowledge, this is the 
first study on the performance of SRI funds around the world. In order to pursue social 
objectives, SRI funds employ a set of investment screens that restrict their investment 
opportunities. On the one hand, the exclusion of companies based on SRI screens may constrain 
the risk-return optimization and negatively influence fund performance. For instance, SRI funds 
typically do not invest in ‘sin’ stocks, i.e. public-traded companies involved in producing 
alcohol or tobacco and in gambling, although these stocks have historically outperformed the 
market (see Hong and Kacperczyk, 2005). On the other hand, the screening process of SRI funds 
may generate value-relevant non-public information and yield superior fund performance. The 
SRI screens are usually also used as filters to identify managerial competence and superior 
corporate governance, or to avoid potential costs of corporate social crises and environmental 
disasters. Specifically, we examine whether or not the risk-adjusted returns of the various types 
of SRI funds are different from those of conventional benchmarks.   
Second, we investigate whether or not ethical investors are able to select the SRI funds 
that generate superior performance in subsequent periods. Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2003) 
show that the fund selection process of SRI investors determines the performance of the SRI 
fund portfolios relative to that of conventional portfolios. While this study assumes that 
investors make fund selection decisions in a Bayesian way based on a fund’s past performance, 
expenses and turnover, a number of other financial and non-financial fund attributes may 
significantly influence SRI investors’ decision process (see Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang, 
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portfolios by following the actual asset allocation decisions of investors (i.e. the decisions to 
invest or withdraw money) instead of making assumptions on investors’ fund selection process. 
Third, we study the impact of SRI screens on fund returns and risk loadings, an issue that 
plays a central role in the SRI fund industry but has not yet been explored in the literature. More 
specifically, we analyze the question whether or not screening intensity and screening criteria 
(i.e. sin, ethical, social, and environmental screens) influence the risk-adjusted returns and risk 
exposure of SRI funds. Simultaneously, we examine the impact of other fund characteristics, 
such as fund size, age, the fee structure and the reputation of fund families, on fund returns and 
risk.  
The main findings of our paper can be summarized as follows. First, the risk-adjusted 
returns of the average SRI fund in the UK and US are not statistically different from those of 
non-SRI funds in these countries, whereas the average SRI fund in many European and Asia-
Pacific countries strongly underperforms the benchmark portfolios. In particular, the risk-
adjusted returns of the average SRI funds in Belgium, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, 
Singapore, and Sweden are on average lower than –5% per annum. These results may reflect the 
impact of ethical considerations on stock prices: firms meeting high ethical standards are 
overpriced by the market and investors in these companies pay a price for ethics. In addition, we 
demonstrate that the explanatory power of the Fama and French’s risk factors has increased 
significantly over time for SRI fund returns. This suggests that SRI funds gradually converge to 
conventional funds by holding similar assets in their portfolios.   
Second, we find mixed results on the ‘smart money’ effect in the SRI fund industry: 
although ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform their benchmarks 
in subsequent periods, there is some fund-selection ability to identify the ethical funds that will 
perform poorly. Meanwhile, we document that the risk-adjusted return of the total wealth 
invested in ethical funds in Europe (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World is about -6% per 
annum.   
Third, the performance of SRI funds is better when these funds use a larger number of 
SRI screens to model their investment universe, or when they employ an in-house SRI research 
team to screen their portfolios. A two standard-deviation increase in the SRI screening intensity 
generates 2.6% abnormal returns per annum. These results support the hypothesis that the 
screening process generates value-relevant non-public information, and SRI screens help fund 
managers to pick stocks. It also appears that screening activities of SRI funds have a significant 
impact on funds’ loadings on risk factors. Chapter 4  94
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes our data. 
Section 4.3 presents the returns and risk characteristics of SRI funds, Section 4.4 focuses on the 
investors’ portfolios of SRI funds, and Section 4.5 examines the determinants of returns and risk 
of SRI funds. Section 4.6 concludes.  
 
4.2   Data  
4.2.1  Ethical and Conventional Mutual Funds  
 
We construct a database that contains socially responsible equity mutual funds domiciled 
in 23 countries and offshore jurisdictions. Specifically, the SRI funds are domiciled in the 
following regions: (i) Europe (excluding the UK): Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, (ii) the UK, including 
Guernsey and the Isle of Man, (iii) the US, and (iv) the Rest of the World: Australia, Canada, 
Cayman Islands, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands Antilles, Singapore, and South Africa. We 
also collect data on conventional equity mutual funds in the UK and the US, which serve as our 
reference groups. Our primary data source is the Standard & Poors’ Fund Service (Micropal), 
which covers ethical funds and conventional UK funds. The US ethical and conventional fund 
data are obtained from the CRSP Survivor-bias Free Mutual Fund Database. We also obtain data 
for the Canadian SRI fund data from Bloomberg. For each fund, the database contains monthly 
Net Asset Value (per share value of a fund’s portfolio net of annual management fees, denoted 
as NAV), monthly Assets Under Management (AUM), and other fund characteristics such as the 
management fees, load fees and the inception date. Our sample period starts in January 1991 
(prior to this year the number of SRI mutual funds is tiny) and ends in December 2003.  
To determine the universe of SRI funds, we create a list of mutual funds which bear 
labels such as  ‘ethical’, ‘socially responsible’, ‘ecology’, ‘Christian value’ or ‘Islamic’ in the 
Standard & Poors’ Fund Service database. S&P classifies mutual funds as ethical or socially 
responsible investment funds if the fund managers specify in the fund prospectuses that they 
have social, environmental or ethical investment goals. We subsequently verify the SRI 
screening policies of these funds. For each fund in our initial sample, we hand-collect and verify 
the information on SRI screens using the fund prospectuses and websites, and also gather more 
information by direct contact with fund managers (by phone, by email or via on-site interviews). 
Furthermore, we also collect information on whether a fund engages in shareholder activism and 
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to be included in our sample, the SRI funds employ at least one ethical, corporate governance, 
social, or environmental screen as part of their investment policies.  
When a mutual fund is sold in two or more countries, the S&P list of socially responsible 
funds reports it as two or more funds. We exclude such duplicated records. We restrict our 
sample to equity mutual funds, excluding fixed-income, balanced, and money-market mutual 
funds. We also do not include funds that are not available to individual investors directly, but are 
only available through institutions such as pension funds, insurance companies, or charities and 
foundations. The above process reduces our sample size from the starting sample of 1,343 funds 
to 455 equity SRI funds, including 45 funds for which we do not have data on their assets under 
management. In addition, we learnt from discussions with several industry experts and fund 
managers that over our sample period eight socially responsible equity mutual funds ceased to 
exist, which implies a very low attrition rate (on average 0.25% on an annual basis). To avoid a 
possible survivorship bias (see Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross, 1992), we collect data 
for these funds from a number of sources including CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund 
Database and the Datastream ‘dead’ mutual funds research files, and include the funds in our 
sample. All returns are inclusive of any distributions, net of annual management fees and 
denoted in local currency. Our final sample of SRI funds comprises 463 live and dead equity 
mutual funds domiciled in 23 countries or offshore jurisdictions around the world.  
Our benchmark sample of UK conventional funds consists of 716 non-SRI equity mutual 
funds, including 649 ‘live’ equity funds and 67 ‘dead’ equity funds (the attrition rate is about 3% 
on an annual basis). Data for dead mutual funds were collected from Datastream. The reference 
group of US conventional mutual funds consists of 12,624 equity funds over our sample period 
(including 8,813 funds alive in December 2003) and these data are collected from the CRSP 
Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund Database. Consistent with Bollen (2006), we classify a US 
fund as an equity fund if its year-end equity allocation reaches 75 percent or more during the 
fund’s life.  
The cross-sectional characteristics of the SRI and non-SRI mutual funds are described in 
Table 4.1 by country
5: the number of funds, the number of fund families (i.e. the financial 
institution that manages the mutual funds), the average and median fund age, the average and 
                                                 
5 We identify a mutual fund’s nationality by its legal domicile. It should be noted that the domicile may be different 
from the countries where the funds are sold. For funds in the four offshore jurisdictions, the investors’ nationalities 
are unobservable. Another extreme case is Luxembourg, whose funds are sold across Europe. Fund managers 
choose Luxembourg and offshore jurisdictions as their domiciles mainly because of favorable tax laws. Based on 
the countries of origin of their fund management companies, we assign 41 out of the 56 funds domiciled in 
Luxembourg to: Switzerland (11 funds), Germany (10), UK (6), France (4), Netherlands (4), Belgium (3), Sweden 
(2), and Austria (1). The remaining 15 funds domiciled in Luxembourg are evaluated using European-wide 
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of equity SRI and non-SRI funds 
 
Panel A of Table 4.1 reports the number of funds, the number of funds in a family (managed by the same financial 
institution), the average and median age (years since the fund’s inception), the average and median Assets Under 
Management (in million €), and the average annual expenses (fund management fees), load fees (the sum of front-end fees 
and back-end fees) and total fees (the sum of management fees and one seventh of load fees) per fund for SRI funds 
around the world at the end of 2003. Panel B reports the cross-sectional characteristics of our benchmark sample of non-





















Panel A: SRI             
Overall 463  221  5.9  4.0  63.9  14.1 1.4% 2.9%  1.8% 
(1) UK              
UK 58  24  9.2  7.5  100.7  49.8 1.3% 3.5%  1.8% 
Isle of Man  8  1  3.8  3.8  2.4  2.4  1.0%  0.0%  1.0% 
Guernsey 1  1  9.5  9.5  27.8 27.8 1.0%  0.0% 1.0% 
Total  67 26 9.0 7.2  95.5  48.4  1.3%  3.5%  1.8% 
(2) US               
US 98  32  8.0  6.7  142.1  17.9  1.6%  1.8%  1.9% 
(3) Europe (excl. UK)            
Austria 17  7  2.0  1.6  3.4  2.7 1.5%  4.5% 2.2% 
Belgium 21  7  3.6  3.0  24.4  9.1 0.9%  2.8% 1.3% 
France 59  34  3.9  3.3  22.7  10.3  1.4%  3.0%  1.8% 
Germany 12  7  8.0  8.0  51.5  51.5 1.3% 2.9%  1.7% 
Ireland 11  6  4.3  2.8  5.5  1.5 1.3%  1.1% 1.4% 
Italy 7  7  4.4  1.8  83.1  9.8  1.8%  0.0%  1.8% 
Luxembourg 15  8  4.6  3.4  41.3 11.0 1.3%  2.2% 1.6% 
Netherlands 19  12  4.0  3.4  61.3 20.5 1.2%  1.2% 1.3% 
Norway 3  2  8.2  6.5  N/A  N/A 1.9% 0.7%  2.0% 
Sweden 26  13  7.6  8.9  33.5  7.6  1.3%  3.9%  1.9% 
Switzerland 16  7  3.6  3.4  45.1 29.2 1.3%  3.8% 1.8% 
Total  206 110  4.1  3.1 32.0 8.8 1.3%  2.8% 1.7% 
(4) Rest of the World              
Australia 36  11  5.2  2.8  7.9 1.7  1.6%  2.5%  1.9% 
Canada 7  5  4.7  3.1  N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
Cayman Islands  1  1  3.8  3.8  2.4 2.4  1.5%  2.0%  1.8% 
Japan 13  10  5.0  4.2  42.8  24.8 1.6% 2.4%  1.9% 
Malaysia 26  19  6.2  2.4  42.6 22.9 1.5%  6.7% 2.4% 
NL Antilles  1  1  6.0 6.0  119.0  119.0  2.0%  5.5%  2.8% 
Singapore 4  3  3.9  3.9  0.7  0.7 1.0%  5.0% 1.7% 
South Africa  4  3  5.0  3.1  28.2 14.4 1.4%  4.8% 2.1% 
Total 92  53  5.4  2.8  26.3  6.9  1.5%  4.0%  2.1% 
            
Panel B: Non-SRI            
Non-SRI (UK)  716  133  12.5  10.0  270.0 71.4 1.3% 3.9%  1.8% 
Non-SRI (US)  12624  688  7.9  6.2  289.2 26.5 1.6% 2.4%  2.0% 
 
 
median assets under management, and the average fees (including management fees and load 
fees
6) per fund in December 2003. The largest number of SRI funds in our sample comes from 
Continental Europe (a total of 206 funds which are part of 110 different fund families), followed 
by the US (98 funds), the UK (67 funds), and Australia (36 funds). The SRI fund industry of the 
UK and the US is the most mature as reflected by the median age of about 7 years, whereas the 
                                                 
6 Load fees include front-end fees (share subscription fees) and back-end fees (share redemption fees). While load 
fees are mainly used to pay for trading costs and marketing expenses (e.g. distribution payments to brokers or for 
advertising), management fees are used to cover operating expenses including managerial compensation as well as 
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industry in Europe (excluding the UK) and the Rest of the World is young with a median age of 
about 3 years since the fund’s inception. Furthermore, US and UK SRI funds are much larger 
than those in Europe and the Rest of the World. For instance, while the average size of SRI 
funds in the US is € 142 million, the one in Europe (excluding the UK) amounts to € 32 million. 
The total fees (the sum of the annual management fees and one seventh of the load fees
7) range 
from 1.3% per annum in Belgium and the Netherlands to 2.4% per annum in Malaysia. There 
are important differences in the components of fund fees across the regions: European and UK 
funds have the lowest management fees (1.3%), whereas the load fees, i.e. the sum of front-end 
loads (share subscription fees) and back-end loads (share redemption fees), are the lowest in the 
US (1.8%). Finally, Panel B of Table 4.1 shows that the conventional funds are typically much 
larger, with an average fund size of € 270 million and € 289 million for the UK or the US, 
respectively. While an SRI fund family consists on average of two SRI equity funds, the average 
number of non-SRI equity funds per family is five funds in the UK and 18 funds in the US. 
 
4.2.2  Social and Ethical Objectives 
The SRI funds usually employ a combination of negative or positive SRI screens in the 
process of constructing portfolios. A typical negative screen is applied to an initial asset pool, 
such as the S&P 500 stocks from which specific sectors (e.g. alcohol, tobacco and defense 
industries), are excluded. Positive screens are employed to select companies meeting superior 
standards on issues such as corporate governance or environmental protection. The use of 
positive screens is often combined with a ‘best in class’ approach: firms are ranked within each 
industry based on social criteria; subsequently, only those firms passing a minimum threshold in 
each industry are selected as potential candidates for inclusion into a portfolio. For instance, the 
chemical firms polluting least are selected as candidates for SRI portfolios. Moreover, in order 
to achieve social objectives, SRI funds sometimes engage in shareholder activism, where fund 
managers attempt to influence the company’s actions through direct dialogue with the 
management or by voting at annual general meetings. 
We develop a list of SRI screens used by SRI funds around the world. Combining the 
information from a variety of data sources
8, we identify 21 screening criteria, which are further 
classified into four major categories. As reported in Panel A of Table 4.2, the first category, 
                                                 
7 We amortize load fees over a seven-year holding period, which is the average holding period for equity mutual 
funds. Like Sirri and Tufano (1998), Total Fees is the sum of the management fees and the load fees charged to 
investors. Note that the true costs of investing in mutual funds maybe higher than the total fees due to taxes on 
investment returns. 
8 Our information sources are Social Investment Forum (2003), Natural Capital Institute 
(www.responsibleinvesting.org), SiRi SRI Fund Service (www.avanzi-sri.org), and Sustainable Investment 
Platform (www.sustainable-investment.org).  Chapter 4  98
Table 4.2: Summary of screening activities of SRI funds 
 
Panel A of Table 4.2 reports the 21 investment screens used by SRI funds around the world which are classified into 
4 broad categories. SRI funds often use a combination of the screens. Positive screens (funds select firms based on 
relative criteria) are in italics and the remaining screens are negative screens (funds exclude specific industries or 
firms). Panel B shows the average number of screens per fund, the average number of negative or positive screens, 
the average number of sin, ethical, corporate governance and social, and environmental screens used. Furthermore, 
it reports the fraction of the funds that use negative, positive, sin, ethical, corporate governance and social, 
environmental or Islamic screens, and of those that engage in shareholder activism or base their screening activity 
on in-house research, and the fraction of the funds that invest across Europe, the world or within their domestic 
countries.  
 
Panel A: Definition of SRI screens  
Categories Screens 
Sin  Tobacco, Alcohol, Gambling, Weapons, Pornography 
Ethical   Animal Testing, Abortion, Genetic Engineering, Non-Marital, Islamic, Healthcare 
Corporate Governance and 
Social 
Corporate Governance, Business Practice, Community, Labor Diversity, Labor 
Relations, Human Rights, Foreign Operations 
Environmental  Nuclear, Environment, Renewable Energy 
  
Panel B: Summary statistics 
  UK  USA  Europe ex. UK  Rest of World  Overall 
By fund: Average number of         
Screens 9.52  8.14  6.62  5.59  7.12 
Negative screens  5.85  4.55  3.00  3.51  3.81 
Positive screens  3.67  3.59  3.62  2.08  3.31 
Sin screens  3.60  3.31  1.73  2.69  2.52 
Ethical screens  1.40 0.67  0.56  0.53  0.68 
Governance & Social screens 2.62 2.71  2.70  1.49  2.45 
Environmental screens  1.90  1.45  1.63  0.88  1.47 
Percentage of funds with           
Negative screens  85%  97%  56%  72%  72% 
Positive screens  87%  69%  92%  58%  79% 
Sin screens  85%  92%  54%  67%  69% 
Ethical screens  85%  57%  38%  52%  51% 
Governance & Social screens 85%  68%  78%  47%  70% 
Environmental screens  94%  72%  88%  60%  80% 
Islamic screens  2%  3%  3%  36%  9% 
Activism policy  31%  47%  18%  6%  24% 
In-house SRI research  27%  55%  22%  11%  28% 
European Diversification  4%  0%  33%  0%  15% 
Global Diversification  40%  16%  61%  17%  39% 
Domestic Investment  56%  84%  7%  83%  46% 
 
 
denoted as ‘Sin’, contains funds that avoid investing in firms from the so-called ‘sin-industries’, 
which produce e.g. tobacco, alcohol, or weapons. The funds in the ‘Ethical’ category exclude 
e.g. firms that test their products on animals, produce equipment facilitating abortion, develop 
genetically-modified products, or violate Islamic or Christian religious principals. Funds that 
employ screens checking for superior corporate governance, good labor relations or a good 
human rights track record (e.g. no child labor) are denoted as ‘Corporate Governance and 
Social’ funds. Finally, funds that invest in environmentally friendly firms are referred to as 
‘Environmental’ funds. Note that an SRI fund usually employs a combination of screens from 
several categories. For instance, the TIAA-CREF Social Choice Equity Fund excludes 
companies that derive revenues from alcohol, tobacco, gambling or weapons, and invests in The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  99
companies meeting high standards in labor relations, corporate governance, and environmental 
performance.  
Panel B of Table 4.2 highlights the differences in screening activities across the four 
regions. The UK SRI funds employ on average 9.5 investment screens simultaneously, 6 of 
which are so-called negative screens which exclude firms or industries with undesirable ethical 
characteristics. In contrast, SRI funds in the Rest of the World apply on average 5.5 screens. 
93% of US SRI funds use at least one of the sin screens, whereas corporate governance, social 
and environmental screens are more popular in the UK and the rest of Europe (used by 87% and 
92% of the funds, respectively). Meanwhile it should be noted that Islamic funds account for 
36% of SRI funds in the Rest of the World, including Asia-Pacific and Africa. Interestingly, 
47% of the US SRI funds report that they make active use of their shareholder voting rights, 
while in Europe (excluding the UK) only 18% of the funds are involved in shareholder activism. 
Furthermore, 55% of the US SRI funds base their SRI screening activities on in-house research, 
compared to only 11% of SRI funds in the Rest of the World. Finally, European SRI funds are 
the most internationally diversified ones: 33% of the funds invest across Europe, 61% invest 
around the world and only 6% invest in the domestic country. In contrast, only 16% of the SRI 
funds in the US invest overseas. 
 
4.2.3 Benchmarks   
We construct monthly returns of benchmark portfolios for each country and region in our 
sample. The benchmark factors are the Fama and French’s (1993) three factors, including the 
market, size, and book-to-market, and the Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor. We collected the 
four factors for the US from the CRSP database. For the risk-free interest rates, we use the 1-
month treasury-bill rate or the inter-bank interest rate, gathered from CRSP and Datastream. As 
the factor returns for countries other than the US are not publicly available, we construct the 
factors for all other countries and regions in our sample using the Worldscope database
9. For the 
excess market return factor (MKT) we use the return of a value-weighted portfolio of all stocks 
(including live and dead companies) in the Worldscope database in each country or region
10 
minus the risk-free rate. The size factor SMB (Small minus Big) is the return difference between 
portfolios of small and large stocks. In line with Fama and French (1993), we rank all stocks in a 
country or region based on the market value and assign the bottom 10% stocks (in terms of the 
                                                 
9 For the construction of the factor portfolios, we used the on-line research tool provided by Style Research Ltd., 
London. 
10 We also used the MSCI country indices as a proxy for the market portfolio, and our results remain unchanged. 
The Worldscope database aims at covering about 98% of market capitalization in each country, while the MSCI 
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total market capitalization) to the small stock portfolio and the remaining 90% to the large stock 
portfolio. To construct the book-to-market factor HML (High minus Low), we rank all stocks in 
the Worldscope database based on their book-to-market ratios, and assign the top 30% to the 
high book-to-market portfolio and the bottom 30% to the low book-to-market portfolio. The 
HML factor return is the return difference between the high and low book-to-market portfolios. 
To form the momentum factor UMD (Up minus Down), we rank all stocks according to their 
returns over the prior 12 months, and assign the top 30% stocks to the high prior return portfolio 
and the bottom 30% to the low prior return portfolio. The return difference between the high and 
low prior return portfolios is the UMD factor return. All of the three factors SMB, HML and 
UMD are value-weighted and constructed using 1-month lagged information. Following Fama 
and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), the SMB and HML factors are rebalanced at the end of 
June of each year, while the UMD factor is rebalanced at the end of each month.  
To check the accuracy of our factor returns, we compare our UK factors with those in 
Dimson, Nagel and Quigley (2003) who construct the UK factors for the period of 1995-2001 
using the London Share Price Database (LSPD)
11. We also construct the US factors using the 
Worldscope database and compare it with the Fama and French factors in the CRSP database. 
We find that our own factors are virtually identical to those from these other sources. 
 
4.3  Returns and Risk  
4.3.1  Doing Well by Doing Good? 
In order to investigate whether or not investors (literally) pay a price for their ethical 
considerations, we examine the risk and return characteristics of SRI mutual funds around the 
world and compare this to reference groups of conventional US and UK funds. Most existing 
research on SRI fund performance does not find evidence for the hypothesis that the risk-
adjusted returns of the average SRI mutual funds differ significantly from those of the average 
non-SRI mutual funds.
12 In a model that considers the stock price implications of ethical 
investing that excludes polluting companies, Heinkel, Krause and Zechner (2001) show that the 
exclusion of polluting firms (or other unethical firms) by ethical investors reduces risk-sharing 
                                                 
11 We thank Elroy Dimson and Stefan Nagel for providing us the UK factor data.   
12 Almost all existing studies on SRI fund performance focus on individual countries (mainly the US and the UK). 
For instance, Goldreyer et al. (1999), Hamilton et al. (1993) and Statman (2000), Geczy et al. (2003), Bello (2005) 
and Girard et al. (2005) study US SRI funds; Luther et al. (1992), Luther and Matatko (1994), Mallin et al. (1995) 
and Gregory et al. (1997) examine UK SRI funds; Bauer, Derwall and Otten (2006) study Canadian SRI funds; and 
Bauer, Otten and Tourani Rad (2006) analyze Australian SRI funds. Multi-country studies are undertaken by 
Schroder (2003) for the US, Germany and Swiss SRI funds; Bauer et al. (2005) for the US, UK and German funds, 
and Kreander et al. (2005) for European funds. As most of these studies are based on different sample periods, 
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opportunities among investors who hold shares of polluting firms, which may negatively 
influence the stock price of polluting firms and raise their expected returns.
13 In line with this 
prediction, Hong and Kacperczyk (2005) find that ‘sin’ stocks in the US have been significantly 
underpriced by the stock market. The authors argue that the mispricing of ‘sin’ stocks may result 
from the fact that they are neglected by an important part of investors, i.e. the SRI investors.
14 
As a result, excluding this underpriced ‘sin’ part of the stock market, as most ethical funds do, 
may negatively influence the risk-return tradeoffs of SRI funds in comparison to conventional 
funds. 
We study the performance of ethical funds by using the time-series returns of an equally 
weighted portfolio of ethical funds.




t MKT t f t r r r r ε β α + − + = − ) ( , 1 ,        (4.1) 
 
where   is the return of an equally weighted portfolio of funds in month t,   is the return on a 
local risk-free deposit (i.e. the 1-month treasury bill rate or the inter-bank interest rate),   is the 
return of a local equity market index, 
t r t f r ,
m
t r
1 α  is Jensen’s alpha introduced by Jensen (1968),  MKT β is 
the factor loading on the market portfolio, and  t ε  stands for the idiosyncratic return. We also 
estimate a four-factor model including the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors 
(see, Fama and French, 1993, and Carhart, 1997):  
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13 Implicit in this model is that there is limited arbitrage in the stock market, e.g. there is not enough arbitrage 
capital exploiting the mispricing between polluting firms and non-polluting firms. This model is in line with 
Merton’s (1987) prediction that stocks with a smaller investor base (labeled as ‘neglected’ stocks) have a larger 
expected return due to limited risk-sharing.  
14 The alternative explanation for the outperformance of ‘sin’ stocks is that sin companies are more liable to 
lawsuits (e.g. tobacco companies) and have higher expected return because of litigation risk. 
15 We evaluate the performance of the fund portfolios on a country and regional basis from a local investor 
perspective: the country portfolios of mutual funds are in local currency, evaluated against local benchmark factors 
while using local risk-free interest rates. In addition, the portfolios ‘Europe excluding UK’ and ‘Rest of World’ are 
in Euro and US dollar and are evaluated against European and Asia-Pacific benchmark factors and the German and 
Australian risk-free rates, respectively. The ‘World’ portfolios are appraised from the perspective of an international 
investor based in the US: these portfolios are in US dollars and they are evaluated using the World benchmark 
factors and the US risk-free rate. As a robustness check, we also assess fund performance from the perspective of an 
international investor by using international indices as benchmarks; our main results remain unchanged (tables are 
available upon request). 
16 As a robustness check, we also estimate the models using a fund regression approach: we compute the cross-
sectional mean of individual fund estimates. These results are similar to the results from the portfolio regression 
approach presented in the paper. For example, using the fund regression approach, we find that the estimated four-
factor alphas of conventional UK and US funds are –0.9% and –2.4% per annum, respectively. Chapter 4  102






t r 4 α  is the four-factor-adjusted 
return of ethical fund portfolios,  MKT β , 
SMB β ,  HML β , and 
UMD β  are the factor loadings on the four 
factors, and  t ε  stands for the idiosyncratic return.  
In order to control for the impact of fund fees on fund performance, we compute the 
alphas of fund portfolios both after and before deducting management fees (denoted as α4, and 
gross  α4  respectively). The gross alpha is calculated by adding back one twelfth of annual 
management fees to the monthly fund returns before estimating the four-factor model.  
Panel A of Table 4.3 presents the excess returns (i.e. fund returns in excess of the risk-
free rate) and the CAPM results for equally weighted portfolios of ethical and conventional 
funds. The average excess return of SRI funds around the world is 2.6% per annum (in USD), 
ranging from –0.7% per annum in the Rest of World to 5.2% per annum in the US. After 
controlling for the exposure to the market risk, the average SRI funds in the UK, the US and 
Continental Europe underperform local equity indices by 2.7%, 2.8%, and 4.3% per annum, 
respectively. However, the alphas for the UK and US SRI funds are not statistically different 
from those of their conventional peers, a result consistent with previous studies on SRI 
performance (see, e.g., Bauer, Koedijk and Otten, 2005).  
The estimation results for the four-factor model are presented in Panels B (regional 
level)and C (country level) of Table 4.3. The annual alphas of SRI funds in the UK and US are –
2.2% and –3.4% respectively (both significant at the 1% level), whereas those of conventional 
funds are –1.1% and –2.5% respectively.
 17 The differences in alphas, about 1% per annum, are 
not statistically significant. It is also important to note that 97% of the return variations of the 
UK and US SRI funds can be replicated by portfolios mimicking the four risk factors, which 
suggests that the holdings of SRI funds in these two countries might be very similar to those of 
conventional funds tracking style indices. European SRI funds underperform the four-factor 
benchmarks by 3.5% per annum (significant at the 10% level), which is less negative than the 
CAPM-adjusted alpha due to the negative loading on the ‘HML’ factor. Furthermore, the US 
SRI funds have a significantly smaller exposure to the size (‘SMB’) factor than the conventional 
funds. This implies that these SRI funds invest relatively more in large-capitalization stocks. In 
contrast, the SRI funds in other countries feature a ‘small-cap growth stocks’ investment style.
18  
Panel C of Table 4.3 reports the performance of SRI funds at the country level from a 
domestic investor’s perspective. The results are shown for countries with at least 5 years of  
                                                 
17 Bollen (2006), who adopts a similar definition of equity funds, reports that the four-factor alpha for the average 
conventional US funds is -25 basis points per month, i.e. –3% per annum, which is similar to our estimates.  
18 A similar pattern of differences in investment styles between the US and European SRI funds are reported in 
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Table 4.3: Performance of SRI funds  
 
Panel A of Table 4.3 presents the average excess return (i.e. fund return in excess of the risk-free interest rate) and 
the CAPM model estimates (Equation (4.1)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and for non-SRI 
funds in the UK and the US, and reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. Panel B 
presents the Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimates (Equation (4.2)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the 
world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US, and it also reports the gross alphas which are estimated by adding 
back one twelfth of annual management fees to the monthly fund returns before running the regressions. Panel C 
reports the four-factor model estimates (Equation (4.2)) and the gross alphas for equally weighted SRI funds in each 
country with at least five years of returns data. The returns of the country portfolios are in local currency and 
evaluated from a local investor’s perspective, i.e. with local benchmark factors and local risk-free rates. The 
estimates of excess returns and alphas (α 1 and α 4) are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with 
Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold 
coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%.  
 












SRI:        
United Kingdom (₤) 1.63  -2.68  0.87  0.83 
 0.42  -1.55  23.37  155 
United States ($)  5.17  -2.84 0.94 0.97 
 1.30  -3.32  69.63  156 
Europe ex. UK (€)  0.22  -4.31 0.78 0.82 
 0.05  -2.24  23.69  155 
Rest of World ($)  -0.68  0.74  0.49  0.45 
 -0.17  0.26  7.54  155 
World ($)  2.64  -1.38  0.84  0.88 
 0.74  -0.95  29.42  155 
Non-SRI:        
United Kingdom (₤) 3.43  -1.23  0.94  0.83 
 0.82  -0.67  24.12  155 
United States ($)  6.08  -1.52  0.89  0.95 
 1.59  -1.52  56.94  156 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:      
United Kingdom (₤) -1.80  -1.45  -0.07  0.00 
 -0.32  -0.58  -1.29   
United States ($)  -0.90  -1.32  0.05  0.02 
 -0.16  -1.00  2.35   
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(Table 4.3 - Continued) 
 


















SRI:           
United Kingdom (₤)  -2.22 0.89 0.40 -0.06 -0.02 0.96 -0.97 
 -2.63  53.01  20.38  -2.86  -1.30  155  -1.15 
United States ($)  -3.37 0.94 0.10 0.05 -0.01 0.97 -1.76 
 -4.48  67.68  3.62  2.73  -1.07  156  -2.33 
Europe ex. UK (€)  -3.48  0.79  0.06  -0.07  -0.05 0.82 -2.18 
 -1.85  21.64  1.03  -2.11  -1.49  155  -1.16 
Rest of World ($)  0.14  0.57 0.44 -0.03  0.15  0.57 1.66 
 0.06  10.71  3.98  -0.40  3.39  155  0.71 
World ($)  -2.04  0.86 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.89 -0.63 
 -1.53  28.32  3.98  0.08  0.98  155  -0.47 
Non-SRI:          
United Kingdom (₤) -1.14  0.95 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.12 
 -0.66  26.73  4.60  -0.09  -0.15  155  0.07 
United States ($)  -2.48 0.89 0.18 0.07 0.00 0.97 -0.85 
  -2.93 58.52 9.67  2.99  -0.23  156  -1.00 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:          
United Kingdom (₤) -1.08  -0.06  0.22  -0.05 -0.02 0.11 -1.09 
 -0.56  -1.53  4.93  -1.31  -0.56    -0.57 
United States ($)  -0.89  0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.91 
  -0.78 2.53 -2.27 -0.40 -0.48    -0.80 
 


















Australia  -2.59 0.65 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.78 -1.01 
 -2.12  18.33  2.53  1.05  1.68  155  -0.83 
Belgium -5.26  0.72 0.26 0.07 -0.01 0.53 -4.36 
 -1.61  11.32  3.27  0.92  -0.23  140  -1.33 
France  -5.96 0.77 0.26 0.01  -0.05  0.77  -4.56 
 -3.32  17.60  5.73  0.32  -2.08  155  -2.54 
Germany -0.62  0.70 0.35 0.01  -0.10  0.56 0.66 
 -0.17  12.12  3.86  0.08  -2.54  155  0.18 
Ireland  -6.14 0.65 0.21 -0.05 -0.02 0.69 -4.88 
 -2.75  16.86  4.02  -1.17  -0.73  155  -2.19 
Italy -2.82  0.32  0.07  -0.10  -0.04 0.38 -0.98 
 -0.89  6.06  1.37  -1.98  -0.79  118  -0.31 
Japan  -5.03 0.73 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.87 -3.43 
 -3.15  23.35  0.94  1.41  0.36  155  -2.15 
Luxembourg -3.34  0.72  -0.15  -0.15  -0.03 0.75 -2.03 
  -1.18 11.59 -1.24 -2.26 -0.70  90  -0.72 
Malaysia -2.99  0.58 0.18 -0.13 0.06 0.92 -1.53 
 -1.69  20.53  4.73  -2.82  2.84  155  -0.86 
Netherlands  -4.10 0.81 0.29 0.06 0.01 0.73 -2.93 
 -1.98  20.31  4.86  1.50  0.41  155  -1.42 
Norway -5.20  0.88 0.32 0.07 -0.06 0.75 -3.27 
 -1.36  16.88  3.03  1.26  -0.92  89  -0.85 
Singapore -5.71  0.57  0.13  -0.18 0.12 0.52 -4.71 
 -1.07  6.46  1.65  -3.00  2.81  75  -0.88 
Sweden  -6.46 0.56 0.12  -0.13  -0.05 0.71 -5.12 
 -2.36  7.97  1.70  -2.79  -1.95  142  -1.87 
Switzerland -3.01  0.83 0.41 -0.06 -0.05 0.62 -1.75 
 -1.10  13.30  4.47  -1.10  -1.06  155  -0.64 The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  105
return data. The four-factor alphas of most country portfolios are strongly negative, which 
indicates the strong underperformance of European and Asia-Pacific SRI funds relative to the 
four-factor benchmarks. For example, the alphas of the average SRI funds in Belgium, France, 
Ireland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden are lower than –5% per annum.  
As the underperformance of actively managed conventional funds may be due to 
management fees (see Gruber, 1996, and Wermers, 2000), we examine the impact of 
management fees on SRI fund performance. Panel C of Table 4.3 shows that, even before 
deducting management fees from fund returns, about half of the country portfolios underperform 
the benchmarks by more than 3% per annum This implies that the management fees cannot fully 
explain the strong underperformance of European and Asia-Pacific SRI funds relative to 
domestic benchmark portfolios. 
To the extent that SRI funds invest in companies that are considered ‘ethical’, our results 
suggest that the companies meeting high ethical standards might be overpriced in stock markets, 
especially in Europe (excluding the UK) and Asia-Pacific.
19 There are two potential 
explanations for the ‘overpricing of ethics’ anomaly. The first is that ethical companies may be 
less risky than unethical ones and hence should earn a lower return. For instance, ethical 
companies may face fewer lawsuits relating to corporate governance scandals, corporate social 
crises and environmental disasters. In case the conventional four-factor pricing model does not 
capture SRI (or ‘ethical’) risks, the estimated alpha may reflect the expected returns associated 
with the missing risk factor. An alternative explanation for the overpricing of ethics may result 
from ‘aversion to unethical/asocial corporate behavior’: investors strongly dislike companies’ 
unethical behavior due to social norms even if the behavior is not associated with higher risks. 
When deriving non-financial utility from investing in companies that meet high ethical 
standards, SRI investors may be content with a lower rate of return from ethical/socially 
responsible firms. The rising demand from shares of SRI firms may cause these firms to be 
priced above their fundamental value such that ethical funds underperform the market.
20 This 
explanation is a behavioral one, which assumes that there are limits to arbitrage in stock 
markets, i.e. there are not enough arbitrageurs short-selling ethical firms if they are overpriced.  
                                                 
19 Alternative explanations of the underperformance of SRI funds may be transaction costs and non-stock holdings 
of funds. Wermers (2000) shows that, for conventional mutual funds in the US, transaction costs and the 
underperformance of non-stock holdings lead to a reduction in fund performance by 0.8% and 0.7% per annum 
respectively. Given that the gross alphas on SRI funds are far lower than –1.5%, it seems that these two factors are 
unlikely to explain the strong underperformance of SRI funds. 
20 This view is related to taste-based theories of discrimination in labor markets, which originates with Becker 
(1957). In this theory, employers with discriminatory tastes are willing to pay a financial price to avoid interacting 
with a particular class of people. Consequently the wage of a particular class of people (e.g. white people) may be 
higher than the wage of others. The ‘aversion to unethical behavior’ explanation is also in line with the fact that in 
product markets, consumers are willing to pay a premium for environmentally friendly products. Chapter 4  106
 
4.3.2  Does Ethical Risk Matter? 
We investigate the relative importance of ‘ethical risk’ and ‘aversion to unethical 
behavior’ to explain the underperformance of ethical funds. If the underperformance is driven by 
the missing ethical risk factor, adding this factor to the four-factor model could substantially 
improve the alphas of ethical funds.  
We measure the ‘ethics’ factor returns by employing ethical equity indices, i.e. the FTSE 
4 Good (FTSE4G) Indices in excess of the risk-free interest rate.
21 In order to be included in the 
FTSE4G indices, companies must pass the negative screens (such as e.g. tobacco, weapons and 
nuclear) and satisfy the positive selection screens (such as environmental sustainability, 
corporate governance, stakeholder relationships or universal human rights). We use the excess 
returns of the UK, US, Europe and Global indices from the FTSE4G, which represent the returns 
of zero-investment passive portfolios of ethical firms. Panel A of Table 4.4 reports the four-
factor-adjusted returns of the passive ethical portfolios of the four regions. We find that 
portfolios of ethical firms in the UK and Europe underperform their local benchmarks by about 
4.5% per annum, consistent with the results for ethical mutual funds. As ethical indices are in 
fact passive portfolios without any transaction costs and non-stock holdings, the result supports 
the view that the underperformance of ethical funds is not driven by management fees, 
transaction costs or non-stock holdings. Meanwhile, the risk-adjusted returns of the US and the 
World ethical indices are about zero. 
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where  5 α  is the five-factor-adjusted return of mutual fund portfolios,   captures the excess 
return of the regional ethical indices,
ethic
t r
23  ETHIC β  is the loading on the ethical risk factor, and  t ε  
stands for the idiosyncratic return. We can also interpret   as a zero-investment spread that 
has a long position in ethical firms and a short position in a risk-free deposit. 
ethic
t r
                                                 
21 The FTSE4Good Indices were launched in July 2001 with a history dating back to 1996. They are value-weighted 
and include companies from the FTSE All-World Developed Index. As a robustness check, we also use the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI) as an alternative to the FTSE4Good indices and obtain very similar results 
(tables are available upon request). The DJSI indices capture the leading 10% companies by industry in terms of 
sustainability and are drawn from the largest 2500 companies in the Dow Jones Global Index. Unlike the 
FTSE4Good indices, the DJSI does not provide indices specific to the UK and US.  
22 Our model is in line with Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2002) framework of mutual fund performance evaluation, 
where fund performance benchmarks include seemingly unrelated assets that are not captured by the benchmarks.   
23 As the FTSE4G does not provide ethical indices for the Asia-Pacific region, we use excess returns of the FTSE4G 
Global Index as a proxy for the ‘ethics’ factor in the Rest of World.  The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  107
Table 4.4: The ‘ethics’ risk factor 
 
Panel A of Table 4.4 presents the Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimates (Equation (4.2)) for returns of the 
FTSE 4 Good UK, US, Europe and World Indices. Panel B presents the estimates of a five-factor model (Equation 
(4.3)) for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US, and reports the 
differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. The five-factor model includes an ‘ethics’ factor 
which is the excess returns of the FTSE 4 Good indices. The estimates of alphas (α4 and α5) are annualized. The t-
statistics are in italics, calculated with Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to account for 
autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%.  
 
















FTSE 4 Good Indices:            
United Kingdom  (₤)  -4.83 0.94 -0.08 0.02 0.00 0.94 
  -3.52  35.73  -2.73 0.79 -0.13  89 
United States  ($)  -0.98  1.04 -0.24 -0.13 -0.01 0.95 
  -0.59 31.46 -7.30 -2.99 -0.60  89 
Europe ex. UK (€)  -4.37 0.86 -0.31 0.09 -0.05 0.91 
  -1.87  20.94  -4.18 1.82 -1.58  89 
World ($)  -0.39  1.06 -0.31 -0.03 0.01 0.96 
 -0.30  40.57  -8.16  -0.94  0.78  89 
 



















S R I :          
United Kingdom  (₤)  -2.56 0.84 0.39 -0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.96 
 -2.17  12.63  15.46  -2.70  -1.37  0.78  89 
United States  ($)  -2.74 0.97 0.07 0.06 -0.02  -0.03 0.98 
 -2.94  14.14  2.25  2.39  -1.94  -0.46  89 
Europe ex. UK (€)  -2.99  0.44 0.26 -0.10  -0.03  0.47  0.89 
  -1.19 4.33 4.04 -2.61 -1.02 4.44  89 
Rest of World ($)  -1.82  0.62 0.47 -0.11 0.07 0.30  0.66 
  -0.57 6.85 3.24 -1.07 1.35 5.08  89 
World ($)  -1.79  0.63 0.29 -0.02 -0.03 0.25  0.94 
  -1.25 4.62 4.89 -0.40 -1.19 2.19  89 
Non-SRI:         
United Kingdom  (₤) -3.65  1.24 0.15 0.02 0.00 -0.27  0.87 
  -1.46 8.63 3.32 0.50 0.08 -1.85  89 
United States  ($)  -3.28 1.23 0.11 0.05 -0.01  -0.31  0.98 
  -2.91 20.36 4.47  1.75  -0.78 -5.87  89 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:         
United Kingdom  (₤) 1.08  -0.40 0.24 -0.08 -0.02  0.33  0.08 
  0.39 -2.52 4.65 -1.86 -0.86 2.01   
United States  ($)  0.54  -0.25 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.28  0.00 
  0.37 -2.75 -0.92 0.50 -0.74 3.45     
 
Panel B of Table 4.4 presents the estimation results for Eq. (4.3). First, as expected, 
ethical funds in Europe (ex. the UK), the Rest of World, and the World have significantly 
positive loadings on the ‘ethics’ factor. The UK and US ethical funds have a significantly higher 
exposure to the ‘ethics’ factor than conventional funds. Second, the five-factor-adjusted alphas 
of the UK and US ethical funds are 1.1% and 0.5% higher per annum than those of conventional 
funds, although the differences are not statistically significant. Third and most importantly, the 
difference between the five- and four-factor alphas of SRI funds is economically small, which is Chapter 4  108
less than 0.5% per annum for ethical funds in the UK, US, Europe and the World. Given that 
ethical funds underperform the four-factor portfolios by more than 5% per annum in many 
countries, it implies that adding the ‘ethics’ risk factor to the four-factor model has only limited 
influence on the risk-adjusted returns of ethical funds. Consequently the underperformance of 
ethical funds seems not to be driven by ethical risk. These results support the hypothesis that 
investors pay a price for ethics due to ‘aversion to unethical behavior’, as ethical fund returns are 
much lower than what is required to compensate for risk.  
 
4.3.3  How Do Returns and Risk Evolve Over Time? 
The SRI fund industry is a relatively young industry, as the average age of SRI funds in 
our sample is only 6 years (see Table 4.1). The industry may have experienced a learning phase 
during the early period of its development. Bauer et al. (2005) document that in early 1990’s US 
and German SRI funds significantly underperform their conventional peers but this difference is 
gradually transformed into a slight out-performance during the late 1990’s. In this subsection we 
examine the evolution of SRI funds’ returns and risk over time.  
We divide our sample period into three sub-samples: the pre-bubble period of 1991-
1995, the internet bubble period of 1996-1999, and the post-bubble period of 2000-2003. We 
estimate the four-factor model (Eq. (4.2)) for the three sub-samples, and report the estimated 
alphas and the adjusted R-squared of the model in Panels A of Table 4.5. Consistent with Bauer 
et al. (2005), the US ethical funds underperform their conventional peers in the pre-bubble 
period by 2.9% per annum (statistically significant at the 1% level) and catch up with 
conventional funds during the post-bubble period. However, in contrast to the US SRI funds, 
ethical funds in the UK, Europe and the Rest of World do not exhibit such a (learning) effect. 
Meanwhile, the World average portfolio of ethical funds shows some improvement in 
performance, as its annual alpha increases from –2.9% before the bubble period to –1% after the 
bubble. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the four risk factors in Europe and the Rest of 
World has increased significantly. The R-squared of European SRI funds has risen from 63% in 
early 1990’s to 87% in early 2000’s. For the World average ethical portfolio, the R-squared 
increased from 80% to 97% during the past decade. 
The fact that a higher fraction of the return variation of ethical funds can be replicated by 
the well-known risk factors over the past decade, may indicate that SRI funds gradually 
converge to conventional funds by holding similar assets in their portfolios. To investigate this 
hypothesis further, we directly compare the risk-return characteristics of an equally weighted 
portfolio of SRI funds and an equally weighted portfolio of conventional funds (representing The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  109
Table 4.5: Development of returns and risk over time 
 
Panel A presents the estimates of alphas and adjusted R-squared in the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (see 
Equation (4.2)) for the pre-bubble period of 1991-1995, the bubble period of 1996-1999 and the post-bubble period 
of 2000-2003, for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US, and 
reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. Panel B reports the sub-sample estimates 
of alphas and adjusted R-squared of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the return of equally 
weighted SRI funds and the independent variable is the return of equally weighted non-SRI funds in the UK and US 
respectively (Equation (4.4)). The estimates of alphas are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics, calculated with 
Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and heterogeneity. Bold 
coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%.  
 
Panel A: The Carhart (1997) four-factor model results 
   α 4    R adj
2  
    1991-95  1996-99 2000-03 1991-95 1996-99 2000-03 
SRI:          
United Kingdom  (₤)  -1.68  -1.66  -4.18  0.97 0.94 0.96 
   -1.68  -1.18  -2.40     
United States (€)  -4.96 -3.53  -2.14 0.97 0.98 0.98 
   -6.63  -3.99  -1.51     
Europe ex. UK (€)  -2.01  -6.23  -4.37 0.63 0.82 0.87 
 -0.79  -1.74  -1.43       
Rest of World ($)  3.51  -3.05 3.47 0.61 0.62 0.77 
 1.33  -0.71  1.12       
World ($)  -2.93  -2.16  -1.04  0.80  0.93  0.97 
   -1.26  -1.16  -0.64       
Non-SRI:         
United Kingdom  (₤) 1.42  -4.06  -4.16  0.80 0.81 0.93 
 0.44  -1.01  -1.89      
United States (€)  -2.04  -2.52  -2.56  0.95 0.97 0.98 
   -2.02 -1.48  -2.45      
SRI vs. Non-SRI:         
United Kingdom  (₤) -3.10  2.41  -0.02  0.17  0.13  0.03 
 -0.92  0.56  -0.01       
United States (€)  -2.92  -1.01 0.41 0.02  0.01 0.00 
   -2.32 -0.53  0.23       
 
Panel B: Equally weighted SRI funds vs. Equally weighted non-SRI funds 
     α 4    R adj
2  
    1991-95 1996-99 2000-03 1991-95 1996-99 2000-03 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:        
United Kingdom (₤)  -1.66 2.58 -2.26 0.80 0.77 0.90 
    -0.65 0.67 -1.12     
United States (€)  -2.14  -0.16  -1.51  0.92 0.96 0.97 
    -1.86 -0.10 -1.64     
 
ethical and conventional investment styles, respectively). If SRI funds converge to conventional 
funds, we should observe that conventional investment styles have increasing explanatory power 
for the return variations of ethical investment styles. We estimate the following equation for the 
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where   ( ) is the return of an equally weighted portfolio of ethical (conventional) funds 





α  is the average tracking error of ethical fund returns relative to Chapter 4  110
conventional fund returns, and  t ε  is the idiosyncratic return of ethical funds relative to 
conventional funds.  
Panel B of Table 4.5 reports the estimated alphas and the adjusted R-squared of Eq. (4.4) 
for the three time periods. First, the estimated alphas for the UK and US SRI funds are negative, 
indicating that the ethical portfolios have lower expected returns and higher risk than β units of 
the conventional portfolios. In other words, ethical portfolios have a lower Sharpe ratio and are 
less mean-variance efficient than conventional portfolios. During both the pre- and post-bubble 
periods, US ethical portfolios experience significantly worse risk-return tradeoffs than their US 
conventional counterparts. Second, over the past decade, a higher fraction of the ethical portfolio 
returns can be explained by the conventional style than before. From the early 1990’s to the 
early 2000’s, the adjusted R-squared rises from 80% to 90% for the UK and from 92% to 97% 
for the US.
24 These results support the hypothesis that the holdings of ethical funds become 
increasingly similar to those of conventional funds. 
 
4.3.4  Time-Varying Risk Loadings and Market Timing  
So far, we have assumed that the risk loadings of SRI funds do not change systematically 
over time, i.e. the portfolio betas are not time-varying. However, fund managers may decide to 
vary the risk exposure of their portfolios under different macroeconomic conditions. 
Furthermore, if fund managers have some ‘market timing’ abilities and hence some predictive 
power regarding the stock market evolution, they may increase funds’ exposure to the stock 
market prior to a market increase and reduce the exposure prior to a market decline. We 
therefore investigate the impact of time-varying risk loadings on the risk-adjusted returns of SRI 
funds, and thus examine market timing. 
We employ a conditional model as introduced by Ferson and Schadt (1996) and assume 
that fund managers change portfolio risk loadings as a rational response to publicly available 
macroeconomic information. By incorporating a lagged information set of macroeconomic 
variables in the four- and five-factor models (Eq. (4.2) and (4.3)), we estimate the following 
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24 The volatility of the idiosyncratic returns of SRI funds remains stable over this period (tables are available upon 
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where  is a vector of four predetermined information variables, and  1 − t z b F, β  is a vector of four 
response coefficients where F stands for MKT, SMB, HML or UMD. The predetermined 
information variables that are good predictors of stock returns (Ferson and Schadt, 1996) 
include: (i) the one-month inter-bank interest rate or the treasury bill rate, (ii) the dividend yield 
of the value-weighted local market indices, (iii) the bond term-structure premium measured by 
the ten-year government bond yield minus the one-month treasury bill rate, and (iv) the bond 
credit-risk premium measured by the corporate bond yield minus the ten-year government bond 
yield, or the Moody’s BAA rated bond yield minus the Moody’s AAA rated bond yield for the 
US. These information variables for each country are obtained from Datastream and are lagged 
by one month.
25 In this model, the time-varying portfolio risk loading ( t F, β ) is a linear 
combination of a time-constant beta ( a F, β ) and time-varying betas ( 1 , ' − t b F z β ): 
t F, β = 1 , , ' − + t b F a F z β β , where both  b F, β  and  are four- or five-dimensional row vectors and 
consequently
1 − t z
t F, β is a scalar. The benchmark portfolio in the conditional model can also be 
interpreted as a dynamic portfolio where portfolio weights are updated mechanically following 
the release of macroeconomic information. For instance,   is the excess return of 
investing  units in the market portfolio at period t. 
) ( , 1 t f
m
t t r r z − −
1 − t z
If a mutual fund manager increases the fund’s exposure to the market prior to a market 
increase or reduces the market exposure prior to a market decline, the fund’s returns are a 
convex function of the market returns. To test this market-timing ability of the managers of SRI 
funds, we employ the Treynor and Mazuy’s (1966) measure by adding a quadratic term of the 
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where the coefficient on the quadratic term ( TM γ ) measures a fund manager’s market-timing 
ability based on private information. A positive  TM γ implies that the fund’s returns are a convex 
function of the market returns even after controlling for time-varying risk loadings based on 
                                                 
25 To evaluate the performance of mutual fund portfolios, we use local information variables for the UK and the US 
portfolios, German and Australian instruments for Europe and the Rest of World region portfolios, and the US 
instruments for the World portfolios. Chapter 4  112
 Table 4.6: Diversification, time-varying risk and market timing 
 
Panel A presents the conditional alphas in the conditional version of the four- and five-factor models (see Equation 
(4.5) and (4.6) and the ‘market timing’ coefficient in the conditional four-factor model (see Equation (4.7)) for 
equally weighted SRI funds around the world and non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. This panel also shows the 
differences in the estimates between SRI and non-SRI funds. Panel B presents the costs of inadequate 
diversification (Div 1 and Div 4) and net selectivity (NS 1 and NS 4), which were introduced by Fama (1972) (see 
Equation (4.8)-(4.11)), for equally weighted SRI funds around the world and Non-SRI funds in the UK and the US. 
The panel also reports the differences in the estimates between SRI and Non-SRI funds. The estimates of 
conditional alphas, diversification losses, and net selectivity are annualized. The t-statistics are in italics and are 
calculated with Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to account for autocorrelation and 
heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 10%.  
 
















SRI:           
United Kingdom (₤)  -1.90 -2.17 -0.19 0.41  0.08  -3.09 -2.30 
   -2.31  -2.21  -0.54 1.23  0.92  -1.91  -2.84 
United States ($)  -3.75 -3.35 0.19  0.14 0.12 -2.98  -3.49 
   -6.41  -3.71  1.22 2.07  2.19  -3.61  -5.09 
Europe ex. UK (€)  -2.51  -0.61  -0.10  0.48  0.38  -4.79 -3.87 
 -1.31  -0.21  -0.25 1.06  0.86  -2.55  -2.06 
Rest of World ($)  -0.11  -0.56  -2.69  -0.68 -0.25 1.42  0.39 
 -0.06  -0.16  -4.01 -0.46  -0.22  0.47  0.15 
World  ($)  -1.84 -1.23 -0.21  0.27  0.27  -1.66  -2.31 
   -1.39  -0.76  -0.61 1.22  1.37  -1.13  -1.64 
Non-SRI:             
United Kingdom  (₤)  -3.08  -3.04 -0.38  0.42  0.38  -1.68  -1.52 
 -1.69  -1.04  -0.70 1.23  1.14  -0.90  -0.88 
United States ($)  -2.11 -3.20 -0.11  0.21 0.12 -1.73  -2.61 
   -2.76  -2.51 -0.66  2.07 2.27 -1.69  -3.47 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:           
United Kingdom  (₤)  1.17 0.87 0.19  -0.01  -0.30  -1.41  -0.78 
  0.59 0.28 0.29  -0.02  -0.86  -0.57  -0.41 
United States ($)  -1.64  -0.15 0.29  -0.06  0.00  -1.25  -0.89 
   -1.70  -0.10  1.32  -0.53 -0.04 -0.95 -0.87 
 
publicly available macroeconomic information. 
Panel A of Table 4.6 reports estimation results for the conditional four- and five-factor 
alphas ( C , 4 α  and  C , 5 α ) and the market-timing coefficient ( TM γ ). First, we find that the 
conditional four- or five-factor alphas across all regions are very similar to the alphas of the 
unconditional models. This implies that allowing for time-varying risk loadings has little impact 
on our results of the performance of SRI funds. An interesting difference with the unconditional 
results is that the four-factor conditional alpha of SRI funds in the US is lower than those of 
conventional US funds by 1.6% per annum (significant at the 10% level). Second, there is little 
evidence that SRI fund managers in the UK, US and continental Europe have the market timing 
ability, a result that is consistent with most existing studies on conventional mutual funds.
26 In 
                                                 
26 Bollen and Busse (2001) show that market-timing tests on daily returns are more powerful than on monthly 
returns, and that US mutual funds exhibit significant timing ability on a daily frequency. The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  113
addition, we find that SRI fund managers in the Rest of World exhibit significantly negative 
‘market timing’ ability, which implies that they time the market in the wrong direction.  
 
4.3.5  Is There a Cost of Inadequate Diversification of Risk? 
Active portfolio management may imply that by actively selecting securities that are 
undervalued, portfolio managers give up part of the portfolio diversification. Investors in 
actively managed funds bear more idiosyncratic risk relative to investors in passive assets such 
as market portfolios. Compared to conventional funds, SRI funds face an additional set of 
constraints on their investment opportunities, the SRI screens. We therefore study whether or not 
the SRI screening activities bring about a cost to investors in terms of reduced diversification of 
idiosyncratic risk. 
We measure the welfare costs of inadequate diversification by investors’ opportunity 
costs for bearing idiosyncratic risk using the following two alternative specifications. First, 
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where σ is the standard deviation of the portfolio excess returns,  MKT β is the portfolio’s market 
beta estimated with Eq. (4.1),   is the market excess return, and  t f
m
t r r , − m σ is the standard 
deviation of the market excess returns. Thus Div1 equals the idiosyncratic part of portfolio return 
volatility ) ( m MKTσ β σ −  multiplied by the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, such that the cost 
of inadequate diversification is the additional expected return that would just compensate the 
investor for the diversifiable portfolio dispersion taken by the manager.  
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where  σ is the standard deviation of portfolio excess returns,  is the return of a zero-
investment portfolio   consisting of the four 
benchmark assets with the factor loadings resulting from regressing excess fund returns on 
factor returns (Eq. (4.2)), and 
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specification, the cost of inadequate diversification (Div4) equals the idiosyncratic part of 
portfolio return volatility  ) ( b σ σ −  times the Sharpe ratio of the four-factor benchmark portfolio. 
  In case SRI fund investors bear more idiosyncratic risk than conventional fund investors 
(e.g. due to SRI screens), SRI investors may require an additional return to compensate the 
opportunity costs of bearing idiosyncratic risk. We calculate the Fama’s (1972) measure of fund 
performance by subtracting the welfare costs of inadequate diversification from funds’ risk-
adjusted returns, which is labeled as ‘Net Selectivity’ (NS). More specifically, Net Selectivity is 
defined as funds’ risk-adjusted returns (i.e. the sum of the alpha and idiosyncratic returns, 
denoted as  t ε α + ) in excess of the welfare costs of bearing idiosyncratic risk (Div). The NS has 
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It is straightforward to see that the Net Selectivity also equals the portfolio excess return 
( ) minus the risk premium for  t f t r r , − σ  units of portfolio risk. 
Panel B of Table 4.6 shows the estimation results for both the original Fama’s 
specification and the extended specification of net selectivity. The welfare costs of inadequate 
diversification (Div) relative to either the one-factor or four-factor benchmarks are economically 
small (i.e. between 0.1% and 0.5% per annum) for ethical funds across the regions, and they are 
not statistically significant (except in the US). The differences in diversification costs between 
ethical funds and conventional funds are also not statistically significant for the UK and US. 
Furthermore, after adjusting for the opportunity costs of taking avoidable risk, the performance 
measures of net selectivity are similar to our previous results of one-factor and four-factor alphas 
(see Table 4.3). The differences in net selectivity between ethical funds and conventional funds 
are not statistically significant. These results suggest that the SRI screening activities do not 
impose welfare costs to investors in terms of inadequate risk diversification. This is consistent 
with the classic view that a well-diversified portfolio does not require a large number of 
stocks
27, which implies that SRI constraints have little influence on the diversification of 
idiosyncratic risk.  
 
                                                 
27 A number of studies show that 5 to 30 stocks are needed to make a well-diversified portfolio (see, e.g. Evans and 
Archer, 1968, Statman, 1987, and Brennan and Torous, 1999).).                  The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  115
4.4   Is There a ‘Smart Money’ Effect?  
The performance of the average SRI fund is not necessarily useful information for 
investors who can selectively invest in a subset of SRI funds. Previous studies document a 
‘smart money’ effect in the conventional mutual fund industry as investors seem to be able to 
make smart decisions by ex ante selecting the mutual funds that will turn out to be 
outperformers (see e.g., Gruber, 1996, and Zheng, 1999). In other words, even though active 
portfolio management on average may not add value, money is smart in selecting the funds that 
will perform well in the future.
28 We therefore study whether or not such a smart money effect 
exists in the ethical fund industry.  
The fund selection process of ethical investors determines the performance of the 
selected SRI funds relative to a conventional fund portfolio. For instance, Geczy, Stambaugh 
and Levin (2003) show that, for an investor who believes that stock returns are generated by the 
four-factor model, the SRI mutual funds that she selects underperform the non-SRI funds by 
3.6% per annum. In contrast, ethical investors who believe in managerial skill pay a large 
financial cost of more than 12% per annum in terms of risk-adjusted returns. This study assumes 
that investors make fund selection decisions in a Bayesian way, namely based on funds’ past 
performance, expenses and turnover. Moreover, a number of financial and non-financial fund 
attributes significantly influence investors’ decision process and, consequently, the money flows 
to SRI funds (Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang, 2006).  
Rather than making assumptions on fund selection process, we construct portfolios of 
SRI funds by tracking the actual fund selection decisions by investors (i.e. the decisions of 
investing versus withdrawing money). More specifically, we employ Zheng’s (1999) approach 
to form portfolios of ethical and conventional funds based on recent cash-flow signals of the 
funds, where the cash flow in month t (Cash Flowt) is defined as the change in a fund’s assets 
under management (AUM) beyond the fund’s asset appreciation (assuming that new money is 
invested at the end of each month): Cash Flowt = AUMt – AUMt-1 (1+Returnt).
29  
The ‘new money portfolios’, are constructed by following the actual fund selection 
decisions by investors in the previous month: (A) Inflow portfolios are cash-flow weighted 
portfolios of all available funds with positive new cash flows; (B) Outflow portfolios are cash-
flow weighted portfolios of all available funds with negative new cash flows; (C) High-flow 
                                                 
28 An alternative explanation for the smart money effect is the momentum effect of stock returns: Sapp and Tiwari 
(2005) show that, given that investors chase the mutual funds that performed well in the past. Such funds may 
subsequently perform well in subsequent periods due to the return momentum, rather than investors’ fund selection 
abilities. After controlling for the momentum effect in return regressions, the ‘smart money’ effect disappears. 
29 In addition, we also define Flow in month t (Flowt) as the growth rate of fund assets under management (AUM) 
beyond fund asset appreciation: Flowt = Cash Flowt /AUMt-1. Chapter 4  116
portfolios are equally weighted portfolios of all available funds with above-median new cash 
flow; and (D) Low-flow portfolios are equally weighted portfolios of all available funds with 
below-median new cash flows. In addition, we also construct the Average portfolios of ethical 
and conventional funds, which are the value-weighted (i.e. assets under management-weighted) 
portfolios of all available funds.
30  
The risk-adjusted returns of the Inflow, Outflow, High-flow, Low-flow and Average 
portfolios using the four-factor model as in Eq. (4.2), and the results are shown in Table 4.7. 
First, we test whether or not a smart money effect exists by examining the difference in alphas 
between the Inflow and Outflow portfolios. The alphas of the inflow portfolios are negative for 
the UK, Europe and the Rest of World ethical funds, and are virtually zero for the US ethical 
funds. This implies that ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform the 
benchmark factors in the future. In contrast, we find evidence that ethical investors may be able 
to identify poor performing funds: the portfolios from which ethical money was withdrawn have 
annual alphas of –3% for the UK ethical funds, -4.7% for the US and continental European 
ethical funds, and –12.3% for the Rest of World ethical funds. Furthermore, a hypothetical 
strategy of going long in the inflow portfolio and going short in the outflow portfolio yields 
economically and statistically significant alphas of 5.5% (and more specifically of 4.7% and 
11.6% for ethical funds from the US and the Rest of World, respectively), where the abnormal 
returns are driven by the significant underperformance of outflow portfolios. We also note that, 
in line with Sapp and Tiwari’s (2005) findings, such a significant difference in alphas between 
the inflow and outflow portfolios does not exist for conventional funds in the UK and US.  
Second, we repeat the above analysis to the High-flow and Low-flow portfolios. 
Comparing the alphas of the two portfolios, we find that ethical investors are unable to identify 
the good performers as none of the High-flow portfolios of SRI funds have significantly positive 
alphas. There is some evidence that ethical investors have some ability to identify poorly 
performing funds ex ante, especially in the UK and US. However, these results are weaker than 
for the cash-flow weighted portfolios. 
                                                 
30 For each country or region, the above portfolios are formed at the beginning of each month based on relevant 
information from the previous month (i.e. cash-flows or assets under management). We hold the portfolios for one 
month and rebalance them at the beginning of the next month by applying the same criteria. All mutual funds 
(including the dead funds) with at least one-month history of returns are included in the portfolios. All available 
funds are partitioned into two categories: the first one received net money inflows over the preceding month (Inflow 
portfolio) whereas money was withdrawn (on a net basis) from the other funds (Outflow portfolio). The returns of 
the Inflow portfolio are the returns of newly invested money, while those of the Outflow portfolio are the 
hypothetical returns of newly withdrawn money. Similarly, High-flow and Low-flow portfolios partition all funds 
into two groups with an equal number of funds in each group: one category received more inflows while the other 
received less inflows. Finally, the returns of the Average portfolio, where funds are weighted by fund assets under 
management, represent the returns of the total wealth invested in the ethical or conventional funds.  The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  117
Table 4.7: Smart money  
 
This table presents the alpha estimates of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model (α 4 in Equation (4.2)) for investors’ 
portfolios of SRI funds around the world and Non-SRI funds in the UK and the US, and reports the differences in 
the estimates between SRI and Non-SRI funds. The investors’ portfolios are the value-weighted average portfolios 
and four new money portfolios including the inflow (column A), outflow (column B), high-flow (column C) and 
low-flow (column D) portfolios constructed using past cash flow signals (described in Section 4.4). The VW, CW 
and EW in brackets denote the value (assets under management)-weighted, cash-flow weighted, equally weighted 
portfolios respectively. The table also reports the difference in the estimated alphas between the inflow and outflow 
portfolios (column A-B), and between the high- and low-flow portfolios ((column C-D). The estimates of alphas are 
annualized. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with Newey-West standard errors and lags of order three to 





























     (A)  (B)  (A) - (B)  (C)  (D)  (C) - (D) 
SRI:          
United Kingdom (₤) -1.68  -2.34  -3.06 0.72 -1.14 -3.13  1.99 
    -1.44 -1.66 -1.49 0.29 -0.99 -2.09 1.05 
United States ($)  -0.99  0.07  -4.68 4.74 -1.71 -4.85 3.14 
    -0.96 0.04 -2.15 1.71 -2.07 -4.31 2.25 
Europe ex. UK (€)  -5.63  -1.15 -4.69 3.54 -4.99  -2.38 -2.60 
  -2.32 -0.41 -1.51 0.84 -2.06 -0.96 -0.75 
Rest of World ($)  -6.22  -0.78  -12.34 11.57  1.26 -1.69 2.95 
  -2.00 -0.16 -2.98 1.78  0.38 -0.93 0.78 
World ($)  -0.14  0.89  -4.65 5.54 -0.11 -1.57 1.46 
    -0.10 0.45 -2.55 2.05 -0.07 -1.05 0.67 
Non-SRI:         
United Kingdom (₤)  -2.16  -1.30 -0.87 -0.43 -1.60 -1.51 -0.09 
  -2.25 -0.94 -0.53 -0.20 -1.07 -0.81 -0.04 
United States ($)  -1.97  -1.16  -3.03  1.87  -1.93 -3.16 1.23 
   -3.45 -1.26 -3.01 1.38 -2.39 -3.20 0.96 
SRI vs. Non-SRI:         
United Kingdom (₤)  0.48 -1.04 -2.19 1.15 0.46 -1.62 2.08 
  0.32 -0.52 -0.83 0.35 0.24 -0.68 0.68 
United States ($)  0.99  1.22  -1.65 2.88 0.22 -1.69 1.92 
   0.83 0.63 -0.69 0.93 0.19 -1.13 1.01 
 
Third, the results on the performance of the Average portfolio suggest that the 
performance of ethical money invested in European (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World 
funds is very poor. The value-weighted average SRI funds in these regions significantly 
underperform the factor-mimicking strategies by 5.6% and 6.2% per annum respectively, 
implying that the total wealth invested in ethical funds is reduced by about 6% per annum on a 
risk-adjusted basis. Meanwhile, it is important to note that part of the underperformance is due 
to the fact that ethical funds who charge management fees of about 1.5% per annum (see Table 
4.1). The net transfer of wealth, from ethical investors to their fund managers, implies that 
investing in socially responsible funds might be not a socially optimal way of committing to 
ethical considerations.
31  
                                                 
31 For instance, alternative ways of committing to ethical considerations, such as donating 6% of one’s wealth 
directly to charities or paying 6% of environmental taxation, may be more cost efficient. Chapter 4  118
  Taken together, we find mixed results in terms of the existence of a smart money effect 
in the SRI fund industry: although ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will 
outperform the benchmark factors in the future, they have some fund-selection ability to identify 
the ethical funds that will perform poorly. In addition, the aggregate performance of money 
invested in ethical funds, especially in Europe (excluding the UK) and the Rest of World, is 
significantly lower than the benchmarks. 
 
4.5  Determinants of Returns and Risk 
  While we have shown the return and risk characteristics of portfolios of SRI funds in 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we now explore the cross-sectional differences between SRI funds and 
investigate the determinants of returns and risk of SRI funds around the world. 
  
4.5.1  Determinants of Returns 
In order to pursue their social objectives, SRI funds employ a set of investment screens 
that restrict the investment opportunities. While the exclusion of companies based on ethical, 
social, or environmental screens may constrain risk-return optimization, the use of screens can 
also be regarded as an active selection strategy yielding superior fund performance. Therefore, 
we include the number and type of SRI screens in our model explaining SRI funds’ risk-adjusted 
returns. The performance of SRI funds may also relate to other fund characteristics, such as fund 
size, age, the fee structure and the reputation of the fund family. For instance, Chen et al.  (2004) 
show that fund size erodes performance due to liquidity and organizational diseconomies, and 
that this relation is more pronounced for funds investing in small and illiquid stocks. Hence, our 
model of SRI fund returns around the world looks as follows: 
 
Risk-adjusted Returni,t = γ0 + γ1 Screening Activityi +γ2 Fund Characteristicsi,t-1  
+γ3 Fund Familyi,t-1 +γControl Variablesi,t + u i,t          (4.12) 
 
where the Risk-adjusted Returni,t is the the four-factor-adjusted return or the conditional four-
factor-adjusted return of fund i in month t.
32  For SRI funds, Screening Activityi comprises the 
following variables: (i) Number of Screensi is the number of SRI screens, listed in Table 4.2, (ii) 
D(Sin Screensi), D(Ethical Screensi), D(Governance & Social Screensi) and D(Environmental 
                                                 
32 The risk-adjusted return (in local currency) is defined as  ε α +  (of Eq. (4.2) and (4.5)) and is estimated for each 
individual fund using the benchmark factors and information variables in domestic countries. The four-factor-
adjusted returns are estimated for each fund with a return history of at least 24 months, while the conditional-model-
adjusted returns and risk loadings are estimated for each fund with at least 60 months’ returns. The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  119
Screensi) are four indicator variables which equal one if the fund uses at least one of the SRI 
screens from these broad screening categories, i.e. sin, ethical, corporate governance and social 
or environmental screens, respectively
33, (iii) D(Islamic Fundi) is an indicator variable capturing 
whether the fund is designed for Islamic investors, (iv) D(Activism Policyi)  is an indicator 
variable which equals one if the fund intends to influence corporate behaviour through direct 
engagement or proxy voting, (v) D(In-House SRI Researchi) equals one if the screening 
activities of the fund are based on in-house SRI research.  
The Fund Characteristicsi,t-1 is a vector of lagged variables consisting of: (i) Sizei,t-1, the 
natural logarithm of fund assets under management in Euro at month t-1; (ii) Agei,t-1, the number 
of years since the fund’s date of inception; (iii) Agei,t-1* D(Youngi,t-1), a term interacting the age 
with an indicator variable equalling one if the fund’s age is below the median of all SRI funds 
(or of all conventional ones – depending on the model specification) in its domicile for month t-
1; (iv) Total Feesi, defined as the sum of the annual management fee and one seventh of the sum 
of the front- and the back-end load fees; (v) Total Feesi *D(High Feesi), a term interacting the 
total fees with an indicator variable equalling one if the fund’ total fees are above the median 
total fees of all SRI funds (or conventional ones) in its domicile; (vi) Riski,[t-1,t-12], the total risk 
of the fund measured by the standard deviation of monthly fund returns for months t-1 to t-12, 
and (vii) Average Returni,[t-1,t-12], the average return of fund i over months t-1 to t-12.   
Subsequently, the Fund Familyi,t-1 variables proxy for the reputation of fund families in 
the SRI or conventional fund industries: (i) D(Top Performer Familyi,t-1) equals one if the raw 
return of at least one SRI (or conventional) fund in the fund’s family belongs to the top 20% of 
all SRI (or conventional) funds in the fund’s domicile in month t-1, (ii) Number of Funds in 
Familyi, t-1 is  the number of SRI (or conventional) funds belonging to the fund’s family at month 
t-1, (iii) D (Market Leader Familyi,t-1) equals one if the fund’s family has the highest market 
share of SRI assets among all SRI (or conventional) fund families in the family’s domicile at t-1.  
Furthermore, the Control Variablesi,t-1 capture the impact of three sets of variables: 
International Diversification, Geographical Location and Time Effects. The International 
Diversification variables include two mutually exclusive indicators, denoted as D(European 
Diversificationi) and D(Global Diversificationi), which are set to one if the fund invests across 
Europe or globally, respectively. The reference group is the funds investing in their domestic 
countries. In order to capture the differences in the risk-adjusted returns across geographical 
locations, we include mutually exclusive indicator variables based on the domicile of the fund, 
                                                 
33 These four indicator variables are not mutually exclusive; all may equal one in case a fund employs screens from 
each of the four main screening categories. Chapter 4  120
Table 4.8: Determinants of risk-adjusted returns in SRI funds 
 
   Panel A: SRI  Panel B: Non-SRI (UK) 
Dependent variable   
4-F Adj Return
Cond 
4-F Adj Return 4-F Adj Return 
Cond 
4-F Adj Return
 Constant  -0.545 -3.181 -0.251 -1.464 0.803  4.452  1.144  7.130 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  0.026  2.648  0.003  0.263         
  D Sin Screens  -0.070 -0.971 0.081  0.963         
  D Ethical Screens  -0.077 -1.347 -0.010 -0.167        
  D Governance & Social Screens -0.092 -1.399 0.171  2.335         
  D Environmental Screens  -0.072 -1.139 -0.136 -1.995        
  D Islamic Fund  0.151  1.334  0.386  3.203         
  D Activism Policy  0.008  0.159  -0.145 -2.563        
  D In-House SRI Research  0.098  2.055  0.058  1.104         
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  -0.000 -3.333 -0.000 -1.949 -0.001  -4.070  -0.000 -3.048
  Age (t-1)  -0.012 -2.507 -0.017 -3.873 0.003  1.799  0.002  1.583 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.003  0.183  -0.029 -2.218 0.007  0.991  0.008  1.320 
  Total Fees  -0.009 -0.173 -0.061 -1.063 -0.045  -0.857  -0.009 -0.183
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -0.046 -1.462 -0.058 -1.634 0.074  3.050  0.067  3.094 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)  -0.035 -2.196 -0.012 -0.782 -0.051  -2.297  -0.142 -7.365
  Average Return (t-1, t-12)  0.020  1.100  0.031  1.598  0.095  4.493  0.083  4.594 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  0.008  0.187  -0.015 -0.347 0.027  0.594  0.010  0.235 
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  -0.009 -1.538 0.003  0.543  0.001  0.209  -0.003 -0.517
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  0.016  0.255  0.086  1.328  0.003  0.035  -0.012 -0.147
Internat. Diversification  D European Diversification  0.057  0.576  0.008  0.050  0.208  1.849  0.190  2.027 
  D Global Diversification  -0.127 -2.482 -0.066 -1.207 -0.202  -5.450  -0.315 -9.699
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  -0.338 -4.462 -0.137 -1.613      
  D US  -0.017 -0.256 -0.158 -2.160     
  D Rest of World  0.040  0.482  -0.351 -3.793        
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes    Yes  Yes  
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.034  15.277 0.021  7.086  0.039  34.979  0.045  39.743
  Observations  17889  12747  27402  27082  
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of determinants of risk-adjusted returns (see Equation (4.12)) for SRI funds 
(Panel A) and non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the four-factor- and conditional four-
factor-adjusted returns of fund i in month t (i.e. t i i , ε α + in Equation (4.2) and (4.5)) respectively. Individual fund 
returns are in local currency and evaluated from a local investor’s perspective (i.e. using local benchmark factors 
and local risk-free rate). The independent variables include the following variables. Number of Screensi is the 
number of SRI screens employed, and D(Sin Screensi),D(Ethical Screensi),D(Governance & Social Screensi) and 
D(Environmental Screensi)  are  four dummies equal 1 if the fund uses at least one of the main SRI screens. 
D(Islamic Fundi) captures whether the fund is designed for Islamic investors, D(Activism Policyi) equals 1 if the 
fund aims at actively influencing corporate behaviour, and D(In-House SRI Researchi) equals 1 if the fund has in-
house SRI research. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of AUM in € (Sizei,t-1). Age is the number of years 
(Agei,t-1). We also include an interaction term of age and a dummy equalling 1 if the age is below the median of all 
SRI (or conventional) funds in its domicile (Agei,t-1* D(Youngi,t-1  )).  Total Feesi is the sum of the annual 
management fee and 1/7
th of the sum of front- and the back-end load fees. We also include an interaction term of 
total fees and an dummy equalling 1 if the total fees are above the median total fees of all funds in the domicile 
(Total Feesi * D(High Feesi)).  The total risk is the standard deviation of monthly fund returns (Riski,t-1)), and 
Average Returni,[t-1,t-12] is the average returns of fund i over the months t-1 to t-12. D(Top Performer Familyi,t-1)  
equals 1 if the raw returns of at least one SRI (or conventional) fund in the funds’ family belongs to the top 20% of 
all funds in its domicile. Number Funds Familyi, t-1 is the number of SRI (or conventional) funds managed by the 
funds’ family,  D(Market Leader Familyi,t-1) equals 1 if the funds’ family has the highest market share in its 
domicile, D(European Diversificationi) and D(Global Diversificationi) equal 1 if the fund invests across Europe or 
Globally. We include dummies based on the domicile of the fund (D(Europe ex. UKi), D(USi)  and D(Rest of 
Worldi)), and 9 year dummies and 11 month dummies. Note that the coefficients on indicator variables (denoted 
with a prefix “D”) and the count variables (i.e. Constant, Age, Age *D Young, Number of Funds and Number of The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  121
Screens) are multiplied by 100. The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard errors to account for 
heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%.  
            
denoted as D(Europei ex. UK), D(USi) and D(Rest of Worldi). The SRI funds domiciled in the 
UK are the reference group. Finally, we also include fixed time effects to control for the bubble 
and recession periods, i.e. nine year dummies and eleven month dummies, denoted as D(Yeari,t) 
and D(Monthi,t).
34  
We report the estimation results of Equation (4.12) for SRI funds in Panel A of Table 
4.8, while Panel B shows those for the conventional UK funds. Panel A of Table 4.10 presents a 
summary of the economic effects of Table 4.8. First, we find that fund returns increase with 
screening intensity (proxied by the number of SRI screens applied). All else equal, funds with 8 
more SRI screens (i.e. a two standard deviation difference) are associated with a 1.3% higher 4-
factor-adjusted return per annum. It supports the hypothesis that SRI criteria help fund managers 
to pick stocks. However, this effect disappears when we measure fund performance via the 
conditional 4-factor model. Funds employing a corporate governance and social screen can 
expect 2.1% higher annual returns (based on the conditional 4-factor model) than funds without 
such a screen, whereas funds employing an environmental screen are associated with 1.6% 
lower returns per annum. Furthermore, employing an in-house SRI research team increases the 
4-factor adjusted return by 1.2% per annum. This finding supports the hypothesis that the 
screening process generates value-relevant non-public information.  
Second, in line with Chen et al. (2004), we find that fund size erodes the returns of both 
SRI and conventional funds, although the effect is economically insignificant. In addition, we 
find that fund age and risk reduce the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds, whereas total fund fees 
do not significantly affect the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds. Finally, after controlling for 
screening activities, fund characteristics and fund family reputation, the risk-adjusted returns of 
SRI funds in Continental Europe and the Rest of World are about 4% lower (annually) than 
those of UK SRI funds.  
 
4.5.2  Determinants of Risk 
While in the previous subsection, we document that screening activities and other fund 
characteristics affect risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds, we now examine what determines SRI 
funds’ risk loadings: 
Risk Loading
F
i, t = γ0 + γ1 Screening Activityi +γ2 Fund Characteristicsi,t-1 
+γ3 Fund Familyi,t-1 +γ4 Economic Conditioni,t-1+ γControl Variablesi,t + u i,t    (4.13) 
                                                 




,i, t stands for the time-varying betas of fund i in month t for factor F which 
stands for MKT, SMB, HML, or UMD. The risk loadings are estimated using Eq. (4.5) for each 
fund with at least 60 months’ returns history. A Risk Loading
F
i, t  ( t i F , , β ) is defined as the sum of 
a time-constant beta ( a i F , , β ) and four time-varying betas ( 1 , ' − t b F z β ) corresponding to the four 
information variables ( ) such that  4 3 2 1 , , , z z z z t i F , , β  equals  a i F , , β   1 , 1 1 , , − + t i F z β   1 , 2 2 , , − + t i F z β  
1 , 3 3 , , − + t i F z β   1 , 4 4 , , − + t i F z β . In addition to the Screening Activityi, Fund Characteristicsi,t-1, Fund 
Familyi,t-1 , and Control Variablesi,t groups of variables (defined above, Eq. (4.12)), we also 
include Economic Conditioni,t-1, a set of explanatory variables consisting of the four lagged 
information variables: the interest rate, the dividend yield, the bond term-structure premium and 
the bond credit-risk premium in domestic countries. 
  The estimation results of Eq. (4.13) are shown in Panels A (for SRI funds) and B (for 
conventional UK funds) of Table 4.9, while Panel B of Table 4.10 provides a summary of the 
economic effects of the results of Table 4.9. First, we find that the screening activities of SRI 
funds have a significant impact on the risk loadings. All else equal, funds employing a sin screen 
have about 10% less exposure to the market, size and book-to-market factors than funds without 
such a screen. This implies that funds with sin screens adhere to investment styles focusing on 
low-betas, large-caps and growth. Corporate governance and social screens generate 13% higher 
loadings on large-cap stocks and 24% more exposure to growth stocks, whereas funds subject to 
environmental criteria have 8% higher loadings on value stocks. Interestingly, SRI funds 
adopting a policy of shareholder activism or employing an in-house SRI research team invest 
10% more in value stocks. 
We also show that the characteristics of mutual funds and fund families also affect the 
risk loadings of SRI funds. For instance, SRI funds with 1% higher fees invest 4% more in high-
beta stocks, 7% more in small stocks and 4% more in value stocks. In addition, a one-standard 
deviation increase in total risk of SRI funds is associated with about 9% higher loadings on the 
market factor, and 8% more exposure to small-cap growth stocks. An interesting result is that 
SRI funds belonging to a fund family with top performers invest 4% more in small stocks, while 
those belonging to a leading family in the SRI market (in terms of the market share) invest 6% 
more in large-cap value stocks.  
  Finally, we find evidence that ethical fund managers respond to macroeconomic 
conditions by changing their funds’ risk loadings. After a 1% increase in the average dividend 
yield, managers of SRI funds increase funds’ exposure to small-cap growth stocks from 7% to The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  123
Table 4.9: Determinants of risk loadings  
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of determinants of risk loadings (Equation (4.13)) for SRI funds (Panel A) 
and Non-SRI funds in the UK (Panel B). The dependent variable is the beta (i.e. the sum of time-constant and time-
varying betas) of fund i in month t for factors MKT, SMB, HML or UMD in the conditional four-factor model as by 
Equation (4.5). Individual fund returns are in local currency and evaluated from a local investor’s perspective (i.e. 
using local benchmark factors and local risk-free rate) for funds with at least five years’ return history. The 
independent variables consist of variables capturing economic conditions including the one-month inter-bank 
interest rate or treasury bill rate (Interest Rate), the dividend yield of the value-weighted local market indices 
(Dividend Yield), a bond term-structure premium measured by the ten-year government bond yield minus the one-
month treasury bill rate (Term Structure Premium), and a bond credit-risk premium measured by corporate bond 
yield minus the ten-year government bond yield (or the Moody’s BAA rated bond yield minus the Moody’s AAA 
rated bond yield for the US) (Credit-Risk Premium). The t-statistics are in Italics, calculated with White standard 
errors to account for heterogeneity. Bold coefficients indicate a significance level of at least 5%.  
 
   Panel A: SRI 
Dependent variable    Conditional MKT Conditional SMB Conditional HML Conditional UMD
 Constant 0.636  21.740 0.120  2.566  0.255  6.752  0.045  1.810 
Screening Activity  Number of Screens  0.009  7.970  0.011  6.450  0.007  4.383  -0.001  -1.199 
  D Sin Screens  -0.114  -13.976 -0.116  -10.042 -0.091  -8.177  -0.004  -0.695 
  D Ethical Screens  0.045  8.218  0.016  1.838  -0.053  -6.028  0.026  5.371 
  D Governance & Social Screens -0.016  -2.094  -0.134  -9.637  -0.239  -20.647  0.047  7.490 
  D Environmental Screens  -0.036  -5.051  -0.003  -0.272  0.084  8.430  -0.042  -7.840 
  D Islamic Fund  -0.114  -9.349  -0.073  -4.315  -0.080  -4.917  -0.052  -6.605 
  D Activism Policy  -0.081  -13.539 -0.052  -5.550  0.098  11.731  -0.057  -11.243
  D In-House SRI Research  -0.024  -4.989  0.052  6.407  0.101  13.610  -0.046  -11.578
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  -0.003  -3.419  -0.002  -1.280  0.008  6.440  -0.004  -4.805 
  Age (t-1)  -0.001  -1.668  -0.002  -4.101  -0.004  -7.311  0.001  2.097 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.005  3.630  -0.005  -2.318  -0.004  -2.452  0.004  3.025 
  Total Fees  4.293  7.122  7.356  7.775  4.303  5.621  -0.643  -1.657 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  -3.972  -12.079 -2.110  -4.033  -1.426  -3.424  0.188  0.805 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)  4.254  32.298 3.580  17.809 -3.363  -20.275  -0.150  -1.641 
  Average Return (t-1, t-12)  0.510  3.273  1.086  4.360  -0.851  -3.718  0.473  3.874 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  -0.002  -0.607  0.042  6.565  0.001  0.129  0.020  5.835 
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  0.004  6.459  -0.003  -2.995  -0.005  -5.751  0.001  1.741 
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  -0.011  -2.012  -0.061  -7.021  0.061  7.956  0.011  2.826 
Economic Condition  Interest Rate (t-1)  0.921  3.186  0.567  1.298  2.733  6.681  -2.498  -10.245
  Dividend Yield (t-1)  -0.285  -0.411  9.755  8.719  -6.672  -7.402  3.500  5.992 
  Term Structure Premium (t-1)  -0.081  -0.238  5.289  10.379 -1.775  -3.963  -1.170  -4.096 
  Credit Risk Premium (t-1)  4.502  6.616  -8.573  -8.068  6.737  7.064  0.163  0.352 
Internat. Diversification  D European Diversification  0.129  7.246  -0.078  -2.682  -0.128  -7.501  -0.024  -1.807 
  D Global Diversification  -0.087  -16.760 -0.086  -11.413 -0.054  -7.851  -0.023  -5.852 
Geographical Location  D Europe (ex. UK)  0.016  1.571  -0.181  -11.353 -0.126  -10.298  0.053  8.186 
  D US  0.106  8.653  -0.246  -11.447 -0.040  -2.432  0.125  11.161
  D Rest of World  -0.175  -17.166 -0.369  -23.015 0.067  5.163  0.062  8.348 
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes  Yes   Yes  
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.398  176.740 0.208 70.603 0.232 81.189 0.102 31.189
  Observations  12747  12747  12747  12747  
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   Panel B: Non-SRI (UK) 
Dependent variable    Conditional MKT Conditional SMB Conditional HML Conditional UMD
 Constant 0.849  23.408 -0.104  -1.959  0.195  3.896  -0.077  -1.954 
Fund Characteristics  Size (t-1)  0.006  5.969  -0.037  -23.918 -0.001  -0.938  -0.001  -0.604 
  Age (t-1)  -0.000  -2.910  0.002  7.757  0.000  2.925  0.000  3.471 
  Age (t-1) * D Young (t-1)  0.002  6.078  0.007  10.946 0.000  -0.942  0.000  -0.061 
  Total Fees  -0.424  -1.239  0.861  1.521  1.837  4.604  0.496  1.697 
  Total Fees * D High Fees  0.235  1.624  4.619  20.263 -0.764  -4.357  0.699  5.378 
  Risk (t-1,t-12)  4.709  37.577 4.167  22.350 0.642  4.832  -0.012  -0.085 
  Average Return (t-1, t-12)  -0.001  -1.580  -0.001  -2.154  0.000  0.708  0.000  0.585 
Fund Family  D Top Performer Family (t-1)  2.002  16.812 3.535  18.935 1.046  8.056  2.353  17.904
  Number Funds in Family (t-1)  -0.064  -1.804  0.017  0.282  0.216  5.226  -0.049  -1.721 
  D Market Leader Family (t-1)  -0.005  -1.735  0.047  10.271 0.000  0.013  0.014  5.698 
Economic Condition  Interest Rate (t-1)  5.924  16.137 4.301  7.356  -1.492  -2.629  -3.311  -7.575 
  Dividend Yield (t-1)  -15.318 -27.281 -13.598 -14.381 -13.546  -18.845  5.832  10.778
  Term Structure Premium (t-1)  3.498  9.608  9.450  17.789 7.402  18.111  -0.442  -1.346 
  Credit Risk Premium (t-1)  2.678  4.004  20.828 20.468 21.398  29.046  -4.912  -8.541 
Internat. Diversification  D European Diversification  -0.058  -6.932  -0.027  -2.072  -0.009  -1.099  -0.058  -7.115 
  D Global Diversification  -0.105  -41.479 -0.049  -10.752 0.129  38.656  0.061  26.083
Time Effect  D Year  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  D Month  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
  Adjusted R
2 / F-statistics  0.277  281.930 0.171  152.690 0.222  209.830  0.092  75.291
  Observations  27124  27124  27124  27124  
 
10%. When the credit-risk premium in the bond markets increases by 1%, SRI fund managers 
react to this news by investing about 8% more in (safer) large-cap value stocks.    
 
4.6   Conclusion   
This paper contributes to the literature of socially responsible investments. Our main 
hypothesis is that ethical/social considerations influence stock prices and that investors pay a 
price for the use of SRI screening of funds. The main reason why SRI investors are willing to 
pay such a price is based on an aversion to unethical/asocial corporate behavior. We investigate 
this hypothesis by focusing on the ethical/SRI mutual fund industry around the world. Investors 
of SRI funds explicitly deviate from the economically rational goal of wealth-maximization by 
pursuing social objectives. 
Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in many European and 
Asia-Pacific countries strongly underperform domestic benchmark portfolios. In particular, the 
average risk-adjusted returns of the SRI funds in Belgium, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, 
Singapore, and Sweden are lower than –5% per annum. In addition, passive portfolios of 
European firms complying with ethical requirements, i.e. companies included in the European 
ethical indices, significantly underperform benchmark risk factors by about 4.5% per annum. 
These results support the hypothesis that ethical considerations influence stock prices and ethical The Price of Ethics: Evidence from Mutual Funds  125
firms are overpriced by the market. We also show that the explanatory power of the Fama and 
French’s risk factors to SRI fund returns has increased significantly over the past decade. This 
signifies that SRI funds gradually converge to conventional funds in terms of the holdings in 
their portfolios.   
We find mixed results in terms of the existence of a ‘smart money’ effect in the SRI fund 
industry: while there is some fund-selection ability in identifying poorly performing ethical 
funds, ethical investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform their benchmarks in 
subsequent periods. The return of total wealth invested in ethical funds in Europe (excluding the 
UK) and the Rest of World is merely -6% per annum on a risk-adjusted basis.   
Our results on the determinants of SRI funds’ returns and risk loadings suggest that the 
screening activities of SRI funds matter: funds with a higher number of SRI screens have better 
returns even after controlling for well-known risk factors. In particular, a two standard-deviation 
increase in the SRI screening intensity generates 2.6% abnormal returns per annum. In addition, 
employing an in-house research team on SRI issues increases fund returns by 1.2% per annum. 
These results support the hypothesis that the screening process generates value-relevant non-
public information and that SRI screens help fund managers to pick stocks.  Chapter 4  126
Table 4.10: Economics effects of the determinants of risk-adjusted returns and risks 
 
This table summarizes the (annualized) economic effects of a standardized change (e.g. a change of one percent, an 
event (a dummy variable of 1), or a change of one standard deviation (1 S.D.)) in the explanatory variables (which 
are statistically significant at the 5% level) in Tables 4.8 and 4.9.  
 
Panel A: Determinants of risk-adjusted returns (in Table 4.8) 





4-factor adj. returns 
Impact on conditional  
4-factor adj.  returns 
     SRI  Non-SRI  SRI  Non-SRI 
Screening Activity          
Number of Screens    1 SD (4.1)  1.3%       
D Sin Screens    1         
D Ethical Screens    1         
D Governance & Social Screens    1      2.1%   
D Environmental Screens    1      -1.6%   
D Islamic Fund    1      4.6%   
D Activism Policy    1      -1.7%   
D In-House SRI Research    1  1.2%       
Fund Characteristics          
Size  -  1 SD (2.2)    -2.6%    -1.5% 
Age Old    1 SD (5.3)  -0.8%  0.2%  -1.0%   
Age Young    1 SD (5.3)  -0.8%  0.2%  -2.9%   
Total Fees Low  -  1%         
Total Fees High  -  1%    0.9%    0.8% 
Risk  -  1 SD (2.2%)  -0.9%  -1.3%    -3.7% 
Average Return    1%    1.1%    1.0% 
Fund Family          
D Top Performer Family    1         
Number Funds in Family    1 SD (4.2)         
D Market Leader Family    1         
Int. Diversification          
D European Diversif.    1        2.3% 
D Global Diversif.    1  -1.5%      -3.8% 
Geographical Location          
D Europe (ex. UK)    1  -4.1%       
D US    1      -1.9%   
D Rest of World    1      -4.2%   
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Panel B: Determinants of risk loadings (in Table 4.9) 
  Event 
Size 
Impact on  
MKT loadings 
Impact on 
 SMB loadings 
Impact on 
 HML loadings 
Impact on 
 UMD loadings 
    SRI Conv SRI Conv. SRI Conv SRI Conv 
Screening Activity            
Number  of  Screens  1  SD  (4.1)  4%  5%  3%      
D Sin Screens  1  -11%    -12%    -9%       
D  Ethical  Screens  1  5%      -5%  3%  
D Governance & Social Screens  1  -2%    -13%    -24%    5%   
D  Environmental  Screens  1  -4%      8%  -4%  
D  Islamic  Fund  1  -11%   -7%  -8%  -5%  
D  Activism  Policy  1  -8%  -5%  10%  -6%  
D  In-House  Research  1  -2%  5%  10%  -5%  
Fund Characteristics            
Size  1  SD  (2.2)  -1%  2%  -8%  2%  -1%  
Age Old  1 SD (5.3)  3%    -1%  1%  -2%  0%  0.5%  0% 
Age Young  1 SD (5.3)  3%  1%  -4%  5%  -4%    3%   
Total  Fees  Low  1%  4%  7%  4%  2%    
Total  Fees  High  1%      5% 5% 3% 1%    1% 
Risk  1 SD (2.2%)  9%  10%  8%  9%  -7%  2%     
Average  Return  1%  0.5%  2% 1% 4% -1% 1%  0.5% 2 
Fund Family            
D Top Performer Family  1      4%  5%      2%  1% 
Number Funds Family  1 SD (4.2)  2%    -1%  -0.5%  -2%       
D Market Leader Family  1  -1%    -6%  6%  6%  2%  1%   
Economic Condition            
Interest  Rate  1%  1%  6%  4%  3%  -1%  -2%  -3% 
Dividend  Yield  1%    -15% 10% -13% -7% -13%  4%  6% 
Term  Structure  Premium  1%    3% 5% 9% -2% 7% -1%   
Credit Risk Premium  1%  5%  3%  -9%  20%  7%  21%    -5% 
Int. Diversification            
D European Diversif.  1  13%  -6%  -8%  -2%  -13%      -6% 
D Global Diversif.  1  -9%  -10%  -9%  -5%  -5%  13%  -2%  6% 
Geograph. Location            
D Europe (ex. UK)  1      -18%    -13%    5%   
D  US  1  11%   -25%   -4%  13%  
D  Rest  of  World  1  -18%    -37%   7%  6%  






Information Salience and News Absorption  




It is now widely acknowledged that individuals have limited information processing 
abilities. As Herbert Simon (1978) mentions “many of the central issues of time are questions of 
how we use limited information and limited computational ability to deal with enormous 
problems whose shapes are barely understood”.    
As a consequence of this limited processing ability, investors may concentrate their time 
and attention to highly visible, easy to process information. In other words, limited processing 
ability may generate limited attention. One of the consequences is that reactions to public news 
depend on their relative salience: the higher the information salience (i.e. media coverage), the 
faster the public information is processed by investors and is reflected in the share prices. In the 
recent past, several articles have reported empirical evidence about asset price reactions to 
public news consistent with the salience theory. Studying closed-end country funds, Klibanoff et 
al. (1998) show that country-specific information which does not receive large media coverage 
is incorporated only gradually into the share prices. In a case study, Huberman and Regev 
(2001) describe EntreMed’s substantial and permanent stock price rise after a ‘special report’ on 
new cancer-curing drugs on the front page of the Sunday edition of the New York Times (NYT). 
This is remarkable as the NYT article did not contain any new information: the potential 
breakthrough had already been reported five months earlier in the scientific press (an article in 
Nature) and in the popular press (including the NYT itself but then not on a prominent place – in 
a tiny article on page A-28). Finally, Chan (2003) studies market returns following prominent 
public news, i.e., firm-related information that made the headlines or a lead article. He finds that 
investors seem to react slowly to bad news. The limit of these studies is that the sample size is 
small and the informational content is not considered in its appropriate context (e.g. the 
coverage received by a piece of information depends on what other events took place in the 
world on that day). Chapter 5  130
 
                                                
English and Scottish professional soccer teams listed on the London Stock Exchange 
provide a unique way of studying the stock price reaction to different pieces of news while 
controlling for the informational content. For each of these stocks, betting markets and stock 
markets co-exist and two pieces of information are released on a weekly basis from August to 
June: betting odds and game results.  The objective of this paper is to analyse the difference in 
the market reactions to these two types of news. 
        Soccer betting in the UK occurs via a fixed-odds procedure: the odds are posted several 
days prior to the game and are not altered in response to betting before the event. This fixed-
odds betting system is different from the US sport wagering markets in which odds respond to 
betting volumes and thus represent a consensus in investors’ opinions. Within a fixed-odds 
betting system, the odds represent only the bookmakers’ (or their experts’) opinions.
1 Hence, 
investors are informed on a weekly basis about the experts’ beliefs about the game outcomes 
(through the odds the bookmakers publish), and the game results.  
        Both  these  types  of  news  provide new information about the performance of the 
teams/firms. However, they differ in three crucial ways. First, betting odds represent experts’ 
opinions about game outcomes while game results represent information about realizations. 
Second, betting odds offer short-lived information. After two trading days, the game outcome is 
known and the information value contained by the betting odds has evaporated. As a 
consequence, if betting odds do contain valuable information, markets must be fast in processing 
this information. Finally, these two types of information also differ in their level of salience. 
Betting odds are publicly available but are only posted on bookmakers’ websites and in ‘betting 
shops’. In contrast, game results are virtually omnipresent: they are extensively discussed in all 
daily newspapers, on the television news, and in a variety of sports shows on prime time.  
        Before proceeding, it should be noted that there is a clear and direct relation between the 
financial performance as measured by the stock returns, and the team’s performance on the field 
for the following reasons. First, the proceeds from the national TV deals are redistributed to the 
teams according to a performance-based scheme, i.e., the end of season ranking (see Falconieri 
et al. (2004) and Palomino and Sakovics (2004) for details). Second, if a team ends the season 
ranked among the first four of the top league (the Premier League in England), it has the right to 
participate in the lucrative European competition (the UEFA Champions' League) during the 
 
1 See Pope and Peel (1990) for a theoretical model of this system, and Kuypers (2000) and Goddard and 
Asimakopoulos (2004) for empirical studies. Sauer (1998) wrote a review of the betting literature.  Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market  131
following season.
2 For teams playing in the First Division (the championship below the Premier 
League), promotion to the Premier League also brings about a significant increase in income 
from television rights.
3 Third, field performance has a direct impact on ticket sales, 
merchandising and sponsorship revenues. For all these reasons, game-outcome related 
information should have an impact on the stock price. 
Our findings are the following. The market reacts strongly to game results, generating 
abnormal trading volumes and abnormal returns in the days following the games. We also find 
that the market processes good news faster than bad news. After a victory, a significant positive 
abnormal return is observed on the first trading day subsequent to the games, but not on the 
following days. Bad news (i.e., defeats) is processed more slowly as we observe significant 
negative abnormal returns on the first three trading days after a game. These results suggest that 
information about game results is used extensively by investors.  
In contrast, we cannot find any evidence of a market reaction (neither in volume nor in 
returns) following the release of betting odds. This is particularly striking because we 
demonstrate that bookmakers’ experts are excellent predictors of the games’ results.  Teams for 
which betting odds strongly predict a victory (defeat) do indeed frequently win (lose). There are 
two mutually exclusive possible explanations for the lack of a market reaction to the posting of 
the betting odds. The first one is that odds do not contain any information unknown to investors. 
The second one is that odds do contain new information but it is not processed by investors. To 
find out which explanation prevails, we construct investment strategies based on betting odds. 
We provide evidence that when the betting odds point out that some teams have a very high 
probability to win their game, the purchase of an equity stake in these listed soccer firms can 
lead to cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of more than 61 basis points over a three-
day period (and a naïve trading rule based on a high probability to win may yield CAARs of 
more than 245 basis points over a period of three months). Hence, our results provide evidence 
that some public information (i.e., betting odds) is totally ignored by investors.   
        Since the game results represent ‘hard’ information about future earnings, our study is 
related to those on stock price (under-)reaction to earning announcements (see e.g. Ball and 
Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996; Frazzini, 
2005).  However, we believe that our study differs from previous analyses of the reaction to 
                                                 
2 For example, for the season 2000-2001, Manchester United receives national television revenues of Euro 29.3 
million and Champions' League participation revenue of Euro 22.2 million. Falconieri et al. (2004) provide more 
data on television revenues in European soccer. 
3 The sport leagues in Europe operate according to a system of promotion and relegation. Teams ending at the top of 
their league are promoted to the league ranked immediately above, while teams ending at the bottom are relegated 
to the league ranking immediately below. Chapter 5  132
 
                                                
public news events in two important ways. First, we analyse the difference in reaction to two 
pieces of news, i.e. betting odds versus game results, that differ in their salience levels. Second, 
we consider a different time horizon.
4 News analysed in previous studies is not released with 
high frequency. For example, earnings releases occur at best on a quarterly basis, mostly even 
less frequently. By contrast, we study the reaction to news released at high frequency, i.e., on a 
weekly basis. Also, one type of news (the betting odds) in our study is short-lived. After two 
trading days, our betting odds do not contain further information as the game outcomes are 
known.  
Since betting odds represent opinions about earnings-related information, our study is also 
related to the literature on (under-)reaction to revisions of earnings forecasts (see e.g. Givoly and 
Lakonishok, 1979; Chan et al., 1996; Womack, 1996). However, we believe that there are also 
crucial differences between information released by bookmakers and that released by equity-
analysts. Bookmakers are not subject to the biases documented about these analysts, i.e., 
systematic optimism (Easterbrook and Nutt, 1999), conflict of interests for analysts working for 
brokerage firms (Michaely and Womack, 1999), and incentives to herd (see, e.g., Trueman, 
1994; Welch, 2000; Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000; Clement and Tse, 2004). 
         Combining analysts’ forecasts and media coverage, Bonner et al. (2005) provide evidence 
that the investors’ reactions to revisions of analysts’ forecasts depend on the media coverage 
these revisions receive. Likewise, Barber and Odean (2005) show that individual investors are 
net buyers of “attention-grabbing” stocks. They suggest that attention-based buying results from 
the fact that it is difficult for investors to search and process information on the thousands of 
stocks they can potentially buy. 
        In the finance literature, the consequences of imperfect information processing ability have 
been studied in various environments. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) study the consequence of 
investors’ limited attention to the way firms release financial information (e.g., pro forma 
earning measures versus GAAP earnings measures), and derive testable implications for the 
stock price reactions and misevaluations. In the microstructure literature, using the probability of 
the private informed trade measure (PIN) developed by Easley and O’Hara (1992), Vega (2005) 
shows that “PIN is not exclusively an insider trading measure, it also captures informed-trading 
by investors who are particularly skillful in analyzing public news”. Foucault, Röell and Sandas 
(2003) use a costly-information-processing explanation to provide a rationale for the fact that 
SOES day-traders make profits against NASDAQ dealers (see also Harris and Schultz, 1998). 
Regarding mutual fund inflows, Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) show that mutual fund 
 
4 Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, Appendix A) review the literature on stock market underreactions. Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market  133
investors are more sensitive to salient fees (such as front-end loads) than to operational 
expenses. They conclude that “investors would benefit from a greater understanding and 
awareness of mutual fund expenses”.    
Finally, our paper is also related to the studies by Renneboog and Van Brabant (2000) and 
Brown and Hartzell (2001) who study the stock price reactions to game outcomes for listed 
sports clubs. The former study investigates whether share prices of soccer clubs listed on the 
London Stock Exchange are influenced by the soccer teams’ weekly sporty performances. They 
find a positive abnormal return following victories on the first post-game day, and negative 
abnormal returns following defeats and draws. However, they do not look at the impact of game 
results on trading volumes. Brown and Hartzell (2001) study the impact of NBA game results on 
the equity prices of Boston Celtics Limited Partnership. They find that (i) the results of the 
Celtics' basketball games significantly affect partnership share returns, trading volume, and 
volatility; (ii) investors respond asymmetrically to wins and losses, and (iii) playoff games have 
a larger impact on returns than regular-season games. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 provides a description of the fixed-
odd betting system. Section 5.3 discusses the dataset and Section 5.4 focuses on methodology. 
Section 5.5 presents the results while Section 5.6 discusses their robustness. Finally, Section 5.7 
concludes. 
 
5.2.  The Fixed-Odds Betting System 
The most prominent form of soccer betting in Great Britain is the fixed-odds system. In 
this system, the bookmakers’ experts generate betting odds for the possible game outcomes 
(home win, away win, draw) in the English and Scottish leagues a few days before a game. Once 
the odds are posted, it is extremely rare that they change prior to the kick-off of the game. In this 
respect, the fixed-odds system is different from other betting systems such as pari-mutuel (as 
used in US sports betting) which reflect and react to the amount of money bet on each possible 
outcome up to the start of the event.
5
The revenues of the bookmakers for their services in the fixed odds-system are also 
different from those in the pari-mutuel system. In the latter system, a bookmaker’s revenue is a 
percentage of the total amount bet. In the fixed-odds system, this is not the case: the 
bookmaker’s revenue is measured by the so-called ’over-roundness’ of the book, which 
represents his gross margin. To see how it can be estimated, consider the following example. 
                                                 
5 Avery and Chevalier (1999) study how investor sentiment changes over time through the analysis of the price path 
of betting odds in US football betting. It should be noted that such an analysis is not possible for UK soccer betting 
as here the odds are fixed and hence do not change prior to the game.  Chapter 5  134
 
                                                
The odds on a game between Chelsea (the home team – on whose field the game is played) 
versus Bolton (the away team) are 5/7 for a home win, 14/5 for an away win, and 13/5 for a 
draw. For each outcome, the amount of the bet required to win GBP 100 is calculated as follows: 
Home win: 100/(1+5/7) =  GBP 58.3 
Away win: 100/(1+13/5) = GBP 26.3 
Draw:         100/(1+12/5) = GBP 27.8 
The over-roundness of the book is then: 58.3+26.3+27.8-100= GBP 12.4. Thus, if the book 
is balanced, the bookmaker takes a proportional stake of 58.3, 26.3 and 27.8. In total, he keeps 
GBP 12.4 whatever the outcome of the game. His return is then 12.4/112.4=11.05% of the total 
amount bet. 
 
5.3.  Data Description  
Twenty UK soccer clubs are listed on the LSE: 12 clubs on the official market and 8 clubs 
on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
6. In addition, the shares of 4 clubs are traded on 
OFEX
7, but we do not include these firms in our sample because trading on OFEX is infrequent, 
is not regulated and there is no guarantee of liquidity. Of the listed clubs, we do not include 
Watford and Aberdeen as their share price history is too short (due to the fact that their flotations 
only took place in the final season of our study). We also exclude Leicester City and West 
Bromwich Albion due to problems with share price data availability. As a result, our dataset 
covers 16 British soccer clubs listed on the London Stock Exchange. Table 5.1 lists our sample 
clubs, the championship to which they participate (English or Scottish), their league (Premier 
League, First or Second Division) by season, their rankings at the end of the season, the market 
on which they are listed (the official market or the AIM), the flotation date, and the market 
capitalization at the end of the 2002 season. The most valuable club is Manchester United. 
The daily closing share prices of the soccer clubs, their dividends, trading volumes and 
accounting data as well as the daily returns of the FT All Share index and FTSE All Small index 
are collected from Thomson Financial Datastream. The turnover and operating performance are 
exhibited in Table 5.2. Strikingly, virtually all clubs incur operating losses with the notable 
exception of Manchester United that generated total sales of GBP 146 million with operating 
earnings of more than GPB 15 million.  
 
6 The AIM is part of the LSE and designed for small and growing companies. The listing requirements of the AIM 
are less strict than those of the official market. Over the previous years, 3 clubs were delisted from the AIM: 
Liverpool at the end of 1995, and Loftus Road (QPR) and Nottingham Forrest, both in December 2001. Therefore, 
we do not include these clubs into our sample.  
7 OFEX is an unregulated trading facility in which JP Jenkins Ltd. is the main market maker. The following clubs 
are traded on OFEX : Arsenal, Bradford City, Manchester City and Gillingham. Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market  135
Table 5.1: Soccer clubs and sporty performance 
 
    This table presents the soccer clubs included in our sample and gives their positions in their leagues for the 
seasons 1999-2000 to 2001-2002. LSE represents a listing on the London Stock Exchange. AIM stands for the 
Alternative Investment Market (a segment of LSE). MV is market value as of 28 June 2002, in GBP million. EP 
(SP) stands for English (Scottish) Premier League. E1 (E2) stands for English First (Second) Division. The numbers 
next to their league are the rankings at the end of the seasons in 2000, 2001 and 2002.  
 
Club  List Date  Exchange MV  League & Position 
    
(GBP 
million)  1999-00 2000-01  2001-02 
Aston  Villa  April  1997  LSE  13.8  EP 6 EP 8 EP 8 
Burnden Leisure 
(Bolton Wanderers)  April  1997  AIM  5.1  E1 6 E1 3 EP  16 
Birmingham  City  March  1997 AIM  13.6  E1 5 E1 5 E1 5 
Chelsea  Village  March  1996 AIM  31.4  EP 5 EP 6 EP 6 
Celtic  Sept.  1995  LSE  15.1  SP 2 SP 1 SP 1 
Charlton Athletic  March 1997  AIM  7.7  E1  1  EP  9  EP  14 
Heart  of  Midlothian May  1997  LSE  7.9  SP 3 SP 5 SP 6 
Leeds  United  Aug.  1996  LSE  20.0  EP 3 EP 4 EP 5 
Manchester  United  June  1991  LSE 316.9 EP 1 EP 1 EP 3 
Millwall  Jan.  1989  LSE  10.7  E2 5 E2 1 E1 4 
Newcastle United  April 1997  LSE  29.8  EP  11  EP  11  EP  4 
Preston  North  End  Jan.  1995  AIM  4.0  E2 1 E1 4 E1 8 
Southampton  Jan.  1997  LSE  11.0  EP 15 EP 10 EP 11 
Sunderland  Dec.  1996  LSE  21.6  EP 7 EP 7 EP  17 
Sheffield  United  Dec.  1996  LSE  2.5  E1 16 E1 10 E1 13 
Tottenham Hotspur  Jan. 1983  LSE  29.6  EP  10  EP  12  EP  9 
 
The results of each game played by the clubs of Table 5.1 during the 3 seasons in the 
period 1999-2002 were purchased from Mables-Tables, an internet soccer information provider. 
Our sample does not comprise all the games because those played by non-listed teams cannot be 
taken into account. This is the reason why we do not have the same number of games won and 
games lost in our sample.  
Betting odds data are obtained from Ladbrokes, the betting and gaming division of the 
Hilton Group.
8 The dataset contains betting odds for weekend games (played on Saturday or 
Sunday, or occasionally on Friday night). These betting data are posted on Ladbrokes' website 
and betting offices throughout the UK on Wednesday night. In order to avoid contamination of 
event windows, we exclude those weekend games that are preceded by a Wednesday game.  
Those national and international games for which no betting odds are reported (which is 
exceptional) in the Ladbrokes database are also excluded. Furthermore, in case two listed clubs 
play against each other, we randomly drop one of the two observations from our sample. The 
reason is that both the odds and the game results of one team have a mirror image in those of the  
                                                 
8 As the largest and dominant betting bookmaker in the UK, Ladbrokes had turnover of GBP 3.81 billion in 2002. Chapter 5  136
 
Table 5.2: Operating performance of listed soccer clubs 
 
This table presents the total sales and operating profits (in million GBP) of the listed soccer clubs. The percentages 
of total sales derived from soccer related activities are reported for 2002. Source: Datastream. 
 
Club  Total Sales  Operating Profit 
 2000  2001  2002  2000  2001  2002 
Aston Villa  35.8  39.4  46.7  100%  -5.2  -6.9  -9.9 
Burnden Leisure (Bolton Wanderers) 13.4  14.5  36.8  83%  -8.6  -12.8  0.8 
Birmingham City  9.4  13.3  15.2  100%  -3.9  -2.6  -6.1 
Chelsea Village  106.8  93.6  115.3  64%  2.1  -6.8  -7.7 
Celtic 38.6  42  56.9  82%  -5.1  -9.4  -2 
Charlton Athletic  11.7  28.3  30.6  100%  -6.7  -0.2  -12.8 
Heart  of  Midlothian  7.1  7.9  6.1 100% -3.3  -3.7  -3.5 
Leeds United  57.1  86.3  81.5  100%  -2.9  -5.7  -28.5 
Manchester United  116  129.6  146.1  100%  15.5  19.3  15.2 
Millwall 4.8  4.8  10.6  100%  -2.6  -2.6  -0.1 
Newcastle United  45.1  54.9  70.9  100%  -19.3  -5.2  0 
Preston North End  5.7  7.2  9.9  100%  -1.5  -0.8  0.2 
Southampton 20.8  29.1  38.5  81%  -3.4  -2.3  -1.6 
Sunderland 37.3  46  43.8  100%  -6.9  1.6  -7.8 
Sheffield United  5.8  6.5  10  97%  -5  -3.6  -2.4 
Tottenham Hotspur  48  48.4  65  100%  -4.2  -1.7  -4.8 
              
Mean 41.9  43.9  55.9  92% -4.7  -4.3 -7.4 
St. Dev  8.6  6.4  12.9  11%  0.7  3.7  3.6 
Median 28.3  34.3  41.2  100%  -4.1  -3.1  -3 
 
other team.
9 After matching the stock returns data with the game results and data on betting 
odds, and after randomly excluding a team in games where both clubs are listed firms, we obtain 
a final sample of 916 observations. 
         
5.4. Methodology 
5.4.1  From Betting Odds to Expectations about Game Outcomes. 
To derive a measure of the predictive power of the betting odds, we proceed as follows. 
Let w, d and l denote a win, draw and loss, respectively; and let xij (j=w, d, l) denote the betting 
odds for a bet on game outcome j for team i. That is, for one unit of money bet, xij units of 
money are awarded to the bettor if outcome j is realized for team i. Hence, xij
-1 represents a 
measure of the bookmaker's belief about the probability of outcome j for team i. The normalized 
probabilities to win and to lose (ProbWin and ProbLoss) reflect the bookmaker's beliefs. These 
measures are equivalent to the implied probabilities in the asset pricing literature.  
                                                 
9 Expectedly, the results presented throughout the paper would be stronger if this exclusion rule were not 
implemented.  Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market  137
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       The denominator in (5.1) and (5.2) is the over-roundness. In our sample, over-roundness has 
a mean of 1.122 and a standard deviation of 0.005, which signifies that bookmakers will realise 
a return of 10.9% (0.122 / 1.122 = 0.109) of the invested (bet) amounts.  
We also use a second measure to capture the experts’ expectations of the game outcome 
and their impact on stock returns: the probability difference (ProbDiff) of winning and losing 
games. Thus, game uncertainty is reflected by:  
   ProbDiffi = ProbWini – ProbLossi                                           (5.3) 
 
Note that we indirectly include in this measure the probability of a draw (which is captured 
by both ProbWini and ProbLossi). As will be shown later, stock prices react strongly to wins and 
losses but do not react significantly to draws. The larger ProbDiff, the more a win is expected 
relative to a loss. As ProbDiff decreases and approaches 0, the outcome becomes more 
uncertain. When ProbDiff is negative, a loss is more likely to occur than a win.  
In order to group the games by type of expectations, four dummy variables are constructed 
by utilizing the above two measures of bookmakers’ expectations: ProbWin and ProbDiff. Each 
dummy variable is constructed in two ways: specification [a] is based on ProbWin  and 
specification [b] is based on ProbDiff:    
• SEW (strongly expected to win): SEW[a] is equal to one if ProbWin > 0.45, and zero 
otherwise. We find that for all these games, we also have ProbLoss < 0.28. SEW[b] is equal to 
one if ProbDiff > 0.3, and zero otherwise. 
• WEW (weakly expected to win): WEW[a] is equal to one if ProbWin ∈ [0.35,0.45], and 
zero otherwise. We find that for all these games, we also have ProbWin > ProbLoss. Hence, a 
win is more likely than a loss. WEW[b] is equal to one if ProbDiff ∈ [0,0.3], and zero otherwise. 
• WEL (weakly expected to lose):  WEL[a] is equal to one if ProbWin ∈ [0.25,0.35],  and 
zero otherwise. We find that for all these games, we have ProbLoss > ProbWin. Hence, a loss is 
more likely than a win. WEL[b] is equal to one if ProbDiff  ∈ [-0.3,0], and zero otherwise. 
• SEL (strongly expected to lose): SEL[a] is equal to one if ProbWin < 0.25, and zero 
otherwise. We find that for all these games, we also have ProbLoss > 0.48. SEL[b] is equal to 
one if ProbDiff < –0.3, and zero otherwise. Chapter 5  138
 
These cut-offs are arbitrary and have been chosen so as to have a sufficient number of 
observations in each sub-sample. Our results remain qualitatively similar when varying the cut-
offs points (see below).  
 
5.4.2  Abnormal Return Computation 
Denoting Pi,t the closing price of stock i on day t, and Divi,(t-1,t) the dividends paid on stock 
i over the period (t-1,t), the return of this stock on day t is defined as 
1 ,
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,
−
− − + −
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t i
t t i t i t i
t i P
Div P P
r               (5.4) 
The alternative way of calculating raw returns, ri,t  = ln (Pi,+ Divi,(t-1,t) / Pi,t-1), does not 
influence the results of this paper. To compute the stocks’ abnormal returns, we regress daily 
returns of each soccer club on the FTSE All Small index, over the full sample period (i.e., Jan. 1, 
1999 to Dec. 31, 2002)
10. We opt for this index to control for the size effect on stock returns.
11  
As some soccer clubs may suffer from non-synchronous trading, we add three leads and 
three lags of market returns to the market model (See Dimson, 1979). Thus, the market model 
we consider is 
t i t m i i t i r r , ,
3
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+
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where rmτ is the return of FTSE All Small index on day τ. Denoting the OLS estimates of 
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Given that there are some periods during the year without weekend games (summer and 
winter stops), we use two ways to account for event clustering. First, we test the significance of 
the ARs using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which is distribution-free and robust to event 
clustering. Second, when conducting t-tests, we also control for event clustering by using the 
standard errors of average abnormal returns for each calendar day (see, e.g. Brown and Warner, 
1980: 233). 
Given that games are played during the weekend and betting odds are posted on 
Wednesday evening after the market closes or on Thursday morning, our event window spans a 
                                                 
10 Since the events of soccer games take place every week in a season, we cannot use pre-event data as estimation 
window. Using the full sample period as estimation window, our approach is similar to Brown and Hartzell (2000). 
An abnormal return is that part of the total return that cannot be explained by the covariance between stock returns 
and market returns. 
11 The results in this paper do no depend upon the choice of the market index. Using the FT All Share index yields 
similar results.  
12 We also corrected the systematic risk for regression to the mean, but this does not influence the results. Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market  139
period from Thursday (prior to the game) to Wednesday (subsequent to the game). We take the 
weekend as the event date and refer to Thursday, Friday, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday as 
day -2, -1, 1, 2 and 3, respectively. For instance, the abnormal return on day -2 (AR(-2)) is the 
abnormal return between Wednesday’s closing time and Thursday’s closing time as expressed 
by Equation (5.6). Similarly, we computed the abnormal returns AR(z) with z = -1, 1, 2, 3. The 
cumulative abnormal return between days z and z', (z, z' ∈ {-2,…, 3}, z' > z) is defined as 
CAR(z,z') = AR(z)+ … +AR(z'). The average abnormal returns and the cumulative average 
abnormal returns are denoted by AAR(z) and CAAR(z,z'). 
 
5.5. Results 
Our approach to study the information content of betting odds is structured as follows. 
First, we examine the price reaction to game outcomes. Second, we investigate the predictive 
power of betting odds with regard to game outcomes. Finally, we study the price reaction to 
betting odds.     
 
5.5.1  Stock Price and Trading Volume Reactions to Game Results 
Panel A of Table 5.3 exhibits the (cumulative) average abnormal returns over the three 
days following the soccer matches that are categorized by the game outcomes (wins, draws and 
losses) for the entire sample. We observe that the stock prices are sensitive to the information 
resulting from the game results. A win triggers a positive abnormal return of 53 basispoints on 
day 1 (statistically significant at the 1% level), and a positive abnormal return of 88 basispoints 
over the first three days (statistically significant at the 1% level). A loss is followed by a 
significantly negative return of 28 basispoints on the first day following a game (statistically 
significant at the 5% level) and a negative return of 101 basispoints over the first three days 
following a game (statistically significant at the 1% level). The mean abnormal return 
subsequent to a draw is negative but not statistically different from zero. These findings confirm 
that a win (loss) provides investors with good (bad) news about the future cash flows of these 
listed firms.  
An interesting related finding is that the market seems to be faster at processing good news 
than bad news. After a win, about 60% of the three-day abnormal return is generated on the first 
day. Conversely, after a loss, only 28% of the three-day abnormal return is generated on the first 
day. However, measured over a three-day window, the market reactions to a victory and a defeat 
are similar in magnitude (88 versus 101 basispoints, respectively). This is different from the 
results obtained in Brown and Hartzell (2001) and Renneboog and Van Brabant (2000) who find Chapter 5  140
 
Table 5.3: Market reactions to game results 
 
This table presents the (cumulative) average abnormal returns ((C)AARs) in basis points subsequent to the soccer 
games. Panel B and Panel C show the (C)AARs for the sub-samples of the August-March games and the April-June 
ones, respectively. The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are presented in the 
first and second rows following the (C)AARs, respectively. 
  
   N  Reaction to games 
      AAR(1) CAAR(1,2) CAAR(1,3)
Panel A:  All games      
Win 405  52.72  63.45  88.26 
p-value of t-test   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
        
Draw 233  -8.15  -25.01  -32.54 
p-value of t-test    (0.652)  (0.367)  (0.281) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.337)  (0.457)  (0.727) 
        
Loss 278  -27.95  -57.02  -100.81 
p-value of t-test    (0.011)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.095)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Panel B:  Games in August-March  
Win 329  51.46  65.16  81.09 
p-value of t-test   (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
        
Draw 187  -0.64  -9.82  -17.72 
p-value of t-test    (0.974)  (0.748)  (0.591) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.436)  (0.497)  (0.799) 
        
Loss 222  -21.10  -54.22  -102.66 
p-value of t-test    (0.063)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.163)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Panel C:  Games in April-June    
Win 76  58.17  56.02  119.30 
p-value of t-test    (0.051)  (0.186)  (0.041) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.222)  (0.175)  (0.047) 
        
Draw 46  -38.68  -86.78  -92.80 
p-value of t-test    (0.381)  (0.187)  (0.211) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.544)  (0.714)  (0.789) 
        
Loss 56  -55.10  -68.11  -93.48 
p-value of t-test    (0.081)  (0.052)  (0.031) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.344)  (0.154)  (0.370) 
 
that the market reaction to a defeat is much stronger than to a victory.  
The end-of-season matches may be different in nature from the matches earlier in the 
season. The reason is that the financial consequences of a victory, a draw or a defeat are more 
important for teams fighting for promotion to a higher league or for the right to participate in the  Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market  141
Table 5.4: Market reactions to April-June games 
 
This table presents (cumulative) average abnormal returns ((C)AARs) in basis points subsequent to the soccer 
games for the games played in April-June only. The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test are presented in the first and second row following the (C)AARs, respectively. 
 
 
   N  Reaction to games  N  Reaction to games 
      AAR(1)  CAAR(1,2) CAAR(1,3)    AAR(1) CAAR(1,2) CAAR(1,3)
Panel A: Promotion    Panel B: Relegation 
Win 17  213.91  154.94  410.50  3  48.97  50.83  51.09 
p-value of t-test   (0.052)  (0.312) (0.065)    (0.410) (0.457)  (0.496) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.124)  (0.163) (0.044)    (0.209) (0.285)  (0.593) 
                
Draw 13  7.31  -201.69  -228.15  6  -213.59 -188.53  -100.02 
p-value of t-test    (0.949)  (0.340) (0.370)   (0.383) (0.444)  (0.580) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.553)  (0.507) (0.600)   (0.463) (0.345)  (0.345) 
                
Loss 9  -191.93  -222.78  -304.77  7  -126.58 -118.54  -212.57 
p-value of t-test    (0.010)  (0.013) (0.024)   (0.253) (0.277)  (0.230) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.021)  (0.021) (0.021)      (0.735) (0.311)  (0.499) 
Panel C: Top    Panel D: Other PostMarch 
Win 23  12.65  16.70  9.86  33  19.41  42.18  61.06 
p-value of t-test   (0.643)  (0.744) (0.872)    (0.559) (0.393)  (0.281) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.976)  (0.927) (0.976)    (0.131) (0.313)  (0.177) 
                
Draw 6  -47.95  -7.73  7.50  21  -14.53 -9.16  -35.60 
p-value of t-test    (0.109)  (0.834) (0.843)   (0.548) (0.717)  (0.284) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.075)  (0.917) (0.753)   (0.205) (0.498)  (0.689) 
                
Loss 9  -125.53  -135.48  -167.57  31  -21.21 -7.74  -16.27 
p-value of t-test    (0.181)  (0.197) (0.161)   (0.582) (0.860)  (0.715) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.260)  (0.441) (0.441)      (0.176) (0.248)  (0.176) 
 
European championships, or to avoid relegation as the end of the season draws near. To address 
this issue, we split our sample in sub-samples. We consider the games played in March or earlier 
in the season, and those played in April or later. The results are presented in Panels B and C of 
Table 5.3. We find that the results for the August-March sub-sample are similar to those 
obtained for the entire season (Panel A). This implies that the significant market reactions to 
wins and to losses are not due to large abnormal returns triggered by games played late in the 
season. Panel C shows that results for the April-June sub-sample are not dissimilar but are 
somewhat less significant, which may be due to a smaller number of observations.   
In a further subsample analysis, we split the April-June sub-sample into four categories 
based on the teams’ end-of-season rankings. The reason is that the financial consequences of the 
final rankings may differ substantially from category to category, which may be reflected in the  Chapter 5  142
 
Table 5.5: Market reactions to game results: regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results explaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following the 
soccer games. The dependent variables are the announcement abnormal return and the CAR(1,2) and CAR(1,3). 
Win (Loss) is a dummy equal to one if the team wins (loses) and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference between 
the number of goals scored and those conceded in a game. PostMarch is equal to one if a game is played in April, 
May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is 
equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is a 








Variable :  AR(1) AR(1)  CAR(1,2) CAR(1,2) CAR(1,3) CAR(1,3) 
         
Constant 23.40  4.46  -7.35  -22.50  -42.12  -45.87 
 (0.924)  (0.986)  (0.983)  (0.948)  (0.921)  (0.914) 
GoalDiff       18.91
***        26.22
***        37.85
***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Win        58.94
***      83.16
***     119.39
***
   (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.001) 
Loss   -19.20  -35.08   -65.02
*
   (0.388)  (0.254)   (0.087) 
PostMarch -16.28  -16.98  -29.21  -29.89  -1.40  -1.99 
 (0.432)  (0.412)  (0.309)  (0.297)  (0.969)  (0.955) 
AIM -29.06  -29.03  -53.35  -60.95  -63.13 -85.35 
 (0.907)  (0.907)  (0.876)  (0.859)  (0.882)  (0.840) 
Home -5.77 -4.28  0.77  0.95  34.98  32.62 
 (0.730)  (0.797)  (0.974)  (0.967)  (0.224)  (0.252) 
Cup -18.06  -18.54 6.19  5.87  -5.39  -5.12 
 (0.536)  (0.526)  (0.878)  (0.885)  (0.914)  (0.918) 
Year9900 20.18  19.02  59.03
**   56.63
**   82.84
**   78.27
**
 (0.321)  (0.350)  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.018)  (0.025) 





 (0.174)  (0.202)  (0.043)  (0.054)  (0.023)  (0.032) 
Team 
Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
        
R
2 0.044 0.045 0.045 0.049 0.050  0.060 
F-Statistics       1.85
***     1.83
***    1.91
***     2.00
***      2.15
***       2.46
***
Prob > F  0.010  0.010  0.007  0.004  0.002  0.000 
 
share price reactions. The four categories are labelled as follows: promotion, relegation, top-
teams, and other post-March. Promotion games are non-cup
13 games played by teams belonging 
to the top six in the English First or Second League. Relegation games are non-cup games 
played by teams ranked at the fifteenth position or lower in every league. Top games are non-
cup games played by teams belonging to the top six in the English Premier League or top two in 
                                                 
13 The cup competitions are different from regular league competitions: all the clubs of the Premier League and 
Divisions 1, 2 and 3 can participate in the cup competitions which is a play-off competition with immediate 
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the Scottish Premier League as they compete for participation in the European championships. 
Finally,  Other represents the other non-cup games which were not included in the above 
categories, but were also played in April, May or June. Panel A of Table 5.4 shows strong 
statistically significant average abnormal returns for the promotion candidates. A victory 
triggers a three-day abnormal return of 4.11% (statistically significant within the 5% level) 
while a defeat leads to a negative price correction of 3.05% (statistically significant within the 
5% level). The abnormal returns for the relegation candidates (Panel B) and the top teams 
competing for the participation right to European soccer, i.e. the UEFA Champions League, 
(Panel C) are large but lack statistical significance (but sample sizes are tiny).   
We also test the market reaction to game results by estimating models including the 
variables Win, Loss and GoalDiff. Win (Loss) is a dummy equal to one if the team wins (loses) 
and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference between the number of goals scored and those 
scored by the opposing team in a game. Hence, it does not only indicate whether or not the team 
won, lost or obtained a draw, it also captures the magnitude of the victory or the defeat. We 
estimate the following regressions: 
  CAR(1,j)  = α0 + α1.Win + α2.Loss + β.ControlVariables + ε (j  =1,2,3)      (5.7) 
  CAR(1,j) = α0 + α1.GoalDiff + β.ControlVariables + ε    (j =1,2,3)     (5.8) 
where ControlVariables include the following dummy variables: PostMarch which equals one if 
a game is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM which equals one if the club is 
listed on the AIM and zero in case of a listing on the Official Market of the LSE; Home which 
equals one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup which equals one 
if the game is a national cup game and zero otherwise, two Year dummies, and fifteen Team 
dummies. The results presented in Table 5.5 confirm that there is a strong positive reaction to a 
victory. In all regressions, GoalDiff and Win are significantly positive at the 0.1% and 1% level, 
respectively. In addition, the PostMarch dummy is not significant in all regressions, which 
implies that the significance of our findings is not caused by the effect of a limited number of 
important games played late in the season. 
To test investors’ reactions to game results in terms of trading volume, we proceed as 
follows. First, we define a measure of abnormal volume (AV) around the event dates:  
AV(1, 2)  =  1
   -2) (t   Volume 1) (t   Volume
  2) (t   Volume   1) (t   Volume
−
= + − =
= + =
 
The numerator of AV(1,2) is the sum of the trading volumes on Monday and Tuesday. The 
denominator is the sum of trading volumes on Thursday and Friday. If AV(1,2) is positive 
(negative), it means that the cumulative trading volume on Monday and Tuesday is larger 
(smaller) than the cumulative trading volume on the preceding Thursday and Friday. However, it Chapter 5  144
 
 Table 5.6: Trading volume reactions to game results 
 
Panel A of this table presents the average abnormal volumes (AAVs) in percentage subsequent to the soccer games. 
The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are presented in the first and second 
rows following the AAVs, respectively. Panel B presents the OLS regression results explaining the abnormal 
volumes following soccer games. The dependent variables are AV(1,2). Win (Loss) is a dummy equal to one if the 
team wins (loses) and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference between the number of goals scored and those 
conceded in a game. PostMarch is equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM 
is equal to one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is equal to one if the game is a home game 
and zero in case of an away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is a national cup game and zero otherwise. The 
p-values of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. All regressions have 475 observations. 
***, 
**, 
* stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Average trading volume reactions 
  N  Reaction to games  N  June-July  Difference 
        
AAV(1,2) 475  121.21%  333 89.4%  31.81% 
p-value of t-test    (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.025) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.013) 
 
Panel B: Regression results 
Dep. Variable :  AV(1,2)  AV(1,2) 
    
Constant 21.08  14.38 
 (0.944)  (0.962) 
GoalDiff 12.82   
 (0.116)   
Win   21.40 
   (0.538) 
Loss   -23.50 
   (0.539) 
PostMarch 10.12  9.91 
 (0.744)  (0.749) 
AIM 169.11  176.86 
 (0.598)  (0.583) 
Home 15.62  19.37 




 (0.075)  (0.067) 
Year9900 -8.56  -7.75 
 (0.820)  (0.838) 
Year0001 15.09  15.08 
 (0.696)  (0.698) 
Team Dummies  Yes  Yes 
    
R
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is possible that abnormal volume only captures a day-of-the-week effect independent of the 
game results. To control for this possibility, we test whether the average AV(1,2) around game 
dates is equal to the average AV(1,2) off season, i.e., in June and July.
14   
The mean AV(1,2) around game dates and for the off-season period (June-July) are given 
in Table 5.6, Panel A. Cumulated trading volumes on Monday and Tuesday are larger than 
cumulated trading volumes on Thursday and Friday, both around game dates and off-season. A 
test of the difference in means also shows that the mean abnormal volume around game dates is 
significantly larger (at the 5% level) than the mean abnormal volume for June and July.  
Taken together, Tables 5.3 to 5.6 show that investors react strongly to information 
contained in game results, and that the reaction to good news is faster than the reaction to bad 
news.  
 
5.5.2  Can Betting Odds Predict Game Results? 
Next, we examine whether the public information released by specialists (namely, by the 
bookmakers’ experts) by means of fixed odds is valuable. In other words, we want to know 
whether betting odds on soccer games have some predictive power. Betting odds are translated 
into probabilities to win or lose as explained in Section 5.4.1. Hence, we estimate the following 
regressions with GoalDiff, Win and Loss as dependent variables for each type of model: 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1ProbWin + βControlVariables + ε                         (5.9) 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1SEW[a] + α2WEL[a] + α3SEL[a] + βControlVariables + ε  (5.10) 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1ProbDiff + βControlVariables + ε                      (5.11) 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1SEW[b] + α2WEL[b] + α3SEL[b] + βControlVariables + ε   (5.12) 
 
The models with GoalDiff as the dependent variable are estimated using an ordered probit 
model (where the constant terms are normalized to zero). Those with Win or Loss as dependent 
variables are estimated using binary probit models.  
Both Panels A and B of Table 5.7 show that there is a very strong relation between the 
game results and the betting odds. The clubs with a high (ex ante) probability to win (ProbWin) 
or a high probability difference (ProbDiff) as well as the teams which are strongly expected to 
win (SEW), do indeed win their games (models 1, 2, 4 and 5) and are able to avoid defeats 
                                                 
14 Trading volume is available for 504 games (out of 916 games in our sample). We treat observations for 
which AV(1,2) is larger than 20 as outliers and remove them from our sample. We retain 475 AV(1,2) observations 
around games dates. For the AV(1,2) in June and July, we have 333 observations.  
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Table 5.7: Quality of odds 
 
This table presents the estimation results of regressions testing the predictive power of betting odds. Win (Loss) is a 
dummy equal to one if the team wins (loses) and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference between the number of 
goals scored and those conceded in a game. The probabilities to win and to lose (in %) are represented by ProbWin 
and ProbLoss. The probability difference of winning and losing games is captured by ProbDiff. We define 4 
dummy variables which indicate whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win 
(WEW), weakly expected to lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on the probability measure 
used, we label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when ProbDiff. is used). PostMarch 
is equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is 
listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an away 
game; Cup is equal to one if the game is a national cup game and zero otherwise. Ordered probit regressions are 
used when the dependent variable is GoalDiff, and probit regressions when Win  and  Loss are the dependent 
variables. The p-values of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. All regressions have 916 observations.
 ***, 
**, 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Quality of odds [a]              Model 1   Model 2  Model 3 
 Ordered  probit  Probit  Probit 
Dep. Variable:  GoalDiff   Win  Loss 
Panel A:       
Constant                  -8.03
***   -6.90
***    8.43
***    6.99
***
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ProbWin      0.04
***       0.04
***  -0.04
***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
SEW[a]        0.58
***      0.66
***       -0.82
***
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
WEL[a]   -0.13    -0.05    0.09 
   (0.226)   (0.727)   (0.507) 
SEL[a]        -0.75
***    -0.52
***      0.78
***
   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000) 
PostMarch -0.09  -0.08 -0.08  -0.08 0.06  0.06 
  (0.303) (0.335)  (0.457) (0.488)  (0.627) (0.643) 
AIM 1.82
* 1.85
*      6.37
***     6.47
***      -7.07
***       -7.17
***
  (0.077) (0.073)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Home -0.12  0.04  -0.11  0.04  0.14  0.02 
  (0.189) (0.669)  (0.334) (0.726)  (0.227) (0.892) 
Cup -0.15  -0.02  -0.06  0.06  0.34  0.25 
  (0.216) (0.861)  (0.728) (0.712)  (0.062) (0.146) 
Year9900 0.08  0.07  0.11  0.11  -0.16  -0.15 
  (0.368) (0.390)  (0.319) (0.333)  (0.187) (0.207) 
Year0001 0.04  0.05  0.13  0.13  -0.04  -0.04 
  (0.641) (0.593)  (0.263) (0.249)  (0.754) (0.753) 
Team  Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
          
Pseudo R
2 0.068 0.059  0.126 0.111  0.158 0.146 
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(Table 5.7 – Continued) 
 
Quality of odds [b]                   Model  4  Model 5       Model 6 
 Ordered  probit  Probit  Probit 
Dep. Variable:  GoalDiff  Win   Loss 
Panel B:    









***   
 (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)     




   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   




   (0.001)    (0.035)    (0.011)   




   (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)   
PostMarch -0.08  -0.07  -0.08  -0.06  0.05  0.03   








 (0.079)  (0.063)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Home -0.11  0.02  -0.10  0.01  0.13  0.01   
 (0.229)  (0.791)  (0.389)  (0.903)  (0.270)  (0.916)   
Cup -0.13  -0.03  -0.03  0.06  0.32  0.24   
 (0.300)  (0.831)  (0.834)  (0.728)  (0.071)  (0.161)   
Year9900 0.08  0.10  0.11  0.13  -0.16  -0.19   
 (0.352)  (0.261)  (0.307)  (0.250)  (0.168)  (0.112)   
Year0001 0.04  0.07  0.13  0.15  -0.04  -0.07   
 (0.624)  (0.403)  (0.251)  (0.175)  (0.722)  (0.538)   
Team Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
              
Pseudo R
2 0.067 0.061  0.125 0.115  0.157  0.148   
 
(models 3 and 6). Likewise, the teams with betting odds strongly predicting a defeat (SEL) are 
indeed frequently defeated (as reflected by the positive coefficients in models 3 and 6) and 
rarely win (as indicated by the negative coefficients in models 1, 2, 4 and 5). All these results are 
highly statistically significant within the 0.1% level.  
Panel A of Table 5.7 also shows that when the betting odds are less clearly predicting a 
defeat (or a victory) as measured by the variable WEL[a] (weakly expected to lose), there is no 
significant relation between WEL[a] and the game results (GoalDiff, Win, Loss). When we 
measure ‘weakly expected to lose’ using the somewhat more refined method of probability 
differences (WEL[b]), we find that teams that are weakly expected lose, do indeed incur more 
defeats and realise fewer victories (Panel B). Still, the magnitude of the parameter coefficients 
as well as their statistical significance are lower than those of teams with betting odds reflecting Chapter 5  148
 
strong predictions of victories or defeats. Thus, a higher degree of uncertainty in the betting odds 
does indeed reflect the higher uncertainty of the team’s performance on the field.  
 We conclude that betting odds are very good predictors of the game outcomes. Our results 
are consistent with the existing literature on betting market efficiency (see Sauer (1998) for a 
review). 
 
5.5.3  Stock Price and Trading Volume Reactions to the Release of Betting Odds 
Given that (i) stock prices react strongly to game results and (ii) betting odds are good 
predictors of these results, one would expect that stock prices react to the announcement of 
betting odds. . If investors are rational and the odds contain new information, the above should 
be fulfilled according to Bayes’ rule. Panel A of Table 5.8 exhibits the CAARs over the two 
days prior to the game (Thursday and Friday). Interestingly, we find neither an economic nor a 
statistically significant price reaction to the posting of betting odds.  
The absence of price reaction does not necessarily mean that the investors ignore the 
information contained in odds. It may be the case that investors have heterogeneous 
interpretations of public information. In that case, abnormal trading volumes could be observed 
(in the absence of price movements), if information is processed by investors (see Kandel and 
Pearson, 1995).  
To capture abnormal trading volumes, we use the following measure:  
AV(-2, -1) =  1
   3) (t   Volume * 2





The numerator of AV(-2,-1) is the sum of the trading volumes on Thursday and Friday. 
The denominator is twice the trading volume on Wednesday. If AV(-2,-1) is positive (negative), 
the average trading volume on Thursday and Friday is larger (smaller) than the trading volume 
on Wednesday. As in the case of the reaction to game results, we control for the possibility of a 
day-of-the-week effect by comparing the AV(-2,-1) after the release of the fixed odds, with the 
off-season AV(-2,-1) (i.e., the abnormal volume in June and July). The results are shown in 
Panel B of Table 5.8. We do not find any evidence that there is a difference between the average 
abnormal volumes after the release of odds during the soccer season and the average abnormal 
trading volume during the off-season. 
We test the stock price reactions to betting odds further by regressing CAR(-2,-1) on the 
predictions from the betting odds (SEW, WEL, SEL) and on our standard control variables, and 
exhibit the results in Table 5.9. We observe that none of the estimated coefficients of these Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market  149
Table 5.8: Market reactions to odds 
 
This table presents the (cumulative) average abnormal returns ((C)AARs) in basis points (in Panel A) and the 
average abnormal volumes (AAVs) in percentage (in Panel B) after the betting odds are posted. We define 4 
dummy variables which indicate whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win 
(WEW), weakly expected to lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on the probability measure 
used, we label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when Probdiff. is used). The p-values 
(in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are presented in the first and second rows following 
the average abnormal returns (volumes). The p-value  of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is presented in the second row 
following the difference in abnormal volumes between on- and off-seasons. 
 
Panel A: Stock price reactions to betting odds 
   N  Reaction to odds [a]  N  Reaction to odds [b] 
      AAR(-2)  AAR(-1) CAAR(-2,-1)    AAR(-2) AAR(-1)  CAAR(-2,-1)
                
SEW  357 5.96 -6.42  -0.47 271  11.38  -6.28  5.09 
p-value of t-test    (0.568)  (0.530)  (0.974)    (0.380)  (0.601)  (0.775) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.635)  (0.666)  (0.849)    (0.973)  (0.903)  (0.877) 
                
WEW 227  -15.91  8.10  -7.82  289  -15.51  2.18  -13.33 
p-value of t-test    (0.218)  (0.522)  (0.650)    (0.157)  (0.849)  (0.368) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.222)  (0.221)  (0.679)    (0.123)  (0.277)  (0.587) 
                
WEL 186  10.71  -12.02  -1.31  241  8.65  -11.40  -2.75 
p-value of t-test    (0.459)  (0.345)  (0.951)    (0.463)  (0.275)  (0.871) 
p-value Wilcoxon    (0.166)  (0.077)  (0.740)    (0.131)  (0.106)  (0.597) 
                
SEL 146  -18.85  14.84  -4.01  115  -25.50  28.66  3.16 
p-value of t-test    (0.287)  (0.478)  (0.888)    (0.227)  (0.265)  (0.929) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.517)  (0.609)  (0.468)     (0.832)  (0.258)  (0.426) 
 
Panel B: Trading volume reactions to betting odds 
  N  Reaction to odds  N  June-July  Difference 
        
AAV(-2,-1) 475  139.08%  324 128.91%  10.17% 
p-value of t-test    (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.540) 
p-value Wilcoxon     (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.451) 
 
expectation dummies is significantly different from zero. This result provides additional 
evidence that investors do not react to betting odds and hence do not update their beliefs.  
We believe that there are two mutually exclusive explanations for this result. The first 
explanation is that betting odds do not contain any new information that has not yet been 
incorporated into the prices. The second explanation is that investors neglect information 
conveyed by betting odds. To find out which of the two explanations prevails, we investigate 
whether or not betting odds have some predictive power for future stock returns. If the odds do 
predict returns, it follows that the market neglects information contained in odds.  
Formally, to test the predictive power of fixed odds on stock returns, we compute the 
CAARs conditional on the strength of the experts’ predictions as reflected in the betting odds Chapter 5  150
 
Table 5.9: Market reactions to odds: regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results explaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) immediately 
after the betting odds are posted. The dependent variables are the CAR(-2,-1). We define 4 dummy variables which 
indicate whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to 
lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on the probability measure used to define the above 
categorization, we label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by [b] (when ProbDiff. is used). 
PostMarch is equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the 
club is listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of 
an away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is a national cup game and zero otherwise. The p-values of the 
estimated coefficients are in parentheses. All regressions have 916 observations. 
 
     Specification [a]  Specification [b] 
         CAR(-2,-1)  CAR(-2,-1) 
    
Constant -14.26  -26.21 
 (0.960)  (0.927) 
SEW 19.42  33.16 
 (0.481)  (0.230) 
WEL 6.14  6.47 
 (0.835)  (0.810) 
SEL -1.99  6.96 
 (0.951)  (0.840) 
PostMarch 14.04  14.50 
 (0.561)  (0.549) 
AIM 18.54  28.11 
 (0.949)  (0.922) 
Home 6.39 4.08 
 (0.792)  (0.868) 
Cup -63.78  -66.50 
 (0.063)  (0.053) 
Year9900 -11.55  -11.02 
 (0.629)  (0.643) 
Year0001 -29.43  -29.43 
 (0.220)  (0.218) 
Team Dummies  Yes  Yes 
    
R
2 0.036 0.034 
F-Statistics 0.99  1.02 
Prob > F  0.482  0.432 
 
(SEL, WEL, WEW, SEW). Table 5.10 provides the results for several time horizons. In particular, 
we observe in Panel A that for teams strongly expected to win under specification [a] (i.e., using  
ProbWin), the three-day abnormal return is 61.37 basis points (significantly positive at the 1% 
level). Using specification [b] (i.e., based on Probdiff), the three-day reaction is somewhat larger 
(64.10 basis points, significantly positive at the 5% level). We also examine a naïve trading 
strategy that extends over 60 trading days: an investor buys a share in a firm that is strongly 
expected to win and sells the share after 3 months regardless of the intermediate news on the 
team’s performance. Panel B of Table 5.10 shows that this naïve trading rule generates between Information Salience and News Absorption by the Stock Market  151
Table 5.10: Predictability of betting odds 
 
This table presents the (cumulative) average abnormal returns ((C)AARs) in basis points subsequent to the soccer 
games, categorized on the basis of the betting odds. We define 4 dummy variables which indicate whether a team is 
strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to lose (WEL) or strongly 
expected to lose (SEL). Depending on the probability measure used, we label the above variables by [a] (when 
ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when Probdiff. is used). The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test are presented in the first and second rows, respectively, following the CAARs. In Panel B, the p-
values of the t-test are computed using Newey-West standard errors of the time-series of average CARs to account 
for serial correlation. The naïve trading rule of Panel B works as follows. Every week, an investor buys a share in 
firms strongly (weakly) expected to win, and sells a share in a team strongly (weakly) expected to win. The investor 
adopts this naïve buy-and-hold strategy for 3 months when he takes the opposite position; he does not take into 
account intermediate news to change his position. Every week, he repeats this strategy. 
 
Panel A: Short-run predictability 
     Specification [a]    Specification [b] 
    N    CAAR(1,2)  CAAR(1,3)   N CAAR(1,2)  CAAR(1,3) 
SEW 357    43.81  61.37  271  50.02  64.10 
p-value of t-test      (0.010)  (0.005)    (0.020)  (0.013) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.010)  (0.005)    (0.031)  (0.040) 
              
WEW 227    -29.76  -47.86  289  -15.86  -19.40 
p-value of t-test      (0.188)  (0.115)    (0.380)  (0.459) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.724)  (0.474)    (0.682)  (0.618) 
              
WEL 186    -25.74  -43.12  241  -24.12  -41.65 
p-value of t-test      (0.381)  (0.207)    (0.326)  (0.144) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.697)  (0.621)    (0.779)  (0.680) 
              
SEL 146    -0.56  -19.79  115  7.46  -13.83 
p-value of t-test      (0.982)  (0.466)    (0.798)  (0.659) 
p-value Wilcoxon       (0.918)  (0.700)     (0.865)  (0.659) 
 
Panel B: A naive long-run trading rule 
     Specification [a]    Specification [b] 
    N    CAAR(1,10)  CAAR(1,60)   N CAAR(1,10) CAAR(1,60) 
SEW 357    126.10  245.11    271  102.69  175.43 
p-value of t-test      (0.009)   (0.045)     (0.092)  (0.056) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.011)  (0.054)    (0.082)  (0.081) 
              
WEW 227    -106.69  -119.49  289  -4.74  97.08 
p-value of t-test      (0.081)  (0.342)    (0.921)  (0.572) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.112)  (0.331)    (0.557)  (0.845) 
              
WEL 186    -19.99  -46.10  241  -55.24  -113.29 
p-value of t-test      (0.704)  (0.604)    (0.181)  (0.223) 
p-value Wilcoxon      (0.849)  (0.440)    (0.275)  (0.216) 
              
SEL 146    32.44  -53.07  115  75.39  -36.80 
p-value of t-test      (0.635)  (0.762)    (0.181)  (0.823) 
p-value Wilcoxon       (0.589)  (0.471)     (0.414)  (0.645) Chapter 5  152
 
175 and 245 basis points (depending on the probability measure Probdiff and  ProbWin, 
respectively) over and above the expected returns.  
   We test the relation between the prediction of the game results (the betting odds) and the 
market price reaction subsequent to the game by running the following OLS regressions (of 
which the variables are defined above): 
CAR(1,j)  = α0 + α1SEW[i] + α2WEL[i] + α3SEL[i] + βControlVariables + ε,     
(i=a,b,  j=2,3 )              (5.15) 
Table 5.11 confirms the results of Table 5.10. Under both specifications [a] and [b], SEW 
is statistically significantly related to the various CARs in the four regressions.  
A puzzling result is the asymmetry of our findings. Given that the betting odds are good 
predictors of both victories and defeats, we find an asymmetry when using the odds to predict 
the stock returns. More specifically, if teams are strongly expected to win, fixed odds predict 
future returns while this is not the case if teams are strongly expected to lose. We believe that is 
due to the fact that our sample is biased in the direction of good teams. In other words, listed 
teams are better than average. This follows from these two observations: first, we have more 
wins (405) than losses (278) in our sample and, second, a listed team has never been relegated to 
a lower league during the three-season period we study.  
The implication for the predictability of odds is the following. Conditionally on not 
winning (i.e., a defeat or a draw is observed), a team strongly expected to win (under 
specification [a]) loses 34.4% of the time and draws 65.6% of the time. Now, conditionally on 
not losing (i.e. a victory or a draw is observed), a team strongly expected to lose wins 47% of 
the time and draws only 53% of the time. Therefore, conditionally on not observing the strongly 
expected outcome, we do not expect symmetric price reactions to victories or losses, given that 
draws do not generate abnormal returns. More precisely, the (positive) expected price reaction if 
a strongly-expected-to-lose team does not lose (i.e., wins or draws), is larger in magnitude than 
the (negative) expected price reaction if a strongly-expected-to-win team does not win (i.e., 
loses or draws). 
To conclude, we believe that the main explanation for the results presented in this section 
is related to the differences of media coverage (salience) of betting odds and game results. Game 
results are available on a wider scale and may even be even hard to avoid: they are presented in 
all daily newspapers, the television news, and in various sports TV programs in prime time. 
Conversely, betting odds are available only on bookmakers’ websites, in specialized sports 
publications or in betting offices. Hence, our results provide evidence that some public 
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Table 5.11: Predictability of betting odds: regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results explaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) subsequent to 
the soccer games. The dependent variables are CAR(1,2) and CAR(1,3). We define 4 dummy variables which 
indicate whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to 
lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on the probability measure used, we label the above 
variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when ProbDiff. is used). PostMarch is equal to one if a game 
is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero 
otherwise; Home is equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup is equal to one 
if the game is a national cup game and zero otherwise. The p-values of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. 
All regressions have 916 observations. 
***, 
**, 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
   Specification [a]  Specification [b] 
 CAR(1,2)  CAR(1,3) CAR(1,2) CAR(1,3) 
       
Constant  -130.58  -214.10 -127.83 -199.99 






 (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.033)  (0.045) 
WEL 1.49  5.67  -7.66  -13.87 
 (0.966)  (0.897)  (0.812)  (0.729) 
SEL  36.04  37.61 28.10 16.98 
 (0.353)  (0.435)  (0.495)  (0.740) 
PostMarch -32.94  -6.59  -32.38  -5.97 
 (0.254)  (0.854)  (0.263)  (0.868) 
AIM  43.60  72.91 49.05 74.56 
 (0.899)  (0.865)  (0.887)  (0.862) 
Home  -9.71  20.93 -5.02 30.04 
 (0.737)  (0.560)  (0.864)  (0.409) 
Cup -3.68  -18.12  -3.73  -16.18 












 (0.043)  (0.025)  (0.039)  (0.020) 
Team  Dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
       
R
2 0.036  0.036 0.034 0.033 
F-Statistics 1.38
* 1.39
* 1.32 1.25 
Prob > F  0.10  0.10  0.14  0.19 
 
5.6.  Robustness of the Findings 
5.6.1  Construction of the Prediction Variables from Betting Odds 
          We also investigate whether our results depend on the way we construct the prediction 
variables SEW, SEL, WEW, and WEL. We find that this is not the case. As already mentioned in 
Section 5.4.1, our results remain qualitatively equivalent when we choose other thresholds for 
ProbWin and ProbDiff to define the dummy variables SEW,  SEL,  WEW, and WEL. For 
Specification [a], the alternative sets of thresholds we tested, are: {0.2, 0.3, 0.4} and {0.3, 0.4, Chapter 5  154
 
0.5}. For Specification [b], our alternatives ({-0.2, 0, 0.2}, {-0.25,0,0.25} and {-0.4,0, 0.4}) also 
yield results similar to the ones presented above.  
 
5.6.2  Team Media Coverage 
We also verify that our results are not driven by a few teams benefiting from large media 
coverage. First, we exclude Manchester United, the most famous (and valuable) soccer team in 
the UK. Our results remain unchanged. Second, in all regressions, we control for team-specific 
effects by using team dummies. Third, we divide the teams into two groups based on media 
coverage. The first group contains eight teams that are more intensely followed by the media: 
Aston Villa, Chelsea Village, Celtic, Leeds United, Manchester United, Newcastle United, 
Sunderland and Tottenham Hotspur. The second group comprises the other eight teams. The 
categorization of the teams in to the two groups with high versus lower media coverage is 
performed using the Factiva database. Factiva, a Dow Jones & Reuters company, is an online 
information provider that gives access to nearly 9,000 news sources, including local, national 
and international newspapers, leading business magazines, trade publications, and newswires. 
To examine the media coverage of the listed soccer clubs, we used club names as key words and 
searched in news headlines in Factiva.com. We restrict the news language to English, and 
exclude republishing news and recurring pricing and market news. We conclude that the market 
reaction to betting odds and games results are not significantly different for the two groups of 
soccer teams. Fourth, media attention may go up near the end of the season when the 
competition become more exciting. We control for this by using a PostMarch dummy in all 
regressions. Our results remain unchanged when using post-February or post-April games as 
end-of-season games. 
 
5.6.3  Econometric Issues (ARMA models and bootstrapping) 
          First, given the low liquidity of some of the stocks we study, the closing price may bounce 
between the bid and ask prices. This may generate a negative autocorrelation in returns and bias 
our statistical inference. However, this effect does not affect our results. After adjusting for 
autocorrelation in stock returns, our results (both the coefficients and the significance levels) are 
unchanged. More specifically, following Brown and Hartzell’s (2001: 366) methodology (i.e., 
verifying the autocorrelation by means of an AR(1) model and a MA(1) model), we check the 
autocorrelations by using the residuals from an ARMA(1,1) model as abnormal returns. The 
ARMA(1,1) model we consider is: 
1 , , 1 , ,
3
3 , − − +
+
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where  t i, ε  is the abnormal returns,  1 , − t i r λ  represents the autoregressive process (AR) in raw 
returns, and  1 , − t i ηε  represents the moving average process (MA) in residuals. Thus, under the 
assumption that stock returns follow a ARMA(1,1) process, the abnormal returns ( t i, ε ) follow a 
random walk. We rerun all the regressions discussed in this paper using the residuals from the 
ARMA(1,1) model as abnormal returns. The results remain largely unchanged and are available 
upon request.   
       Second, as we have only performed OLS regressions, one may argue that if the residuals 
of regressions are not normally distributed, the statistical inference from OLS and t-test may be 
biased. Using an OLS bootstrapping technique to estimate the empirical distribution of the OLS 
estimates in our paper, we find that the results remain unchanged.  
 
5.7. Conclusion   
    It is now widely acknowledged that individuals have limited information processing 
abilities. One of the consequences is that the way information is processed may depend on its 
relative salience, i.e., the media coverage it receives. Professional soccer clubs listed on the 
London Stock Exchange provide a unique way of studying stock price reactions to different 
types of news since two pieces of news are released on a weekly basis from August to June: 
betting odds which incorporate information about the expected future performance, and game 
results which capture information about the realized performance. Furthermore, these two types 
of information differ in their level of salience: game results receive very high media coverage (in 
all daily newspapers, in the television news, and in sports shows on prime time), while betting 
odds are only posted on bookmakers’ websites, in specialized sports magazines and in betting 
shops. 
We have found that markets are very fast in processing good news about game outcomes 
(victories) and somewhat slower in incorporating bad news (defeats) in the share prices. The 
market reactions are strongly statistically significant. In contrast, we do not find a significant 
reaction (neither in share prices nor in trading volumes) to the release of betting odds by 
bookmakers. This is surprising as we show that the betting odds are excellent predictors of the 
game outcomes. Interestingly, due to the absence of a market reaction to the disclosure of 
betting odds, these odds can be used to predict short-run market returns. In particular, if betting 
odds point out that some teams have a very high probability to win their game, the purchase of 
an equity stake in these listed soccer firms can lead to high abnormal returns of more than 61 
basis points over 3 days subsequent to the game outcome and to more than 245 basis points Chapter 5  156
 
using a naïve three-month trading rule. Hence, our results provide further evidence that non-




Myopic Loss Aversion: 




The behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion (MLA), introduced by Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995), predicts that investors with longer evaluation periods find risky investments more 
attractive. Gneezy and Potters (1997) (hereafter GP) tested this hypothesis in laboratory 
experiments. They compared the investment choices of two groups of subjects with different 
evaluation periods: One group of subjects received less information feedback and had less 
flexibility in adjusting their investments than a control group. The results of their study suggest 
that the more frequently returns of investments are evaluated, the lower is the average level of 
investments in risky assets. Such an evaluation period effect is in line with the MLA hypothesis. 
Haigh and List (2005) replicated the study of GP with professional traders and found an even 
stronger effect. Gneezy et al. (2003) demonstrated the effect in a market experiment. 
However, all of these experiments exhibit a common design feature: Both the frequency 
of information feedback and the level of investment flexibility are manipulated simultaneously. 
Our question of interest is to investigate which of the two manipulations is responsible for the 
effect of the evaluation period on investment behavior. In this paper, we report an experimental 
test that allowed us to disentangle the effect of information feedback from that of investment 
flexibility. We first replicated the high frequency information/high investment flexibility 
treatment (labelled H) and the low frequency information/low investment flexibility treatment 
(labelled L) that were used in previous experiments. In addition, we conducted a high frequency 
information/low investment flexibility treatment (labelled M). 
In comparing M and L, the information feedback is varied while the investment 
flexibility is held constant. Whereas in comparing M and H, the investment flexibility is varied 
while the information feedback remains unchanged. We show that the evaluation period effect 
previously reported in the literature can be explained by information feedback alone. 
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6.2.  Test Design and Procedure 
We designed the basic setting of our experiment in close resemblance to GP. Participants 
were confronted with a sequence of nine independent draws of the same gamble. For each draw 
an individual received an endowment of 70 Eurocents, which could be totally or partially 
invested. In the gamble, there was a probability of 1/3 of winning two and a half times the 
amount bet. With probability 2/3 the amount would be lost entirely. Subjects were fully 
informed about the objective probabilities of winning and losing, and about the corresponding 
size of gains and losses. It is important to stress that subjects could not bet any money 
accumulated in previous rounds. Hence, the maximum bet in each round was 70 Eurocents, 
independently of the outcome of the bet in any of the previous rounds. 
First, we replicated the GP treatments H (high frequency information/high flexibility) 
and L (low frequency information/low flexibility) in order to provide a basis for comparison.  
In treatment H the subjects played the gambles one by one. At the beginning of round 
one they had to choose how much of their endowment of 70 Eurocents to bet in the lottery. Then 
they were informed about the realization of the lottery in round one. Only then they could decide 
how much of their new endowment of 70 Eurocents to bet in round two, and so on. Hence, in 
this treatment subjects made nine subsequent betting decisions. 
In treatment L, on the other hand, subjects played the nine rounds in blocks of three. At 
the beginning of round one, subjects had to decide how much of their endowment of 70 
Eurocents to bet in the lotteries of rounds one, two, and three. In addition, these bets were 
restricted to be equal. If a subject bet X in round one, she also bet X in rounds two and three. 
After subjects decided on their bets, they were informed about the realizations for rounds one, 
two, and three at the same time. Subsequently, subjects decided how much to bet in rounds four, 
five, and six, and so on. 
In addition to these two treatments, we conducted a third treatment M. In this treatment, 
we combined the information condition of treatment H with the flexibility condition of treatment 
L. That is, while subjects received information about the outcome of the gamble after each draw, 
they had to commit to a fixed equal amount of investment for three subsequent periods in 
advance in each of the periods one, four, and seven. Hence, relative to treatment H, varying the 
evaluation period meant lowering the flexibility while holding the information frequency 
constant. Treatments L and M had the same investment flexibility, but in L information was 
obtained at a low frequency while in M information was obtained at a high frequency. 
We ran a computerized experiment with a total of twelve sessions in September 2003. 
Participants were recruited via email from the subject pool of the CentER lab at Tilburg Myopic Loss Aversion: Information Feedback vs. Investment Flexibility  159
University comprising 500 people at the time of recruitment. The invitation announced a 
decision-making experiment that would last no longer than 40 min, with a reward that would 
depend on their decisions. The experiment was held in the CentER lab, where students were 
seated in separated compartments. In total, 135 students participated: 47 in treatment M and 44 
in treatments H and L, respectively. The number of subjects per session varied from 4 to 18. 
Upon entering the room, instructions written in English were distributed (see the 
Appendix for instructions). Subjects examined the instructions on average for 7 min, within 
which also questions were answered in private. 
 
6.2.1. Treatment  H 
On the computer screen subjects were asked to enter their bet for the first round. Then, 
the lottery was conducted by means of a ‘wheel’: A random number generator gave out a 
sequence drawn from the numbers 1, 2, and 3 with each number replacing the previous until the 
wheel came to a halt. The subject won in case the last number displayed was a ‘3’. After the 
round, the computer program displayed gains or losses, the profit and the earnings from that 
round and subjects recorded their earnings on their registration forms. This procedure was 
repeated for all nine rounds. 
 
6.2.2. Treatment  L 
On the computer screen subjects were asked to enter their bet for the subsequent three 
rounds. Then, three neighboring wheels would run one after the other on the same computer 
screen. Next, the computer program displayed gains or losses, the profit and earnings jointly for 
the three rounds and subjects recorded their joint results for the previous three rounds on their 
registration forms. Note the important difference: In this treatment subjects recorded one entry 
per three rounds as opposed to separate entries for each round in the H and M treatments. This 
procedure was repeated three times, for a total of nine rounds. 
 
6.2.3. Treatment  M 
On the computer screen subjects were asked to enter their bet for the subsequent three 
rounds. Then, the wheel ran one time. Next, the computer program displayed gains or losses, the 
profit and earnings from that round and subjects recorded their results. Thereafter, the wheel ran 
another time for the second round without subjects entering another bet since the bet had already 
been decided upon in the first round. Again, the computer program displayed the results and 
subjects had to record them separately from the results of the first round. The wheel ran a third Chapter 6  160
time and results were again displayed and recorded separately for the third round. Note that 
although subjects had to fix their bets for three rounds in advance, they were forced to 
experience the gains or losses they had made in each round separately when recording their 
results on paper. This procedure was repeated three times, for a total of nine rounds. 
At the end of each treatment, participants calculated their total earnings. The computer 
program displayed summary statistics so that we could check the calculations to make sure that 
the output of the computer screen matched the amounts entered. Finally, forms were collected. 
Sessions for treatments H and M lasted about 30 min in total, whereas sessions for treatment L 
had a duration of about 20 min. 
 
6.3. Results 
In order to analyze the results, we compared average percentages of endowment bet in 
the gamble per round across the three treatments. The left-hand side of Table 6.1 displays these 
average percentages of the invested amount for each treatment, while the right-hand side 
presents the Mann–Whitney test values for each hypothesis tested. The p-values of each test are 
enclosed in brackets. 
To begin with, we replicated the test of GP by comparing average investments in the 
high frequency information/high flexibility treatment (H) and in the low frequency 
information/low flexibility treatment (L). Like GP, we found average investments in treatment L 
to be significantly higher than average investments in treatment H for all three blocks.  
Thereafter, we tested the null hypothesis that flexibility in adjustment does not affect 
investments against the alternative hypothesis that H≠M by comparing average investments in 
the high frequency information/high flexibility treatment (H) with average investments in the 
high frequency information/low flexibility treatment (M). We could not reject this null 
hypothesis in any of the three blocks at 10% significance levels. 
Finally, we tested the null hypothesis that information feedback does not affect 
investments against the alternative hypothesis that Mp L by comparing average investments in 
the low frequency information/low flexibility treatment (L) with average investments in the high 
frequency information/low flexibility treatment (M). We found that subjects with low 
investment flexibility but more frequent information on their financial situation invested 
significantly less than subjects who faced the same flexibility but received less information. This 
effect was particularly strong in the first two blocks, and was less strong but still significant in 
the third block at the 11% level. Both sets of tests clearly indicate that the evaluation period 
effect found in the literature can entirely be attributed to information feedback rather than to  Myopic Loss Aversion: Information Feedback vs. Investment Flexibility  161
Table 6.1: Average percentage of endowment bet 





     H vs. L  H vs. M  M vs. L 
Rounds 1–3  56.6 (32.4)  63.9 (30.7)  50.9 (31.8)  -2.13 [0.034]  -1.26 [0.208]  -3.42 [0.001] 
Rounds 4–6  60.6 (36.0)  72.7 (28.3)  62.8 (29.7)  -2.51 [0.012]  -0.04 [0.965]  -2.86 [0.004] 
Rounds 7–9  61.4 (38.7)  76.6 (29.1)  70.6 (32.3)  -2.77 [0.006]  -1.54 [0.123]  -1.59 [0.111] 
Rounds 1–9  59.5 (35.8)  71.1 (29.8)  61.4 (32.2)  -4.36 [0.000]  -0.50 [0.615]  -4.47 [0.000] 
Note: a: #obs= 44, 44, 47 for treatments H, L and M. Standard deviations in parentheses. b: two-tailed significance 
levels ( p-values in brackets). 
 
investment flexibility. 
It is interesting to report related evidence in Langer and Weber (2006), who find average 
investments in their corresponding M treatment to be significantly higher than those of their H 
treatment. While our results suggest that average investments in our M treatment are not 
significantly different from eight those of our H treatment when aggregated over the nine rounds 
of play, we find in the last three rounds an effect in line with that reported by Langer and Weber. 
In particular, average investments in rounds 7–9 are slightly higher in treatment M than in 
treatment H (p =0.123). Equally interesting in the Langer and Weber study is their finding that 
average investments in M and L treatments are not statistically different (i.e. no information 
feedback effect), which is in sharp contrast to our results. These differences might be due to the 
‘multiplicative approach’ used by Langer and Weber, where investors receive an initial 
endowment that is transferred from period to period and can be reinvested together with its 
returns. In contrast, our design is chosen in consistency with the existing ‘additive-based’ 
literature on an evaluation period effect, in which individuals invest a certain amount out of a 
constant income flow, and gains and losses in a period do not affect the endowments in 
subsequent periods. Although this gives us the advantage of making our comparisons with the 
existing literature possible, a more careful comparison of the additive and multiplicative 
approaches is an interesting area of future research. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we reported the results of an alternative experimental test for the presence 
of an evaluation period effect. This test allowed us to disentangle the effect of information 
feedback from that of flexibility on the investments in risky assets. We confirm the works by 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) and others building on it, and furthermore find that experimentally 
induced myopia in combination with loss aversion remained to affect investment behavior 
systematically even when flexibility in adjusting investment was no longer varied. MLA is 
driven by information feedback. Hence the latter should be the variable of interest for 
researchers and actors in financial markets alike. Chapter 6  162
Appendix to Chapter 6:   Instructions to the experiment 
 
Introduction 
Welcome to our experiment. The experiment will last about 40 minutes. The instructions for the 
experiment are simple, and if you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. 
All the money you earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you, privately and in cash, immediately after 
the experiment and a post-experimental questionnaire. Please study the instructions carefully on your 
own. If you have any questions please raise your hand. We answer them privately. Please do not talk or 
communicate with the other participants during the experiment.  
 
Instructions  
The experiment consists of 9 successive rounds. In each round you will start with an amount of 70 
Eurocents (EC). You must decide which part of this amount (between 0 cents and 70 EC) you wish to bet 
in the following lottery.  
You have a chance of 2/3 (67%) to lose the amount you bet and a chance of 1/3 (33%) to win two and a 
half times the amount you bet.  
You will make all your decisions on the computer. Nevertheless, you are requested to record your choice 
on your Registration Table, which you find at the back of the instruction sheet. Suppose that you decide 
to bet an amount of X cents (0 < X < 70 EC) in the lottery. Then you must fill in the amount X in the 
column headed Your Choice in the row with the number of the present round. [Additionally for both, M 
and L: Please note that you fix your choice for the next three rounds. Thus, if you decide to bet an 
amount X in the lottery for round 1, then you also bet the same amount X in the lottery for rounds 2 and 
3. Therefore, three consecutive rounds are joined together on the Registration Table.] 
 
Whether you win or lose in the lottery partly depends on a lucky round number drawn randomly by the 
computer. In any round you win in the lottery if your lucky round number is equal to 3; otherwise you 
lose (numbers 1 or 2). Since there are 3 possible numbers, and with one of which you win, the chance of 
winning in the lottery is 1/3 (33%) and the chance of losing is 2/3 (67%). Hence, your earnings in the 
lottery are determined as follows. 
If you have decided to put an amount of X cents in the lottery, then your earnings in the lottery for the 
round are equal to -X if the lucky round number is 1 or 2 (you lose the amount bet) and equal to +2.5X if 
the lucky round number is equal to 3 (you win two and a half times the amount bet).  
A number wheel will randomly draw several numbers. The last number [instead for L: set of numbers] 
drawn will be the lucky round number for that period. You need to record in the column Gains/Losses 
whether the Lucky Round Number provides a gain or a loss. Also you need to record your Profit from the 
lottery and your Earnings for the round in the row of the corresponding round. Your earnings from the 
round are equal to 70 EC (your starting amount) [instead for L: 210 EC (three times your starting amount 
of 70 EC)] plus your profit from the lottery. 
 
After that, you are requested to record your choice for the next round [instead for both, M and L: three 
rounds (4 – 6). For each of the three rounds you]. Again you start with an amount of 70 EC, a part of 
which you can bet in the lottery. The same procedure as described above determines your earnings for 
this round. It is noted that for each round a new lucky round number is drawn. All subsequent rounds will 
also proceed in the same manner. After the last round has been completed, your earnings in all rounds 
will be totaled.  
 
At the end of the experiment we will come by to check your table of records and approve the total 
earnings which you can then collect at the cashier at the exit of the laboratory. Myopic Loss Aversion: Information Feedback vs. Investment Flexibility  163
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
 
Ethiek, Beleggen, en Beleggersgedrag 
 
 
Deze thesis bevat twee delen. Het eerste deel, met de titel Ethisch beleggen, onderzoekt de 
geldstromen en risico-rendementseigenschappen van ethische beleggingsfondsen overall ter 
wereld. Het tweede deel, met de titel Beleggersgedrag, onderzoekt of het beleggersgedrag wordt 
beïnvloed door de frequentie waarmee specifieke bedrijfsinformatie onder het voetlicht wordt 
gezet.  
Tijdens het voorbije decennium, kende sociaal verantwoord beleggen (SVB) een 
explosieve groei in de hele wereld. Kenmerkend voor sociaal verantwoorde beleggingsfondsen 
is dat ze zowel financiële als sociaal/ethische doelstellingen nastreven. Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een 
extensief overzicht van de literatuur over SVB. In hoofdstuk 3, bestuderen we de geldstromen in 
en out sociale beleggingsfondsen overall ter wereld. We concluderen dat ethisch belegd geld 
rendementen uit het verleden najaagt. In tegenstelling tot de beleggers in conventionele fondsen, 
geven sociaal verantwoorde beleggers minder om de kosten van de fondsen. Sociaal 
verantwoorde beleggingsfondsen die veel geldstromen ontvangen zullen het slechter doen in de 
toekomst, wat overeenstemt met de theorie van de afnemende schaalopbrengsten in de 
beleggingsfondsindustrie. Bovendien, fondsen die meer sociaal verantwoorde belegggingsfilters 
om hun investeringsuniversum af te lijnen, halen hogere rendementen dan fondsen met weinig 
filters. Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert de economische effecten van ethisch beleggen door zich te 
concentreren op sociaal verantwoorde beleggingsfondsen. Het blijkt dat beleggers een prijs 
betalen voor ethisch beleggen aangezien sociaal verantwoorde fondsen in heel wat Europese en 
Aziatische landen minder goed presteren (5% minder goed op jaarbasis) dan de conventionele 
portfolio’s uit die landen. Bovendien hebben de beleggingsfilters die sociaal verantwoorde 
fondsen toepassen een negatieve impact op de rendementen die gecorrigeerd zijn voor risico en 
op de loadings van de risicofactoren.  
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de reactie van beleggers op informatie onderzocht door gebruik te 
maken van een experiment. Via de notering van een aantal voetbalclubs aan de Londense 
aandelen beurs (LSE) wordt op een unieke wijze de aandelenprijs reactie onderzocht op Sammenvatting  166
verschillende nieuwsfeiten. Voor elke onderneming worden wekelijks twee stukjes informatie 
bekend gemaakt: het eerste betreft het verwachte wedstrijdresultaat van de experts via de 
zogenaamde kansen om te winnen (‘odds’), het tweede betreft de uitslag van de wedstrijd zelf. 
Het blijkt dat aandelenmarkten sterk reageren op de werkelijke uitslag van de wedstrijd, waarbij 
er significante abnormale rendementen en handelsvolumes worden gegenereerd. Echter er treedt 
nauwelijks een marktreactie op na de aankondiging van de ‘odds’ terwijl deze ‘odds’ zeer goede 
voorspellers zijn van het wedstrijdresultaat. Blijkbaar bezitten deze ‘odds’ niet-geprijsde 
informatie die kan worden gebruikt om korte termijn aandelenrendementen te voorspellen. Dit 
resultaat versterkt bestaande theorieën waarin wordt gesuggereerd dat er een onderreactie is op 
nieuwsfeiten vanwege een te beperkte aandacht van beleggers.  In hoofdstuk 6 wordt via een 
kunstmatig experiment het beleggingsgedrag van een myopic (bijziende) verlies-averse belegger 
onderzocht waarbij wordt geprobeerd het effect van informatieterugkoppeling te scheiden van 
beleggingsflexibiliteit. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat het voldoende is om slechts de frequentie 
waarop informatie wordt verkregen te variëren om beleggingsgedrag te observeren dat in lijn is 
met de hypothese van de Myopic Loss Aversion.        
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